This study begins with the observation that traditional multilateralism has struggled to function effectively amid the deepening structural rivalry between the United States and China and the recurrence of global crises. Existing research tends to foc...
This study begins with the observation that traditional multilateralism has struggled to function effectively amid the deepening structural rivalry between the United States and China and the recurrence of global crises. Existing research tends to focus on specific characteristics of emerging forms of multilateralism—such as informality or low-cost coordination—or relies heavily on the framework of “contested multilateralism,” which emphasizes institutional conflict and competition. To address these limitations, this study introduces the framework of “complementary multilateralism mechanism” to explain why new middle power–led coalitions—specifically the Alliance for Multilateralism and the Paris Peace Forum—have emerged under conditions of institutional degradation, and why these two initiatives have evolved through distinct institutional pathways despite operating within the same structural environment.
The complementary multilateralism mechanism conceptualizes the formation and institutionalization of polylateral multilateralism as a sequential process unfolding across the systemic, actor, institutional, and outcome levels. Using Atlas.ti to analyze speeches, documents, and program records, this study conducts a comparative empirical analysis of the Alliance for Multilateralism and the Paris Peace Forum. The findings show that when traditional multilateral institutions fail to respond effectively to the combined pressures of U.S.–China rivalry and complex global challenges—such as digital governance, health crises, and climate change—middle powers seek alternative cooperation channels grounded in normative leadership, thereby giving rise to new forms of polylateral multilateralism. Although both cases share key features—including selective participation, issue-specific agendas, and complementary relations with existing institutions—the nature of the crises they confronted and the way these crises were interpreted by actors produced divergent institutional outcomes. The Alliance for Multilateralism emerged as a state-led, declaratory mechanism aimed at safeguarding rules-based order and addressing normative deficits, ultimately dissolving once the WHO regained its functional capacity. In contrast, the Paris Peace Forum institutionalized itself as a continuous platform that supplements existing institutions through bottom-up, problem-solving approaches in areas they inadequately address, characterized by active participation from civil society and non-state actors.
Theoretically, this study contributes to the literature by reframing multilateralism not as a static institutional structure but as a dynamic process in which external mechanisms supplement and restore traditional institutions during periods of crisis. The concept of complementary multilateralism mechanism moves beyond the predominant focus on negative institutional interactions and demonstrates empirically that the resilience of traditional multilateralism can be strengthened through external cooperative platforms. This study shows that middle powers are not limited to binary alliance choices even amid the entrenched U.S.–China strategic rivalry. Strategic and technology-intensive domains—such as semiconductors, AI governance, and critical minerals—require practical cooperation among states and a wide range of stakeholders. The Alliance for Multilateralism and the Paris Peace Forum demonstrate that middle powers can exercise normative leadership and build transnational networks in these areas. Through such mechanisms, they are able to create alternative pathways for cooperation beyond great-power competition. This insight highlights opportunities for South Korea to play a proactive role in shaping global public goods and international norms.
Nevertheless, the study has limitations. Because the analysis centers on institutional interactions, it does not fully address the micro-level motivations behind actors’ participation in each initiative. Future research should examine the actor-specific drivers and participation patterns across initiatives to better account for the sustainability and expansion of polylateral multilateralism. Such research would also help identify potential partners for Korea in various issue areas within the evolving landscape of global governance.