This dissertation consists of two empirical studies on shareholder proposals in the Korean capital market. The first study analyzes the determinants of shareholder proposals submitted to Korean listed firms. Using a sample of 238 firms that received s...
This dissertation consists of two empirical studies on shareholder proposals in the Korean capital market. The first study analyzes the determinants of shareholder proposals submitted to Korean listed firms. Using a sample of 238 firms that received shareholder proposals between 2018 and 2024, a Logit regression model was employed, along with additional analyses based on proposal type—director and auditor(committee) appointments, shareholder return proposals, and charter amendments. The empirical results reveal three key findings. First, higher ownership by controlling shareholders and foreign investors significantly reduces the likelihood of all types of shareholder proposals, confirming that Korea’s concentrated ownership structure acts as a deterrent to shareholder engagement. Second, shareholder proposals are more prevalent in firms with lower stock price volatility and longer operating histories, suggesting that reduced information asymmetry is a precondition for shareholder activism. Third, the determinants vary by proposal type: proposals aimed at improving corporate governance, such as director/auditor appointments and charter amendments, are strongly influenced by ownership structure, while shareholder return proposals(e.g., dividends, share repurchases and cancellations) show a significant positive association with ROA, indicating the multifaceted nature of shareholder proposals. The second study investigates post-proposal changes in financial performance and short-term market reactions. Using 87 firms that received shareholder proposals between 2018 and 2021, the study examines changes in profitability and growth over the two years following the proposals. In addition, cumulative abnormal returns for 218 firms(2018–2024) were analyzed to assess short-term market reactions. The results show that shareholder proposals in Korea do not have statistically significant effects on profitability, growth, or shareholder return indicators. However, free cash flow(FCF) decreases significantly at the 5% level, indicating that shareholder proposals partially mitigate managerial agency problems. Overall, shareholder proposals in the Korean market currently have limited direct effects on financial performance, but appear to exert more substantial indirect effects by placing disciplinary pressure on management. This dissertation provides the first systematic empirical evidence in Korea on the financial consequences of shareholder proposals, offering meaningful academic contributions.