This study examines how Bolivia’s universal non-contributory pension, Renta Dignidad, is associated with household welfare and whether these associations vary depending on the gender of the recipient, household authority structures, and Indigenous s...
This study examines how Bolivia’s universal non-contributory pension, Renta Dignidad, is associated with household welfare and whether these associations vary depending on the gender of the recipient, household authority structures, and Indigenous status. Using household-level data from the 2015-2016 Bolivian Income and Expenditure Survey (EPF), the dissertation analyzes the heterogeneous welfare conversion within households on category-specific welfare expenditures treated in the literature as welfare-enhancing. The theoretical argument includes two complementary lenses. First, the Life-Cycle Hypothesis and Permanent Income Hypothesis motivate treating Renta Dignidad as a predictable, policy-guaranteed income stream that relaxes liquidity constraints and raises expected resources, with implications for consumption levels and smoothing. Second, intra-household allocation theory implies that additional income does not translate equally into welfare because household members may have different preferences and bargaining power. Thus, the identity of the recipient and the household’s authority structure condition how resources are allocated across welfare-enhancing goods. Building on this framework, the dissertation treats recipient gender and headship as indicators of differential bargaining position and formal authority and treats Indigenous status as a marker of compounded constraints that can shape the effective ability to convert cash transfers into welfare-enhancing spending.
Empirically, the study estimates OLS models that relate Renta Dignidad receipt to each expenditure category while controlling for household demographic composition, head characteristics, labor income, urban residence, and department fixed effects. It tests heterogeneity using recipient gender and headship interactions and evaluates compounded heterogeneity through a fully hierarchical interaction design that allows the Renta Dignidad-expenditure relationship to vary jointly across recipient type, headship, and indigeneity.
The analysis demonstrates that universal coverage does not lead to uniform welfare conversion among recipient households. Female-recipient households exhibit stronger predicted increases in welfare-enhancing categories, especially health and other non-durables, aligning with collective-model implications. These effects are amplified when female recipients are also household heads, suggesting the existence of an authority channel, while acknowledging headship as an imperfect proxy for intra-household power. Differences in indigeneity are most coherently interpreted as constraints-driven heterogeneity rather than preference divergence. The triple interactions reveal non-additive heterogeneity where recipient identity, authority structures, and constraint environments jointly condition household spending responses. The findings imply that evaluating universal pensions solely by coverage and average effects is incomplete. Policy design should focus on recipient control over resources and to complementary interventions that reduce access barriers where conversion capacity can be weakened.