Strategic Variation in North Korean Nuclear Policy across Three Leadership Eras: Hedging, Sprinting and Assured Retaliation

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

One question about North Korea's nuclear trajectory is puzzling: why did it shift its nuclear strategy three times over the course of the three Kim regimes? Puzzle one: Why did North Korea alter its strategy despite a remarkable continuity in the structure of the international security environment? To be sure, the combination of U. S. extended deterrence and the U. S.-ROK alliance has presented a fairly constant external threat throughout the entire period. Puzzle two: Why can no dominant theory in the proliferation literature account for strategic choice under all three leaders? I rule out realist theories rooted in deterrence logic, domestic- political theories, and constructivist theories centered on regime identity. My explanation builds on Vipin Narang's synthetic analytic framework, drawing together the proliferation- strategy typology from Seeking the Bomb （20 22） and the assured-retaliation posture concept from Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era （2014）. The core idea in this framework is that variation in strategic combinations mirrors variation in leader sensitivity to feasibility/ desirability tradeoffs: that is, what their nuclear program does and what it does for them politically.
I demonstrate how this framework applies to North Korea in three time periods. Hedging provided diplomatic optionality under Kim Il- Sung when technical feasibility was low and Soviet backing couldn't be counted on. Sprinting bought North Korea coercive leverage when they were weakest: during the systemic crisis of post-collapse Russia in the 1990s and the famine of the Arduous March. When North Korea stood to lose the least from international isolation （because they were already failing as an economy）, they had the most to gain from coercive nuclear diplomacy. Assured retaliation has been bought by North Korea under Kim Jong-un through obtaining thermonuclear warfighting capabilities and being trusted with them （constitutionally, via The Law on Nuclear Forces Policy, passed in 2022）, making nuclear weapons integral to North Korea's national brand.
This argument leads to two contributions to our understanding of the DPRK's nuclear strategy. First, it illustrates that substantial nuclear strategy variation can occur within a regime, not just between countries. Second, leader sequencing matters for strategic outcomes; it is not just a background condition. That the material and ideational drivers of proliferation both operate within the same stage of decision-making suggests they are best understood as interacting components of the desirability calculation, not competing explanations. This leads to a sobering policy conclusion: complete denuclearization has become increasingly unlikely under present conditions. This does not mean arms-control negotiations are hopeless, just that their scope will be restricted to buying down risks where possible: capping stockpiles, restricting deployments, and maintaining open lines of communication when crises occur.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• List of Tables iii
• Abstract iv
• 1. Introduction 1
• 1.1 Purpose of Study 2
• 1.2 Argument and Contributions of the Study 3
• 1.3 Scope, Case Selection, and Structure of the Study 4
• 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Gaps 6
• 2.1 Existing Theoretical Frameworks and Their Limits 6
• 2.2 Three Empirical Anomalies: The Case for a Strategic Approach 7
• 3. Theory: Narang’s Analytical Framework 9
• 3.1 Strategy over Motivation 9
• 3.2 Hedging, Sprinting, and Assured Retaliation: Definitions 12
• 3.3 Feasibility and Desirability as Selection Criteria 13
• 3.4 Operationalization and Observable Indicators 13
• 3.5 Why North Korea Fits: Personalist Authoritarian Conditions 15
• 3.6 Case Selection and Data Sources 18
• 4. Empirical Analysis: Three Strategic Phases 23
• 4.1 Kim Il-sung — Hedging under Alliance Volatility 23
• 4.1.1 External Conditions and Alliance Structure 24
• 4.1.2 Strategic Choices and Observable Indicators 25
• 4.2 Kim Jong-il — Sprinting amid Systemic Collapse 27
• 4.2.1 External Conditions and Systemic Collapse 29
• 4.2.2 Strategic Choices and Observable Indicators 31
• 4.3 Kim Jong-un — Assured Retaliation 33
• 4.3.1 External Conditions and Technological Threshold 34
• 4.3.2 Strategic Choices and Observable Indicators 39
• 5. Explaining Strategic Transition: Mechanisms 41
• 5.1 Alliance Reliability and Great-Power Positioning 41
• 5.2 Domestic Legitimation and Elite-Stability Calculus 43
• 5.3 Identity Narratives and Symbolic Payoffs 44
• 5.4 Technological Advancement and Capability Thresholds 46
• 6. Conclusion 49
• 6.1 Summary of Findings 49
• 6.2 Theoretical Implications for Proliferation Research 51
• 6.3 Policy Implications for Arms Control with DPRK 52
• 6.4 Limitations and Future Research 55
• References 59