Recently, there have been attempts to establish computer games as a new form of fiction in the field of analytic aesthetics. If computer games are a new kind of fiction, what distinguishes computer games from traditional fiction such as painting, film...
Recently, there have been attempts to establish computer games as a new form of fiction in the field of analytic aesthetics. If computer games are a new kind of fiction, what distinguishes computer games from traditional fiction such as painting, film, and theater is precisely the fact that their appreciators determine the fictional content of the work. Unlike appreciators of traditional fiction who merely contemplate the given fictional content, the appreciators of computer games—the ‘player’—influences the fictional world in computer games through input devices such as controllers, keyboards, and mice. Analytic aestheticians who have attended to this distinctive aspect of computer games argue that computer games should be understood as ‘interactive fiction,’ distinct from traditional fiction.
However, when we say that players influence the fictional world in computer games, this does not mean they do so freely. For example, a player of New Super Mario Bros. can control the protagonist Mario to defeat the villain Bowser and rescue Princess Peach. However she cannot make a peace treaty with Bowser to get Princess Peach back.
From this, we can derive two aspects. First, the appreciators of interactive fiction—the player—determines what will happen in the fictional world. Second, what happens in the fictional world is constrained by interactive fiction. The task of reconciling these two competing aspects is important because it is closely connected to elucidate ‘playing (or play)’—the appreciation of interactive fiction. The first aspect is what distinguishes ‘playing’ from the appreciation of traditional fiction. The second aspect is what distinguishes ‘playing’ from the creation of new fiction.
Therefore, I formulate the reconciliation of these competing aspects as a ‘problem of constrained generativity’ that any promising theory of interactive fiction should address. By examining whether existing discussions successfully address it, I aim to philosophically elucidate ‘playing,’ a unique way of appreciating interactive fiction. Finally, this paper categorize various interactive fiction theories that adopt the methodology of Anglo-American analytic aesthetics into Waltonian and non-Waltonian approaches. I critically examine each approach in light of the ‘problem of constrained generativity.’ I then introduce and defend the ‘Dual-Work Theory’ as the theory that appropriately address this problem.
Chapter Ⅰ lays the groundwork for the main discussion. First, I clarify the meanings of interactivity and fiction, the two core concepts constituting ‘interactive fiction’. I also examine whether fictionality and interactivity are compatible properties. After this, I define interactive fiction. Furthermore, I formulate a problem of constrained generativity, which any promising theory of interactive fiction must successfully address.
Next, Chapter Ⅱ critically examines a Waltonian approach to interactive fiction, hereafter Waltonism. Waltonism is a theoretical approach that comprehensively applies Kendall Walton's make-believe theory to interactive fiction. Waltonism focuses on the similarity between computer games and children's make-believe games, a key metaphor in Walton's theory of fiction. I also examine the Waltonist arguments of Grant Tavinor and Aaron Meskin & Jon Robson. They compare children's make-believe games with computer games, arguing that just as children generate fictional truths in their imaginary games, computer game players also generate fictional truths in computer games. I consider potential objections that might be raised to these claims. I demonstrate that Waltonism, which focuses on explaining the aspect in which players generate fictional truths, fails to properly explain an important aspect about interactive fiction, the ‘constraint thesis’—players can generate fictional truths only under constraints preset by game designers.
Chapter Ⅲ examines a non-Waltonian approach to interactive fiction,' hereafter non-Waltonism. In this chapter, I categorize the theories of Marissa D. Willis and Alex Fisher as non-Waltonism and closely analyze their arguments. They either do not explain computer games through Walton's theory of fiction, or they take a critical view of the theory. Non-Waltonism devides the fictional truths of computer games into two categories: content that players can generate and content that they cannot, and presents criteria for this classification. However, non-Waltonism merely categorize various fictional truths of interactive fiction. It fails to explain the key aspect of interactive fiction—namely, how players can generate fictional truth. For this reason, I show that non-Waltonism fails to appropriately account for an important aspect about interactive fiction, the ‘generativity thesis’—the appreciators of interactive fiction determines what will happen in the fictional world of the work.
Chapter Ⅳ introduces Karim Nader's 'Dual-Work Theory' as a position that reconcile the concerns of Waltonism and non-Waltonism. Unlike the two approaches discussed above, the Dual-Work Theory focuses on the properties possessed by the fictional truths of interactive fiction that enable players to generate fictional truths. The Dual-Work Theory explains fictional truths that players can generate as ‘forced-choice incompleteness,’ which refers to the fictional content of the computer game itself presented to players in the form of choices and possibilities. The Dual-Work Theory provides a more refined explanation of ‘playing’ in interactive fiction by describing ‘playing’ as an act in which players generate fictional truths by resolving forced-choice incompleteness. The Dual-Work Theory explains two things. First, players generate the fictional truths of particular playing by resolving forced-choice incompleteness. Second, the range of the fictional truths that players can generate is already constrained by the work itself in the form of forced-choice incompleteness. Given these points, I argue that the Dual-Work Theory is the most promising approach that properly address the problem of constrained generativity regarding interactive fiction.
Although the Dual-Work Theory almost successfully addresses the problem of constrained generativity of interactive fiction in existing discussions, I would like to point out its limitation. The theory fails to clearly distinguish between two types of fictional truths: fictional truths carried by interactive fiction and fictional truths about the appreciators generated through playing interactive fiction. Given this limitation, I complement Nader's Dual-Work Theory with Walton's distinction between the work world and the make-believe game world. I then explore what explanatory advantages the complementary view provides regarding the appreciation of interactive fiction.