The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Part Ⅰ. Introduction = 1
• 1. Forword = 1
• 2. The Research Agenda = 6
• 3. What is a Nuclear Weapons Program = 8
• (1) The Fission Bomb = 8
• (2) The Thermo-Nuclear Bomb = 9
• (3) Making a Bomb ; 2 Routes : = 11
• (i) The Uranium 235 Route = 13
• (ii) The Pu-239 Route = 15
• Part Ⅱ The Background = 18
• 1. The Origins and Motives Behind the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program = 18
• 2. The Embryonic Program = 23
• 3. A South Korean Nuclear Weapons Program = 25
• 4. The International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) = 28
• 5. North Korea Joins the IAEA = 30
• 6. Further Developments = 31
• 7. North Korea Joins the Non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.) = 32
• Part Ⅲ North Korea and the N.P.T. = 35
• 1. The N.P.T. = 35
• (1) General = 35
• (2) What it Says = 36
• 2. Weaknesses of the N.P.T. = 38
• (1) Article Ⅰ = 38
• (2) Article Ⅱ = 38
• (3) Article Ⅲ and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (C.T.B.T.) = 40
• 3. Other Weaknesses = 42
• (1) Article Ⅲ = 42
• (2) The Lack of Initial Support = 43
• (3) Article X = 44
• (4) The N.P.T.'s Fundamental Flaw = 44
• 4. The IAEA Safeguards = 46
• 5. Delays in Concluding the IAEA Safeguards Agreement = 48
• 6. The Joint Declaration = 53
• 7. North Korea and the IAEA = 57
• 8. Withdrawal from the N.P.T. = 64
• 9. Suspension of Withdrawal = 68
• 10. Sanctions = 72
• Part Ⅳ The Agreed Framework and Beyond = 79
• 1. The Agreed Framework = 79
• 2. Criticisms of the Agreed Framework = 82
• 3. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization[KEDO] = 86
• (1) The Supply Agreement = 87
• (2) Oil Deliveries = 88
• (3) Spent Fuel Canning = 89
• (4) The IAEA = 90
• 4. Challenges th the Implementation of the Agreed Framework = 92
• (1) Financing KEDO = 92
• (2) The North Korean Missile Program = 93
• (3) Kumchangri = 95
• (4) A.U.S. Attack? = 97
• (5) The Legality of a Pre-emptive Strike = 98
• Part Ⅴ Conclusion = 105
• Conclusion = 105