중국의 전쟁수행 전략에 관한 연구 : 모택동 전략을 중심으로 = China's war strategy : Mao Zedong's military strategy and his ways to conduct war

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This dissertation analyzes Mao Zedong's strategy, focusing on the cases of the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Civil War, newborn China's strategy toward the United States, and the Korean War. The main research question is, "if Mao's strategy was revolutionary war strategy which had formed during the Chinese Revolutionary War, how was it applied and conducted in international war?" This research examines changes and continuities emerged from Mao's strategy from Chinese Revolutionary War to the Korean War, and applies and tests Clausewitz's war theory through Mao's ways of waging wars.
Why should we study Mao's strategy even in this modern era carrying out high-technological wars with mass destructive weapons? First, as one of a few states which fought modern warfare against China, it is necessary to elicit and cumulate some lessons from Chinese ways to conduct wars. Second, without proper comprehension of Mao's strategy, it would be impossible to understand Chinese war strategy. Third, even though there have been active historical studies of Mao's strategy especially after the opening of secret materials from Russia and China, they have failed to give any satisfactory interpretation of newborn China's war strategy.
It seems that there have been some misunderstandings of Mao's strategy, which results in distortions of Chinese strategy. Because of Mao's preeminence in the Chinese Revolution, most scholars have identified his strategy with revolutionary war strategy, overlooking the aspects of international war strategy. One critical problem resulted from this tendency is that even Mao's strategy in the post-Civil War era is considered not as a "state-to-state" strategy, but a "class-to-class" strategy. For examples, Chen Jian argues that China's entry into the Korean War was determined not just by security concerns but by "revolutionary nationalism." Zhang Shuguang also argues that Mao's "man-over-weapon doctrine"-or "military romanticism"-was the main motive for Chinese intervention, and China's aim was to achieve perfect victory over the US forces. These views tend to overemphasize Mao's revolutionary aspiration whereas ignoring infant China's military weakness. As Michael Hunt indicates, because their arguments are based on the Chinese Communist Party's public documents, they are inclined to overestimate Mao's ideological motivation and political propaganda.
In fact, revolutionary war and International war is different in their purposes and ways of conducting war. Revolutionary war is a kind of "absolute war" which aims to exterminate the enemy through a perfect destruction. International war tends to be a "limited war" which ends in peace treaty through negotiation and compromise with an enemy. In a word, the former pursues "revolution," the latter "security." Likewise, international war strategy should be distinguished from revolutionary war strategy, and Mao's strategy in the post-Civil War era should be dealt with as an international war strategy.
This research uses case-oriented method, thus aims for "understanding" and "interpretations" of the cases, not "finding" a new theory. However, as Harry Eckstein argues, case study can utilize established theory not just to apply and interpret the cases, but also to testify, modify, and refine the theory. This research introduces Clausewitz's theory that "the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive," and suggests a hypothesis that "avoiding a decisiveness in war is a necessary condition for successful defense." The hypothesis would function as a clue to understand and interpret Mao's strategy, while at the same time it would be testified through the cases of Mao Zedong's wars. By proving its validity, the hypothesis would be able to provide logical basis to correct some misunderstandings and distortions found in recent studies.
My main arguments can be summarized as follows.
First, the cases of Mao Zedong's wars show that any defensive war cannot be successful without avoidance of decisiveness in the early phase of war, accordingly confirming the validity of the hypothesis with the logic as follows: The defender should avoid decisive battle pursued by the stronger enemy; Denied any decisiveness, then, the enemy's attack fails to get decisive results while his forces become overstretched and dispersed, thus giving the defender opportunities for tactical surprise attacks; When balance of forces changes to be favorable after the culminating point of attack, the defender can pursue relentless counterattack and annihilate the enemy's main forces. Through the cases of the Chiang Kai-seck's encirclement campaigns, the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, Mao could get every victories with this strategic concepts. On the contrary, the cases of Wang Ming's strategy in the fifth encirclement campaign, Chiang Kai-seck's strategy in Shanghai front, Chiang's strategy in the last phase of the Civil War, and Mao's offensive strategy in the Korean War showed that pursuing decisiveness against stronger enemy would result in only decisive defeat.
Second, Mao's strategy should be considered, due to the first argument, as realistic and reasonable one which is based on the calculation of balance of forces, Most scholars have paid attention to Mao's "man-over-weapon" doctrine, and insisted that China could challenge against stronger enemy even under unfavorable situation, Of course, it is true that Mao emphasized "one against ten" principle in the strategic level. However, he followed more faithfully to the rule "ten against one" in real wars and battles. It means that even though Mao stressed the importance of will to fight, he would never dare to fight when he thought his forces were weaker. His strategic concept, "active defense," which means "strategic defense, tactical offense," shows that Mao was not a "romantic" strategist, which risks rashly against strong army with the "man-over-weapons" doctrine.
Third, Mao's strategy changed from revolutionary war strategy to international war strategy when PRC was founded. It is true Mao pursued an absolute aim to overthrow his enemies during the Chinese Revolutionary War. However, when new China was born and had to face with the preponderant US military threat, he could not pursue such an aim any more. Because of Chinese military weaknesses, Mao had to try to avoid any military confrontation with the United States. For instances, in the first Indo-China War, China's aim was only to secure buffer zone in the northern area of Vietnam, not entire revolution of the peninsula. In the Koran War, China's aim was to "recover" the buffer state, not total victory over the U.S. forces. Even though Mao aspired to Asian revolution beyond China's national security, his revolutionary passion had to be limited by the security demand for China. Also, my first two argument scan support the third argument.
In sum, this research suggests a new viewpoint on Mao Zedong's strategy, which is not "special" but "normal." Alastair lain Johnston's argument that in Chinese history there has been no strategic culture peculiar to the "Central Kingdom" supports my view. Also, Michael Handel's argument that there is no such thing as "Eastern" strategy or "Western" strategy advocates my conclusion. In terms of a strategy in general, Mao Zedong showed how to win against the stronger enemy by avoiding decisiveness, and proved the Clausewitz's theory that the defense is stronger form of war than offense even in this modern era.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Abstract = i
• 목차 = v
• 제1장 서론 = 1
• 제1절 문제 제기 = 1
• 제2절 접근 방법: 군사전략적 접근의 유용성 = 13
• 제3절 연구 방법 및 구성 = 20
• 제2장 군사전략: 방어와 결전의 회피 = 26
• 제1절 전략의 패러독스: 방어의 강함 = 26
• 제2절 결정적인 전투와 결전의 회피 = 39
• 제3절 군사전략적 방어형태 = 46
• 제4절 가설과 분석 틀 = 55
• 제3장 모택동의 혁명전쟁 수행전략 = 58
• 제1절 클라우제비츠, 레닌 그리고 모택동 = 58
• 제2절 모택동 전략의 형성과정 = 63
• 제3절 모택동의 혁명전쟁 수행전략 = 74
• 제4절 중국혁명전쟁(1937- 1949): 항일전쟁과 중국내전 = 81
• 제4장 모택동의 국제전 수행전략 = 107
• 제1절 신생 중국의 위협인식 = 107
• 제2절 본토방어전략: 중소군사동맹 = 120
• 제3절 대 아시아 전략: 공산혁명전략 = 136
• 제5장 한국전쟁 개입결정과 모택동의 군사전략 = 162
• 제1절 김일성의 남침계획 동의 = 162
• 제2절 한국전쟁 발발과 중국의 대응 = 170
• 제3절 한국전쟁 개입 결정과정 분석 = 187
• 제4절 모택동의 군사전략 구상 = 203
• 제6장 중국의 한국전쟁 수행전략 = 210
• 제1절 전략적 기습의 성공 (제1차 전역) = 210
• 제2절 결정적인 승리의 실패 (제2차 전역) = 224
• 제3절 전쟁목표의 확대와 무리한 결전의 추구 (제3-5차 전역) = 242
• 제4절 모택동의 한국전쟁 수행전략 분석 = 258
• 제7장 결론 = 263
• 참고 문헌 = 272