The employment relationship in the platform economy is characterized by algorithmic dispatching, real-time rule adjustments, and elastic responsibility boundaries, subjecting workers to higher uncertainty and institutional friction in scenarios such a...
The employment relationship in the platform economy is characterized by algorithmic dispatching, real-time rule adjustments, and elastic responsibility boundaries, subjecting workers to higher uncertainty and institutional friction in scenarios such as penalty deductions, accident conflicts, and appeal communications. Centered on the core question of "how union intervention occurs, functions, and is constrained in platform labor governance," this study takes the ride-hailing industry as an empirical field to construct a multi-dimensional evaluation framework for the effects of union intervention, and identifies key influencing factors and their weight structures through cross-platform comparisons. Initially, utilizing a combination of purposive and snowball sampling strategies, the study conducted valid interviews with 25 key stakeholders, including ride-hailing drivers and union practitioners, establishing an analytical linkage between labor practices and institutional intervention from a multi-actor perspective.
Based on the qualitative materials, the study decomposes the union intervention process into a continuous chain of "Risk Triggering—Intervention Execution—Result Perception—Structural Limitation." Accordingly, an evaluation system comprising four dimensions and 13 indicators was developed to delineate how risk events enter the union
mechanism, the modalities of union intervention, how workers perceive outcome changes, and how institutional and resource boundaries shape the practical efficacy of such interventions. In the quantitative phase, a 7-point Likert scale was employed to measure each indicator. The questionnaire design referenced existing user experience scales and underwent multiple rounds of readability testing; a pre-survey of 50 individuals was conducted prior to the formal investigation, yielding Cronbach’s α values all above 0.8, indicating robust internal consistency. The sample size was estimated using Cochran’s formula (minimum required sample size of 384), and 500 valid samples were ultimately obtained to ensure statistical power and the generalizability of the results.
To mitigate the bias introduced by a single weighting logic, this study introduces a combined subjective and objective weighting approach. First, 10 experts from the union system, academic research institutions, and related fields were invited to participate in the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to enhance the professionalism and explanatory validity of the weight structure. Second, based on the platform sample data, the CRITIC method was utilized to calculate objective weights, capturing both the "variability" and "conflict" of the indicators through standard deviation and correlation structures, thereby identifying factors with genuine discriminatory power amidst real-world platform differences. Third, an equal-weight linear fusion strategy was adopted to integrate the normalized AHP and CRITIC results, forming a final comprehensive weight to support cross-platform comparisons and the screening of key factors.
The findings indicate that union intervention does not occur homogeneously across different platforms; rather, its effects exhibit significant conditionality and unevenness. On one hand, apparent threshold differences exist among platforms in the "risk triggering and information accessibility" phase, which determines whether rights issues can be identified and advanced into the subsequent processing chain. On the other hand, the intervention modalities themselves demonstrate a "coexistence of local advantages and relative shortcomings" across different platforms, suggesting that the executability and conversion efficiency of the same type of service are inconsistent under varying platform conditions.
From the perspective of the comprehensive weight structure, "Individual Case Assistance and Dispute Coordination (B2)" and "Resource and Authority Limitations (D1)" constitute two key fulcrums explaining the variances in union intervention. The former, serving as the core path of intervention practice, directly determines whether the union can transform risk events into actionable handling processes; the latter reflects the boundaries of institutional space and the structure of rights and responsibilities, determining whether the intervention can further spill over into verifiable outcome improvements. Within the comprehensive weight results of this study, B2 and D1 occupy the highest weight interval (B2=0.1207; D1=0.1183) and, together with indicators such as "Rights Impairment and Risk Event Triggering (A1)" and "Improvement of Rights Processing Results (C1)," form a composite explanatory framework of "Risk Triggering—Process Mediation—Structural Constraint."
This finding advances the understanding of "union effectiveness" from "what the intervention does" to "in what institutional space the intervention operates." It suggests that the evaluation of union intervention should not be confined to service lists or mechanism designs, but should rather integrate platform responsiveness, resource authority, and workers' foundational trust into a unified analytical structure. This holistic integration helps explain why interventions of similar formats yield significantly disparate outcomes across different platforms.
The innovations of this study are primarily twofold. Theoretically, by adopting a continuous chain perspective, it decomposes union intervention into a testable, multi-dimensional indicator system, illuminating the intrinsic coupling relationship of "Risk Triggering—Intervention Execution—Result Conversion—Structural Limitation" in platform labor governance. Methodologically, through the comparison and fusion of AHP and CRITIC, it juxtaposes "normative importance" (the expected functions emphasized by expert judgment) with "empirical importance" (the actual divergences exposed by platform differences). By leveraging the tension between the two, the study identifies key contradictions and governance bottlenecks, thereby offering a replicable comprehensive evaluation paradigm for complex governance processes.
The study's conclusions offer valuable implications for union governance practices: Unions should leverage their individual case assistance capabilities as a pivot to strengthen cross-departmental coordination and institutional referral channels. Concurrently, by enhancing information accessibility and platform response mechanisms, and expanding the boundaries of resources and authority, unions can improve the verifiability of intervention outcomes and foster long-term trust accumulation among workers. Ultimately, this approach will enhance the stability and equity of intervention effects across diverse platform contexts.