The modernization of China's nuclear arsenal has raised questions about the trajectory of its nuclear strategy. Existing explanations often link Chinese nuclear developments with either material changes in the United States’ forces or broader great ...
The modernization of China's nuclear arsenal has raised questions about the trajectory of its nuclear strategy. Existing explanations often link Chinese nuclear developments with either material changes in the United States’ forces or broader great power ambitions for a more offensive nuclear posture. This thesis argues instead that China's nuclear modernization is primarily in response to the perceived weakening of its confidence in assured retaliation, caused by the interaction between the United States’ counterforce first-strike and missile defense capabilities which, respectively, undermine survivability and penetrability of China's nuclear force. These developments alter Chinese perceptions of the offense-defense balance by increasing the challenges and costs linked with maintaining a credible second-strike capability under evolving conditions. Drawing on offense-defense balance theory, Chinese nuclear developments are understood as a compensatory response aimed at restoring the confidence in assured retaliation, rather than signaling a shift towards offensive strategies. The findings also suggest that the interplay of nuclear and conventional capabilities can shape great power competition between the United States and China, potentially deepening the security dilemma.