고르바쵸프下에서의 蘇聯-北韓關係에 關한 硏究 : 하나의 戰略的 視角

국문 초록 (Abstract)

1985年 미하일·고르바초프가 蘇聯 共産黨 서기장에 就任한 以來로 1986年 2月의 第27次 全黨大會 및 同年 7月 28日의 「블라디보톡 演說」에서는 지금까지 蘇聯이 보여주고 있던 유럽優先主義原則을 배제하고 아시아, 특히 東北아시아를 우선적으로 택하고 있다. 즉 地域的 戰略(regional-strategy)의 일환으로 이루어져 왔던 蘇聯의 對東北아시아政策이 世界戰略(global-strategy)으로 변하게 된 것이다. 이는 볼셰비키(Bolshevik) 革命 議ㄽ 나타난 蘇聯의 유럽國家的 性格을 아시아·太平洋 國家的 性格으로 탈바꿈하려는 것으로, 특히 韓國, 日本, 中共에게는 커다란 意味를 주고 있다.
이처럼 蘇聯이 東北아시아를 重視하게 된 原因은 다가오는 太平洋 時代를 대비함은 물론 가장 近接되어 있는 敵, 즉 中共을 견제하고, 이 지역에서의 美國의 勢力을 弱化시키고자 하는 것이라 思慮된다.
이러한 입장에서 볼 때, 蘇聯에 있어 가장 큰 變數로 떠오른 것은 北韓과 그 指導者인 金日成이다.
北韓은 蘇聯이 太平洋으로 進出함에 있어 그 橋頭堡가 됨과 동시에 베트남의 캄란만과 다낭을 연결하는 중요한 軍事基地로써 中共의 아시아에서 膨脹을 막을 수 있을 뿐만 아니라, 나아가서는 필리핀에 進駐해 있는 美軍의 活動에도 적지 않은 영향을 주는 一擧三得의 效果를 노릴 수 있기 때문이다.
한편 北韓은 1948年 政權樹立 議ㄽ 中·蘇關係에서 均衡維持政策을 성공적으로 운영하여 왔다. 그러나 지난 몇 년동안 中共과 蘇聯은 經濟改革을 단행하기 시작했으나 北韓은 계속된 重工業 優先政策으로 經濟的 破綻狀態에 이르렀다. 때문에 現代的 軍事武器를 필요로 하는 北韓으로서는 이를 蘇聯에서 支援을 받아야만 했다.
이러한 兩國의 相互必要性은 1984年 金日成의 모스크바 訪門 議ㄽ 자연스럽게 밀착하게 되었다. 또한 이는 蘇聯으로 하여금 北韓의 後繼者 繼承問題를 默認하게 하였고, 北韓으로서는 계속된 蘇聯의 武器 援助로 軍事優位政策을 固守하게 하고 있다.
이와 같은 東北아시아에서의 蘇聯-北韓 密着의 궁극적 目的은 軍事的·經濟的 强大國(regional-power)으로 成長되어 있는 中共을 포위.弧立시키는 것이며, 더 나아가서는 美國에 대해 蘇聯式 「中共 카드」를 제시하고자 하는 것이다. 그러나 中·蘇의 平和的 關係開善은 現實的으로 어려우며, 따라서 蘇聯은 계속 北韓에 軍事的·政治的 協力關係를 유지해 나가고자 할 것이다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Along with the incredible economic development of East Asia has come an extraordinary increase in the size and sophistication of military armament that supports the now successful and then not so successful communism containment policy of the United States and the expansion of communist power in the region. No where is this more evident than in Korea.
Yet within this dramatic economic and military expansion there remains a politically dramatic variable of extreme significance, North Korea and its enigmatic leader, Kim Il-sung. With two major powers competing for her interests, North Korea has held both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union just far enough at bay to gain significant economic, military and political assistance while escaping domination by either. But North Korea's economy is rapidly becoming destitute. and her military is failing to keep pace with the rapidly improving military of the Republic of Korea.
Under the leadership of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, there has been a significant increase in the attention the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has given to Asia in general and Northeast Asia in particular. No where does this seem more evident than in the newly warmed relations between Moscow and Pyongyang.
Closer Moscow-Pyongyang relations has great potential for causing formal regional alliances. A close working relationship between the military and political arms of the Soviet Union and North Korea would increase the Soviet capability of power projection in the area and facilitate Soviet designs to counter U.S. influence in the region. Efforts by the United States and nations allied to the United States would then necessarily reflect joint responses to the increase of Soviet power on their doorsteps. This would necessitate increased funding for military equipment and manpower necessary to counter the increased threat as perceived by those nations.
The Soviet Union sees China as the definitive threat in Asia. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union seems to support this through political and military maneuvers in Afghanistan, India. Indochina, Mongolia and now warmer relations with Pyongyang. Apparent usage of North Korean warm water port facilities by Soviet ships and aircraft overflights of North Korean airspace reflect a more substantial relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang that serves Soviet intentions to encircle China, thus relatively neutralizing Beijing. Expanded use of these North Korean facilities, paid for through the sale or outright grant of sophisticated Soviet military equipment to North Korea, enables the Soviet naval and air forces to more effectively interdict Asian sea-lanes-of-communication and counter U.S. military strength in the region.
Subsequently, Moscow has been courting Pyongyang with weapons for the purpose of obtaining military forward-basing rights, with the primary objective of completing geostrategic encirclement of China and projecting psycho-political pressure on other Northeast Asian nations and regional powers.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS = 0
• 國文要約(Korean Abstract) = 0
• CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION = 1
• A. GENERAL = 1
• 1. Apparent Increase in Moscow-Pyongyang Relations = 3
• 2. Provocation or Normal Extension of Foreign Policy? = 5
• 3. Gorbachev-Relative Implications = 7
• B. PUROSE OF STUDY = 8
• 1. Substantiality of Stated Trend = 8
• 2. Implications for Regional Power Balance = 9
• C. REVIEW OF LITERATURE = 10
• D. RESEARCH DESIGN = 11
• 1. Basic Concepts = 11
• 2. Application to Study = 12
• CHAPTER TWO : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND = 14
• A. EARLY MOSCOW-PYONGYANG RELATIONS : Major Power Conferences Prior to The Establishment of The Two Korean Republics = 14
• 1. Teheran Conference = 14
• 2. Yalta Conference = 14
• 3. Potsdam Conference = 15
• 4. Japanese Surrender Treaty = 15
• 5. Moscow Conference = 15
• 6. Joint U.S.-Soviet Commissions on Governing Korea = 16
• B. PHASES OF MOSCOW-PYONGYANG RELATIONS = 17
• CHAPTER THREE : COUNTER PERSPECTIVES TO MOSCOW-PYONGYANG THAW = 22
• CHAPTER FOUR : SOVIET UNION PERSPECTIVE = 28
• A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CURRENT SOVIET POLICY = 28
• B. SOVIET OBJECTIVES = 36
• 1. Soviet Objectives in East Asia = 37
• 2. Soviet Objectives in North Korea = 48
• CHAPTER FIVE : NORTH KOREA PERSPECTIVE = 53
• CHAPTER SIX : CONCLUSIONS = 59
• FOOTNOTES = 65
• BIBLIOGRAPHY = 71
• ABSTRACT = 81