In March 2025, the South Korean National Assembly passed a reform bill for the National Pension Service (NPS), ending an eighteen-year legislative stalemate. However, this thesis argues that this reform represents a parametric compromise that fails to...
In March 2025, the South Korean National Assembly passed a reform bill for the National Pension Service (NPS), ending an eighteen-year legislative stalemate. However, this thesis argues that this reform represents a parametric compromise that fails to address the fundamental structural vulnerabilities of the system, merely postponing the fiscal crisis rather than resolving it. Employing the framework of historical institutionalism, specifically the concept of path dependence, this study analyzes why the NPS has remained resistant to necessary structural overhaul despite a deepening demographic crisis and looming fund depletion.
The study introduces the concept of the “Immaturity Trap” to explain the counter-intuitive expansion of benefits during a fiscal crisis. It argues that the NPS’s relatively short history creates a dual crisis: the system is too immature to provide sufficient amount of pension for the current generation of the elderly—resulting in the highest elderly poverty rate in the OECD—while simultaneously facing insolvency due to a demographic collapse, which erodes the trust of younger generations. By tracing the historical trajectory of the NPS from its developmentalist origins in 1988 through the reforms of 1998 and 2007, the analysis demonstrates how the political logic of blame avoidance and the resulting “pension phobia” have locked the system into a cycle of insufficient incremental adjustments.
Consequently, the 2025 reform is identified not as a solution, but as a deepening of path dependence that reinforces existing institutional legacies. To escape this trap, the thesis proposes a “Two-Track” strategy for path shaping: depoliticizing the NPS through the introduction of an automatic adjustment mechanism (AAM) to ensure long-term fiscal solvency, while simultaneously restructuring the tax-funded Basic Pension from a quasi-universal benefit into a targeted, high-benefit safety net to effectively alleviate elderly poverty. This approach aims to decouple the goal of poverty alleviation from the goal of actuarial balance, thereby restoring intergenerational equity and social trust to the pension system.