This study examines whether a firm’s decision to retain foreign earnings is simple means of tax avoidance or a signal suggests the qualitative characteristics of a firm. We use U.S Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) as an exogenous shock that changes repa...
This study examines whether a firm’s decision to retain foreign earnings is simple means of tax avoidance or a signal suggests the qualitative characteristics of a firm. We use U.S Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) as an exogenous shock that changes repatriation tax incentives. Using a firm-level data from Compustat, we find that there was no significant relationship between potential repatriation tax and cash holdings. Furthermore, firms with high profitability showed investment inefficiency (underinvestment) after TCJA. These findings suggest that, after the TCJA, retaining foreign earnings became more costly to highly profitable firms and that highly profitable firms withhold earnings as a signal of financial stability of foreign operations. (separating equilibrium).