This study examines whether and how strong administrative environmental policy instruments interact with market mechanisms and shape corporate green transformation in China’s environmental governance system, where administrative regulation has long ...
This study examines whether and how strong administrative environmental policy instruments interact with market mechanisms and shape corporate green transformation in China’s environmental governance system, where administrative regulation has long played a dominant role and market mechanisms remain relatively underdeveloped. Focusing on the Central Environmental Protection Inspection (CEPI) and the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as representative administrative and market-based instruments respectively, the study moves beyond the conventional analytical framework that treats regulation and markets as mutually substitutable or antagonistic. Instead, it adopts a policy mix perspective to investigate how their interaction unfolds within China’s environmental governance context.
Existing research has generated substantial evidence on the effects of China’s environmental policies in improving environmental quality, reducing pollutant emissions, and, under certain conditions, stimulating corporate green innovation. Nevertheless, important limitations remain. First, macro-level studies tend to focus on policy evolution, institutional events, or the structure of policy instruments, paying limited attention to the institutional logic through which strong administrative regulation and relatively weak market mechanisms have come to coexist, and to how this configuration shapes the operation of specific policy mixes. Second, empirical studies centered on CEPI or ETS have largely evaluated the governance performance of single policy instruments, offering insufficient explanation of how local governments and firms adjust their behavior under overlapping institutional pressures, and how such adjustments translate into firm-level green transformation outcomes. To address these gaps, this study conceptualizes CEPI and ETS as a policy mix embedded within a shared governance structure and introduces an analytical framework centered on enforcement foundations, data foundations, and trust foundations, in order to explain how strong administrative instruments shape and safeguard the institutional conditions necessary for market mechanisms to function.
Theoretically and methodologically, the study draws on policy mix theory and neo-institutional organizational theory, employing a qualitative research design that combines document analysis with comparative case studies. At the macro level, this study systematically traces the long-term evolution of China’s environmental policies since 1949, from an initial stage of policy absence and emergence to the current phase of policy instrument alignment under the ecological civilization framework. This analysis reveals a parallel institutional trajectory in which administrative regulation has been continuously strengthened while market-based instruments have been introduced and tested in a gradual manner. At the empirical level, Hubei Province is selected as a regional case, and three high–energy-consuming firms are examined: Huaxin Cement (a joint-venture firm), Hubei Yihua (a state-owned enterprise), and Fuxing Technology (a privately owned enterprise). The study compares changes in firms’ transformation drivers, resource allocation, technological pathways, business structures, and perceptions of market instruments across two stages: the ETS-only phase(2013-2015) and the CEPI–ETS policy mix phase(2016-2020).
The findings of this research demonstrate that during the ETS-only phase, limitations in enforcement intensity, deficiencies in the credibility of emissions data, and weak policy predictability led firms to perceive ETS primarily as a compliance-oriented constraint or a cost management tool. Carbon price signals failed to exert substantive influence on investment decisions or technological choices, and green transformation outcomes were largely confined to formal compliance improvements or the maintenance of minimum regulatory standards.
By contrast, the institutional environment changed markedly with the reinforced implementation of CEPI. High-intensity yet predictable administrative constraints significantly reshaped firms’ external institutional conditions. On the one hand, strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms substantially increased the costs of environmental non-compliance. On the other hand, the standardization of emissions accounting and compliance practices enhanced the institutional credibility of ETS. As a result, ETS came to be perceived not merely as a short-term compliance burden, but as a structural constraint that firms must continuously account for in their medium and long-term managerial decision-making. Administrative regulation and market mechanisms thus formed an interaction characterized by institutional reinforcement.
At the firm level, green transformation outcomes under the policy mix exhibited pronounced heterogeneity across ownership structures. Huaxin Cement, a joint-venture firm and industry leader, shifted during the policy mix phase from a compliance- and cost-control–oriented response toward strategic adjustment aimed at repositioning its competitive standing. Environmental and R&D investments expanded from end-of-pipe treatment toward systemic low-carbon technologies and business reconfiguration, with technological pathways characterized by the simultaneous upgrading of production processes and energy structures. Low-carbon and environmental businesses were progressively internalized as new sources of growth, and ETS evolved from a compliance instrument into a carbon asset management tool, generating a green transformation outcome marked by the linkage of compliance, technological upgrading, and revenue realization.
In contrast, the state-owned enterprise Hubei Yihua exhibited weak transformation incentives during the ETS-only phase. Under the CEPI–ETS policy mix, however, it faced survival-oriented constraints stemming from tightened administrative permitting, intensified accountability pressures, and heightened risks of production suspension. Consequently, its green transformation outcomes concentrated on passive compliance and structural downsizing, manifested in pollution control retrofits, capacity reductions and relocations, asset divestment, and organizational restructuring. In this case, ETS functioned primarily as a compliance constraint rather than an innovation incentive. The privately owned firm Fuxing Technology, operating under more severe financial and credit constraints, initially buffered compliance costs through internal capital reallocation during the ETS-only phase. Under the policy mix, the increasing visibility of compliance risks combined with tighter credit constraints led to green transformation outcomes centered on risk-control–oriented structural adjustments, including the contraction of high-risk businesses, disposal of unstable assets, and the strengthening of compliance governance, while radical technological upgrading remained limited.
In summary, this study argues that at a critical juncture in China’s environmental governance transition, CEPI did not weaken market-based mitigation mechanisms. Instead, under specific institutional conditions, it has provided essential institutional foundations for the effective operation of ETS. By transforming environmental regulation from a negotiable cost burden into an institutional condition directly tied to firms’ organizational survival, the CEPI–ETS policy mix reshaped the criteria through which firms assess long-term risks and expected returns. This process led to differentiated and selective green transformation outcomes among high-emission firms. The findings offer new empirical evidence for understanding the interaction between administrative regulatory mechanisms and market-oriented mechanisms in transition economies, and provide practical implications for the future design and implementation of environmental policy mixes.