Middle powers use economic diplomacy to pursue foreign policy objectives in the context of intense geopolitical competition and the rising prominence of economic concerns in foreign policy. While economic diplomacy and middle-power behavior have attra...
Middle powers use economic diplomacy to pursue foreign policy objectives in the context of intense geopolitical competition and the rising prominence of economic concerns in foreign policy. While economic diplomacy and middle-power behavior have attracted scholarly attention, there is limited comparative insight into how middle powers operationalize economic diplomacy across different national contexts. This dissertation examines how domestic and external context, decision-making process, and the tensions between politics and economics, domestic and external pressures, and public and non-public actors explain variations in the effectiveness and coherence of middle-power economic diplomacy. Through a comparative case study of Mexico, South Korea, and Türkiye, the research identifies three distinct models: a constrained model in Mexico, shaped by U.S. dependence and institutional fragmentation; a coordinated model in South Korea, built on strong institutional capacity and stable political and economic foundations, though occasionally constrained by the competing pressures of U.S.–China rivalry; and an assertive but uneven model in Türkiye, driven by regional power ambitions but limited by domestic and regional instability. The findings demonstrate that structural factors, including political stability, economic performance, external dependence, and regional positioning, condition the capacity and orientation of economic diplomacy in each case, shaping the selection and deployment of tools and theaters. The study contributes to the scholarship at the intersection of economic diplomacy and middle-power behavior through the application of a structured comparative framework, showing that economic diplomacy is not only a set of economic instruments, but also a defining feature of how middle powers pursue foreign policy goals under structural constraints.