This study aims to examine the development of naval power in South Korea, China, and Japan within the Northeast Asian maritime domain across different periods, policy orientations, and national strategic frameworks, and to analyze the structural chara...
This study aims to examine the development of naval power in South Korea, China, and Japan within the Northeast Asian maritime domain across different periods, policy orientations, and national strategic frameworks, and to analyze the structural characteristics of the maritime security threats arising from naval competition among these states. In recent years, China has dramatically expanded its blue-water operational capabilities through the modernization of its aircraft carrier strike groups, the rapid deployment of large surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers, and the enhancement of its nuclear-powered submarine forces. Through the 2022 National Security Strategy, the United States has identified China as its “sole competitor” and “most consequential strategic rival,” thereby intensifying comprehensive measures to constrain Beijing. Since 2010, China has sustained rapid economic growth and, as of 2025, remains the world’s second-largest economy in terms of GDP. Its naval power is likewise assessed to rank second globally. The enhancement of China’s naval power, which now supports blue-water operations, can be regarded as an indicator of Beijing’s pursuit of regional—if not hegemonic —dominance. Furthermore, in order to prevent the United States from maintaining strategic control over the Pacific, China has formulated and implemented regional expansion strategies, including Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) concepts based on the first, second, and third island chains, the promotion of a “community of shared destiny” with neighboring states, and the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative as a means of extending its influence. Japan, grounded in a fundamental reconfiguration of its national security strategy, is expanding the operational scope and roles of the Maritime Self-Defense Force by prioritizing the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, the establishment of an integrated coastal and blue-water defense system, and the enhancement of multi-domain capabilities across the maritime, space, cyber, and electronic warfare domains. After its defeat in World War II, Japan maintained a principle of exclusive self-defense and a homeland-centered, passive defense posture grounded in the U.S.–Japan alliance. However, following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the operational scope of the Maritime Self-Defense Force gradually expanded. Currently, Japan operates a fleet of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers and emphasizes dynamic defense capabilities, advocating for collective self-defense and the notion of becoming a “normal country.” In particular, to counterbalance China’s expanding influence, Japan conducts joint exercises and engages in various military-diplomatic activities in the Pacific region through its alliance with the United States, aiming to maintain maritime superiority. South Korea is also pursuing the modernization of key naval capabilities, including submarines, destroyers, and maritime surveillance systems. However, compared to neighboring countries, its long-term development of naval force structure remains relatively constrained due to economic and strategic limitations, as well as domestic political debates. The qualitative and quantitative expansion of naval capabilities in the region extends beyond a mere arms race, leading to increased complexity in maritime territorial disputes, heightened transnational vulnerabilities of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and the expansion of legal and non-military arenas of competition. In particular, the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula, as a geopolitical pivot where the strategic interests of the three countries intersect, exhibit the simultaneous intensification of both traditional military conflict risks and non-traditional security threats. This study evaluates changes in the force structure and strategic posture of the three states through literature review, comparative analysis of defense white papers and defense planning documents, and long-term naval power projection data, and, based on these findings, derives response measures and development directions for the Republic of Korea Navy. This study proposes several strategic directions that the Republic of Korea Navy should adopt in the future: (1) strengthening substantive linkages between the ROK–U.S. alliance and multilateral security cooperation frameworks; (2) achieving a balanced development of blue-water maneuver forces and coastal deterrence capabilities; (3) acquiring intelligent unmanned and AI-enabled systems along with advanced surveillance and reconnaissance assets; and (4) institutionally enhancing multi-domain integrated operational capabilities and crisis-management proficiency. This analysis sheds new light on the structural challenges facing South Korea within the evolving maritime security environment of Northeast Asia and offers policy and scholarly implications for the Republic of Korea Navy to enhance its strategic deterrence and secure stable maritime control capabilities. Keywords : Naval power, Maritime forces, Maritime strategy, Naval strategy, South Korea–China–Japan naval capabilities