This dissertation consists of two independent studies that share a common overarching theme of inequality.
The first chapter examines the relationship between monetary policy and inequality: Using a dataset with improved coverage of high-income house...
This dissertation consists of two independent studies that share a common overarching theme of inequality.
The first chapter examines the relationship between monetary policy and inequality: Using a dataset with improved coverage of high-income households, this study shows that although the labor-income Gini declines following monetary easing, the total-income Gini increases due to a widening gap in financial income. This divergence reflects differences in household income sources and asset composition: top households earn a large share of income from risky financial assets that benefit from monetary easing, while bottom households rely primarily on labor income and hold interest-bearing assets whose returns fall when interest rates decline. To explain this pattern, I develop a modified two-agent New Keynesian framework that incorporates a financial accelerator mechanism. In this framework, risk-taking top households borrow deposits of bottom households as external finance through banks, so that monetary easing lowers the price of risk-taking—the lending spread—and redistributes financial income toward the top. As a result, the model can replicate the opposite impulse responses of the two Gini coefficients, consistent with the empirical findings. It highlights the importance of the financial income channel in understanding the redistributive effects of monetary policy.
The second chapter investigates how property taxation affects the housing wealth Gini coefficient. I begin by constructing a simple model and analytically decomposing the housing wealth Gini into two components: inequality among homeowners and the share of non-homeowners. A key insight from the model is that raising overall property tax levels may unintentionally exacerbate inequality by discouraging homeownership, whereas a more progressive tax can help mitigate this effect by shifting the tax burden from low- to high-value properties. To explore general equilibrium forces, I develop a heterogeneous-agent model in which households choose between house renting and home owning. The model reveals that housing supply elasticity plays a critical role: in inelastic markets, tax-induced price adjustments may mitigate inequality by expanding homeownership. Additionally, lump-sum transfers from the increased tax revenue have an impact on inequality similar to the housing price channel. These findings underscore the importance of both tax design and general equilibrium effects in shaping the redistributive consequences of property taxation.