One of the core objectives of corporate insolvency law is to provide swift and effective relief for companies in financial distress. In recent years, a series of severe global crises has intensified scholarly and policy debates on hybrid restructuring...
One of the core objectives of corporate insolvency law is to provide swift and effective relief for companies in financial distress. In recent years, a series of severe global crises has intensified scholarly and policy debates on hybrid restructuring procedures as alternatives to traditional formal insolvency proceedings. Hybrid restructuring procedures combine elements of formal and informal restructuring mechanisms and may be understood as procedures in which judicial involvement is necessary within a corporate restructuring framework, but remains more limited than in conventional insolvency proceedings. Recent legislative developments across jurisdictions commonly emphasize four key features of such procedures: (i) speed, (ii) autonomy, (iii) efficiency, and (iv) fairness. Examining these trends provides important and useful insights for future reform of the Korean insolvency system.
Chapter 2 presents a general theoretical analysis. It first traces the historical development of corporate insolvency law in order to explain the background and context in which hybrid restructuring procedures emerged, and then examines their concept, theoretical foundations, typologies, and critiques. In light of the purposes of the system, the burdens imposed on parties and courts, and comparative legal considerations, this chapter argues that, among the various models of hybrid restructuring, a mixed and pre-engagement model, in which formal and informal elements are combined and courts intervene in a limited manner at the negotiation and confirmation stages, is the most desirable. The theoretical background of hybrid restructuring procedures may be understood as a response by both contract law and insolvency law to overcome their respective limitations. Within hybrid restructuring, courts play a dual role: as facilitators, intervening at the early stage (stay of individual enforcement), the intermediate stage (selective restructuring, protection of new financing, appointment of a restructuring facilitator, maintenance or termination of contractual relationships), and the final stage (confirmation and cramdown); and as supervisors, preventing abuse inherent in debtor-in-possession restructurings and ensuring that the legitimate interests of existing stakeholders are not unjustifiably infringed.
Chapter 3 surveys the current landscape and legislative models of hybrid restructuring procedures. Although Korean rehabilitation proceedings possess several advantages, they remain limited as early restructuring tools. Moreover, various domestic hybrid restructuring mechanisms—such as the P-Plan, ARS, and joint management procedures—have not fully compensated for these limitations and are used only infrequently, despite their respective merits. This chapter therefore analyzes the structure, characteristics, usage, and evaluation of major foreign hybrid restructuring procedures introduced relatively recently, including the U.S. pre-packaged Chapter 11, the U.K. Restructuring Plan, the Dutch WHOA, the German StaRUG, the French accelerated safeguard (PSA), and Japan’s Early Business Recovery Procedure, and derives implications for improving Korea’s hybrid restructuring framework.
Chapter 4 conducts a stage-by-stage analysis of key issues arising in hybrid restructuring procedures. Specifically, it examines: (i) at the pre-commencement stage, early warning systems, diversification of crisis-recognition actors, and incentives and sanctions for early filing; (ii) at the commencement stage, standing to file, eligibility requirements, and stays of individual enforcement; (iii) at the post-commencement and pre-confirmation stage, the restructuring actor (debtor-in-possession), the scope of restructuring (selective restructuring and class formation), and the facilitation and limitation of negotiations (appointment of a restructuring facilitator, protection of new financing, and the continuation or termination of contractual relationships); and (iv) at the confirmation stage, adoption requirements for restructuring plans, confirmation standards (the best interests of creditors test), and class-based cramdown requirements (fairness standards). For each stage, major foreign legislative models are examined comparatively, and the results are contrasted with Korea’s rehabilitation procedure under the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act to identify directions for reform.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this dissertation proposes that an ideal hybrid restructuring procedure should be designed as a modular process that enables companies before reaching insolvency to selectively adjust their debts through negotiation.