This study analyzes the rent-seeking behavior of private investors in Korea’s public-private partnership (PPP) projects by applying the concept of policy rents, focusing on the Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) scheme, which constitutes a form of gove...
This study analyzes the rent-seeking behavior of private investors in Korea’s public-private partnership (PPP) projects by applying the concept of policy rents, focusing on the Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) scheme, which constitutes a form of government subsidy support. The study aims to examine whether the MRG scheme induces rent-seeking behavior by private investors, whether such behavior is inherently permitted by the institutional characteristics of the scheme, and, if rent-seeking behavior exists, to identify the specific mechanisms through which it is exercised.
To this end, the study reviews Korea’s PPP and port PPP projects, and develops an analytical framework grounded in rent theory. By distinguishing rent-seeking from profit-seeking from both public and corporate perspectives, the study constructs an evaluation model capable of systematically identifying rent-seeking behavior by private investors. Using six port PPP projects subject to the MRG scheme, the projects are classified into three types according to implementation conditions. The evaluation model is designed based on the assumption that private investors may engage in rent-seeking through mechanisms such as cargo volume adjustment, operating cost manipulation, and commission fee adjustment.
The empirical analysis reveals that private investors adopt different rent-seeking strategies depending on the conditions and scope of the MRG scheme, and that the primary methods of rent extraction vary accordingly. The findings further suggest that the selection of rent-seeking strategies may be induced by the inherent attributes of the MRG scheme itself. This implies that institutional design should incorporate not only the perspective of service providers but also that of beneficiaries, and that more rigorous ex ante review and complementary safeguards are necessary to achieve the intended policy objectives.
From a policy perspective, the study argues that rent-seeking behavior by private investors may stem from information asymmetry between investors and policymakers. Accordingly, the study proposes feasible policy measures to mitigate information asymmetry and highlights the need for follow-up research to broaden the scope of rent-seeking studies in the field of PPP projects.