From the perspective of arms control, the military dimension is often overlooked, while from the perspective of nuclear strategists, the diplomatic and broader security implications are similarly underemphasized. Extended deterrence policy cannot be r...
From the perspective of arms control, the military dimension is often overlooked, while from the perspective of nuclear strategists, the diplomatic and broader security implications are similarly underemphasized. Extended deterrence policy cannot be reduced to a straightforward expression of U.S. grand strategy, as the wide range of perspectives and debates that emerged among early strategists suggests. From this standpoint, this study examines the cases of Germany and the Korean Peninsula through the lens of international relations theory, testing the explanatory power of existing theoretical frameworks. The approaches traditionally expected to best explain extended deterrence during the Cold War—namely, structural realism and U.S. grand strategy–centered analyses—are found to be insufficient.
Therefore, this study proposes a new theoretical framework that builds upon and complements existing paradigmatic approaches. Through a process-tracing methodology, it reexamines the trajectory of extended deterrence policy, which is observed to have followed a broadly similar pattern during the Cold War era. This analysis leads to the conclusion that a neoclassical realist perspective provides a more appropriate analytical lens. The proposed framework proceeds as follows: (1) structural factors serve as the independent variables; (2) shifts in U.S. nuclear strategy function as the first intervening variable driving policy change; (3) client states’ participation—through efforts to adjust U.S.-led extended deterrence policies to their own security preferences—acts as the second intervening variable; and (4) the implementation of extended deterrence policy, the dependent variable, is shaped by the interaction of these three elements.
In the case of Germany during the transitional period (1989–1991), the efforts of reunified Germany—formerly West Germany—influenced the U.S. decision to retain its tactical nuclear weapons through bargaining and negotiation not only with the United States but also with neighboring states and even the Soviet Union. Similarly, on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea pursued autonomous diplomacy by linking Nordpolitik with the announcement of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and by seeking to recover peacetime OPCON from the United States. In both cases, domestic politics in the client states played a significant role—at least no less important than U.S. grand strategy regarding nuclear weapons—in reshaping extended deterrence policy.
The core argument of this study is that U.S. allies have been actively involved in the implementation of U.S. nuclear strategy and have made sustained efforts to tailor U.S. policy to their specific security circumstances. Moreover, the empirical realities in Germany and Korea diverge from the scenarios predicted by realist theories that dominated the theoretical landscape throughout the Cold War. This study further finds that U.S. extended deterrence policy was not driven solely by structural factors such as the nuclear balance, nor was it a direct or automatic reflection of U.S. nuclear strategy.