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    THE UNCERTAINTY OF DETERRENCE: US COUNTERFORCE, MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPANSION UNDER XI JINPING

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T17546310

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    The modernization of China's nuclear arsenal has raised questions about the trajectory of its nuclear strategy. Existing explanations often link Chinese nuclear developments with either material changes in the United States’ forces or broader great power ambitions for a more offensive nuclear posture. This thesis argues instead that China's nuclear modernization is primarily in response to the perceived weakening of its confidence in assured retaliation, caused by the interaction between the United States’ counterforce first-strike and missile defense capabilities which, respectively, undermine survivability and penetrability of China's nuclear force. These developments alter Chinese perceptions of the offense-defense balance by increasing the challenges and costs linked with maintaining a credible second-strike capability under evolving conditions. Drawing on offense-defense balance theory, Chinese nuclear developments are understood as a compensatory response aimed at restoring the confidence in assured retaliation, rather than signaling a shift towards offensive strategies. The findings also suggest that the interplay of nuclear and conventional capabilities can shape great power competition between the United States and China, potentially deepening the security dilemma.
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    The modernization of China's nuclear arsenal has raised questions about the trajectory of its nuclear strategy. Existing explanations often link Chinese nuclear developments with either material changes in the United States’ forces or broader great ...

    The modernization of China's nuclear arsenal has raised questions about the trajectory of its nuclear strategy. Existing explanations often link Chinese nuclear developments with either material changes in the United States’ forces or broader great power ambitions for a more offensive nuclear posture. This thesis argues instead that China's nuclear modernization is primarily in response to the perceived weakening of its confidence in assured retaliation, caused by the interaction between the United States’ counterforce first-strike and missile defense capabilities which, respectively, undermine survivability and penetrability of China's nuclear force. These developments alter Chinese perceptions of the offense-defense balance by increasing the challenges and costs linked with maintaining a credible second-strike capability under evolving conditions. Drawing on offense-defense balance theory, Chinese nuclear developments are understood as a compensatory response aimed at restoring the confidence in assured retaliation, rather than signaling a shift towards offensive strategies. The findings also suggest that the interplay of nuclear and conventional capabilities can shape great power competition between the United States and China, potentially deepening the security dilemma.

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    목차 (Table of Contents)

    • Table of Contents 5
    • Abstract 6
    • 1. Introduction 7
    • 2. Literature Review 14
    • 3. Theoretical Framework 27
    • Table of Contents 5
    • Abstract 6
    • 1. Introduction 7
    • 2. Literature Review 14
    • 3. Theoretical Framework 27
    • 3.1 Methodology 32
    • 4. United States’ Counterforce and Missile Defense Developments 34
    • 4.1 Counterforce First-Strike Capabilities 35
    • 4.2 Missile Defense 38
    • 4.3 Homeland Missile Defense 40
    • Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 40
    • 4.4 Regional Missile Defense 42
    • Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 42
    • Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 43
    • Patriot. 44
    • 4.5 Effect on the Offense-Defense Balance 47
    • 5. Chinese Perceptions of the United States’ Capabilities 55
    • 5.1 Chinese Perceptions of the United States’ Intent 57
    • 5.2 Chinese Perceptions of the United States’ Capabilities 66
    • 5.3 Impact of China's Perceptions on the Offense-Defense Balance 73
    • 6. China's Nuclear Expansion 78
    • 6.1 Survivability 80
    • 6.2 Penetrability 84
    • 7. Conclusion 93
    • Glossary 98
    • Bibliography 100
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