Coordinating Supply Chains Under Multi- Source Uncertainty: : Contract Mechanisms, Dynamic Cost Structures, and Price Optimization Models = 다중 원천 불확실성하에서의 공급망 조정: 계약 메커니즘, 동적 비용 구조와 가격 최적화 모델

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Modern supply chains are increasingly exposed to multiple sources of uncertainty, including dynamic production costs, supply disruptions, and exchange rate volatility in cross-border operations. These uncertainties complicate decentralized decision-making and often exacerbate inefficiencies such as double marginalization and misaligned investment incentives. Motivated by these challenges, this dissertation develops a unified analytical framework to investigate how contract mechanisms can restore coordination and improve supply chain efficiency under multi-source uncertainty. The dissertation first examines a two-echelon supply chain with learning-curve-driven cost dynamics, where cumulative production reduces marginal costs over time. Using a Stackelberg game framework, the analysis shows that learning effects fundamentally alter optimal pricing and ordering decisions and intensify coordination failures under decentralized control. Appropriate revenue-sharing contracts are shown to effectively internalize learning-induced externalities and achieve coordination. The framework is then extended to incorporate supply disruption risk and backup sourcing. By introducing an unreliable primary supplier and a reliable backup supplier, the study investigates how operational risk interacts with learning effects. The results demonstrate that buyback and option-based contracts can balance long-term efficiency gains from learning with short-term reliability concerns, although coordination feasibility depends critically on disruption risk levels. Next, the dissertation considers financial uncertainty in a cross-border green supply chain by explicitly modeling exchange rate volatility and green investment decisions. The analysis shows that exchange rate risk distorts pricing and investment incentives, particularly when environmental investments generate spillover benefits. Flexible exchange rate contracts combined with revenue-sharing mechanisms are shown to mitigate financial risk while promoting sustainable investment and improving overall supply chain performance. Finally, the dissertation compares option contracts and revenue-sharing contracts under demand information updating, highlighting their relative strengths and robustness across different uncertainty environments. Overall, this dissertation contributes to the supply chain coordination literature by providing an integrated perspective on contract design under dynamic costs, operational disruptions, and financial uncertainty, and offers managerial insights for designing resilient and sustainable supply chain contracts. Keywords: supply chain coordination, learning curve, backup sourcing, sustainable supply chain, demand updating

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CHAPTER 1. Introduction 1
• 1.1 Research Background 1
• 1.2 Problem Definition and Research Objective 2
• 1.3 Literature Review 5
• 1.3.1 Supply Chain Coordination Mechanisms 5
• 1.3.2 Learning Curve Effect Application 6
• 1.3.3 Green Supply Chain (GSC) Pricing Strategies 8
• 1.4 Summary of Research Gaps 10
• 1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 10
• CHAPTER 2. Theoretical Foundation and Modelling 12
• 2.1 Unified Notation 12
• 2.2 Stackelberg Framework 13
• 2.3 Optimization and Contract Design Principles 15
• 2.4 Methodological Framework 17
• CHAPTER 3. Supply Chain Coordination with the Learning Curve 19
• 3.1 Introduction and Background 19
• 3.2 Literature Review 20
• 3.3 Model Description 23
• 3.4 Contract Design Principles 24
• 3.5 Numerical Analysis 27
• 3.6 Conclusion and Management Insights 31
• CHAPTER 4. Supply Chain Coordination with Learning Curve and Backup Supplier 32
• 4.1 Introduction and Background 32
• 4.2 Literature Review 33
• 4.3 Model Description 35
• 4.4 System Description 36
• 4.4.1 The centralized model (CXX) 37
• 4.4.2 The Centralized Model with Learning Curve (CLX) 38
• 4.4.3 The Centralized Model with Backup Supplier and LC Effect (CLB) 39
• 4.4.4 The Decentralized Model with only the LC Effect (DLX) 41
• 4.4.5 The Decentralized Model with only Backup Supplier (DXB) 41
• 4.4.6 The Decentralized Model with Backup Supplier and LC Effect (DLB) 42
• 4.5 Numerical Analysis 45
• 4.6 Conclusion and Management Insights 53
• CHAPTER 5. Green Supply Chain Pricing Strategies with Flexible Exchange Rate 55
• 5.1 Introduction and Background 55
• 5.2 Literature Review 56
• 5.3 Model Description 57
• 5.4 Supply Chain Structure and Assumptions 57
• 5.5 Profit Expectation 58
• 5.5.1 Centralized System 59
• 5.5.2 Flexible Exchange Rate (FX) Contract 59
• 5.5.3 Revenue sharing with Flexible Exchange Rate (RX) Contract 61
• 5.6 Sensitivity Analysis and Policy Implications 64
• 5.7 Conclusion and Management Insights 71
• CHAPTER 6. Comparative Analysis of Option and Revenue Sharing Contracts 73
• 6.1 Introduction and Background 73
• 6.2 Literature Review 74
• 6.3 Model Comparison 75
• 6.4 Contract Coordination under Demand Information Updating 78
• 6.5 Numerical Analysis 81
• 6.6 Conclusion and Management Insights 84
• CHAPTER 7. Conclusion and Future Research 86
• Appendix A 92
• Appendix B 95
• References 99