Nations often exhibit significantly different levels of security capability enhancement despite comparable levels of defense spending. This discrepancy suggests that the mechanism through which defense expenditure translates into actual military power...
Nations often exhibit significantly different levels of security capability enhancement despite comparable levels of defense spending. This discrepancy suggests that the mechanism through which defense expenditure translates into actual military power is contingent not merely on budget size but on institutional factors. Although the modern security landscape is rapidly expanding beyond traditional military competition into advanced domains such as cyberspace, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and space, systematic empirical research regarding the role of institutions in determining the‘conversion efficiency’of defense finance remains insufficient. This study analyzes the process by which defense spending is converted into arms imports and how defense R&D investment accumulates into advanced technological capabilities, specifically aiming to elucidate the moderating roles of corruption control and alliance depth in these relationships.
The theoretical framework of this investigation is situated at the intersection of New Institutionalism, Principal-Agent Theory, and Alliance Theory. Building upon the premise that institutional quality determines performance, this study evaluates the internal and external pathways that moderate the efficacy of defense resource allocation. From the perspective of Principal-Agent Theory, the study examines the potential for resource distortion within the defense sector's characteristic multiple principal structure, where information asymmetry and technical complexity are high. It analyzes how low hidden costs and fragmented oversight provide opportunistic incentives, and discusses how robust corruption control aligns budget execution with strategic national objectives by mitigating these pressures. Furthermore, alliances are conceptualized as "external institutions” that provide a framework for security strategy, empirically demonstrating that alliance depth functions as a moderating variable contributing to security capability enhancement within the global technological hierarchy.
To account for the multidimensional nature of defense resource allocation, the study conducts two independent yet complementary empirical analyses. This bifurcated design—separating arms procurement from advanced technological capabilities—reflects the fundamentally different logics inherent in input characteristics, output measurement, time-lag structures, and institutional moderating mechanisms. The study employs the System Dynamic Panel GMM estimation method to rigorously control for country-specific heterogeneity, potential endogeneity, and dynamic bias.
In Chapter 2, an analysis of 49 countries from 2010 to 2023 indicates that higher levels of corruption control are associated with a moderated elasticity of arms imports relative to defense spending increases. This finding suggests that transparent governance functions as an “institutional filter”that redirects resources toward endogenous capability building—such as domestic industrial bases and human capital development—rather than relying solely on foreign procurement. Similarly, the study demonstrates a heterogeneous mechanism for alliance depth: it serves as a structural decelerator substituting for individual arms imports in highly institutionalized frameworks like NATO, while acting as an institutional facilitator for acquiring advanced weaponry within strategic partnerships.
In Chapter 3, the analysis of 47 countries (2014–2023) regarding emerging security domains reveals a notable “input-output mismatch,”as quantitative R&D investments did not consistently yield automatic improvements in technological capabilities. Specifically, in the space domain, an “institutional threshold” of approximately 46 points on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was identified; R&D investments translate into positive performance only when this threshold is surpassed. Furthermore, unlike space technology, which exhibits strong path dependency, the AI and cyber domains are characterized by technological discontinuity, where current innovation ecosystems and agile responsiveness outweigh historical accumulation.
The academic contributions of this research involve extending New Institutionalist logic to defense resource management and reinterpreting alliances as regulatory external institutions that moderate resource allocation. From a policy perspective, the findings advocate that institutional designs assessing “governance maturity”should precede quantitative budgetary expansion. Specifically, the results suggest a dual strategy for space capabilities—balancing alliance-based cooperation with indigenous accumulation—and a differentiated governance framework for the cyber and AI domains that prioritizes technological autonomy and flexible adoption.
This study acknowledges certain limitations in causal identification and generalizability, resulting from the blurring of boundaries between analysis units due to technological convergence, the absence of corruption indices specifically tailored to the defense sector, and the relatively short data accumulation period for advanced technologies. Nevertheless, these limitations provide opportunities for future research, such as developing integrated security capability indices that synthesize conventional weapon systems with emerging technologies, constructing micro-level institutional indicators—including the frequency of defense audits—and rigorously identifying causal effects through natural experimental designs. In particular, in-depth case studies that reflect the unique security environment and institutional specificities of South Korea will serve as a vital follow-up task to substantiate the practical efficacy of the institutional moderating mechanisms proposed in this research.