Recently, U.S. protectionism has rapidly expanded its scope beyond traditional tariffs to include structural regulations such as supply chain internalization and strengthened Local Content Requirements. This study analyzes the direct impact of these p...
Recently, U.S. protectionism has rapidly expanded its scope beyond traditional tariffs to include structural regulations such as supply chain internalization and strengthened Local Content Requirements. This study analyzes the direct impact of these protectionist policy instruments on the economic performance (local sales) of U.S. affiliates of foreign MNEs and identifies how Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), a core internal resource, moderates these shocks. To this end, protectionist policies were categorized into Price-based instruments (e.g., Trade War, Sec 232) and Regulatory and Structural instruments (e.g., USMCA, Buy American). An empirical analysis was conducted using industry-level panel data from 2007 to 2022 provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), focusing on key target industries such as automobiles, steel, and semiconductors, along with comparative groups.
The analysis yielded distinct results depending on the nature of the policy instruments. First, regarding direct effects, Regulatory instruments exerted a significant negative (-) influence on local sales. This proves that measures like the 'Buy American' act serve as substantial entry barriers beyond mere cost increases. Conversely, Price-based instruments did not show a statistically significant main effect on average firm sales, suggesting that the negative shock of tariffs may have been neutralized through price pass-through mechanisms or synchronization with domestic prices.
Second, the verification of the moderating effect of FDI revealed contrasting outcomes. Under Regulatory measures, FDI demonstrated a strong positive (+) moderating effect. A high level of FDI functioned as a strategic "License to Operate," effectively defending against sales decline and securing market access, whereas firms with low FDI suffered significant losses. However, under Price-based measures, the moderating mechanism of FDI was not statistically significant. This implies a clear limitation: even with local production bases, firms could not fully offset the generalized cost-push pressure caused by tariffs on raw materials and intermediate goods.
This study clarifies that within a protectionist environment, regulation represents an "eligibility" issue that must be overcome through preemptive investment (FDI), whereas tariffs constitute a "cost" issue that is difficult to resolve solely with internal corporate resources. Based on these findings, this paper suggests essential localization strategies for firms to survive regulatory barriers, and emphasizes the need for the government to strengthen diplomatic negotiation power to alleviate the structural cost burdens of tariffs that individual firms cannot solve on their own.