This study critically reflects on the phenomenon in which the concept of student agency emphasized by the OECD Education 2030 has been virtually equated throughout domestic educational discourse with learners’ autonomy or self-regulatory capabilitie...
This study critically reflects on the phenomenon in which the concept of student agency emphasized by the OECD Education 2030 has been virtually equated throughout domestic educational discourse with learners’ autonomy or self-regulatory capabilities, and raises the necessity of reconstructing agency as an ontological approach through philosophical inquiry rather than as a psychological or sociological concept. Unlike previous studies that have understood agency as a product of learning outcomes or as an internal capacity of an individual, this thesis emphasizes that agency is not a fixed attribute within the subject but a phenomenon existentially manifested within relational interactions and temporal flows formed between the agent and the world, environment, and others.
This understanding is achieved through the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and the perspective of enactivism among various contemporary streams of embodied cognition. While phenomenology conceives the human subject as a “living body (Leib)” that precedes cognition and mediates the relation between cognition and the world, understanding action as a mode of knowing and being, enactivism reinterprets the concept of agency within the entanglement between body and world by defining cognition and action as inseparable autopoietic activities. This perspective shows that the manifestation of agency is not merely a matter of volitional choice but a process achieved through practical enactment within the ecological and existential conditions in which the agent-subject is situated—namely, within temporal contexts and relational fields.
This thesis applies the axes of temporality and relationality presented in Archer’s critical realism and Emirbayer and Mische’s reconceptualization of agency to educational contexts, and, by referring to Biesta and Tedder’s ecological approach, explores how student agency represents a dynamic process exhibiting changes through relationality with others. The changes in agency revealed through case analysis can be explained not as differences in individual competence, but as transformations in the manner by which learners relate to the world to which they belong—that is, changes in their modes of being-with-the-world. This suggests that agency should not be understood as the exercise of individual internal subjectivity but, from an ontological perspective, as something manifested between body and world (others).
The significance of this study is as follows. First, it attempts a relational understanding of agency by departing from interpretations centered on individual internal abilities, capabilities, or attributes such as subjectivity and autonomy, and instead, through a phenomenological approach, grasping student agency as a fundamental entanglement between the agent and the world (including others). Second, through the enactive perspective centered on the naturalization of cognition and bodily action, it provides a foundation for reinterpreting the concept of agency across educational elements such as teachers, students, and learning spaces.
In conclusion, this study proposes that agency should no longer be understood as something that the student agent ‘has,’ but rather as something the student agent ‘does,’ and furthermore, from the perspective of a mode of ‘being’ or ‘becoming,’ as something to be understood relationally and dynamically. Agency is phenomenologically achieved within the entanglement with the world through temporal and relational contexts and bodily action. Such a perspective implies the possibility of an existential and ontological approach to understanding agency as a broad form of learning in which student agents exercise initiative within the contexts of their lives and construct meaningful personal worlds.