This study analyzes Ukraine’s counter-drone defense during the Russia-Ukraine War through the lens of security service co-production, and examines its implications for South Korea's security environment. The research departs from the recognition tha...
This study analyzes Ukraine’s counter-drone defense during the Russia-Ukraine War through the lens of security service co-production, and examines its implications for South Korea's security environment. The research departs from the recognition that low-altitude small drones in modern hybrid warfare have emerged as asymmetric threats that exploit the detection blind spots of conventional high-altitude radar-centric air defense systems, and that effective responses can no longer be achieved through military-exclusive means alone.
The analysis employs the concepts of co-production, polycentricity, and transaction costs, conducting a qualitative case study centered on three mechanisms comprising Ukraine’s counter-drone response system: citizen-based detection(ePPO), public infrastructure-based acoustic detection network(Sky Fortress), and field-centered decentralized mobile air defense groups(MADG).
The findings demonstrate that Ukraine’s counter-drone response can be understood not as mere wartime mobilization, but as a case of security service co-production under a polycentric structure in which citizens, public infrastructure, and the military each assume distinct functional roles. In particular, real-name verification, AI-based information refinement, and cross-validation through an integrated platform served as key mechanisms for controlling the transaction costs generated by multi-actor participation. However, the study also identifies limitations in that this model constitutes a form of “context-dependent co-production” shaped by the extreme conditions of full-scale war, and does not fully satisfy all theoretical requirements of co-production.
In examining applicability to South Korea, the study argues that the direct transplantation of the Ukrainian model is constrained by peacetime conditions, ultra-high-density urban environments, and strong legal regulations. Four directions are proposed: limited citizen participation through the Safe-Didimdol app and smart-city infrastructure, strengthened self-protection of critical national facilities, construction of a digital information-fusion platform, and legislative reform. On this basis, the study contends that “institution-led co-production”—designing a framework of legislation, platforms, and education prior to crisis so that co-production can activate immediately in emergencies—constitutes the most appropriate model for South Korea.
This study holds scholarly significance in reframing low-altitude drone defense not as a question of weapons systems, but as one of security service co-production and national resilience, and in extending co-production theory into the domain of security governance through the contrast between context-dependent and institution-led co-production.