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      한국ㆍ중국ㆍ일본 해군력 발전현황과 해양안보 위협

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T17396196

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

      This study aims to examine the development of naval power in South Korea, China, and Japan within the Northeast Asian maritime domain across different periods, policy orientations, and national strategic frameworks, and to analyze the structural characteristics of the maritime security threats arising from naval competition among these states. In recent years, China has dramatically expanded its blue-water operational capabilities through the modernization of its aircraft carrier strike groups, the rapid deployment of large surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers, and the enhancement of its nuclear-powered submarine forces. Through the 2022 National Security Strategy, the United States has identified China as its “sole competitor” and “most consequential strategic rival,” thereby intensifying comprehensive measures to constrain Beijing. Since 2010, China has sustained rapid economic growth and, as of 2025, remains the world’s second-largest economy in terms of GDP. Its naval power is likewise assessed to rank second globally. The enhancement of China’s naval power, which now supports blue-water operations, can be regarded as an indicator of Beijing’s pursuit of regional—if not hegemonic —dominance. Furthermore, in order to prevent the United States from maintaining strategic control over the Pacific, China has formulated and implemented regional expansion strategies, including Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) concepts based on the first, second, and third island chains, the promotion of a “community of shared destiny” with neighboring states, and the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative as a means of extending its influence. Japan, grounded in a fundamental reconfiguration of its national security strategy, is expanding the operational scope and roles of the Maritime Self-Defense Force by prioritizing the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, the establishment of an integrated coastal and blue-water defense system, and the enhancement of multi-domain capabilities across the maritime, space, cyber, and electronic warfare domains. After its defeat in World War II, Japan maintained a principle of exclusive self-defense and a homeland-centered, passive defense posture grounded in the U.S.–Japan alliance. However, following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the operational scope of the Maritime Self-Defense Force gradually expanded. Currently, Japan operates a fleet of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers and emphasizes dynamic defense capabilities, advocating for collective self-defense and the notion of becoming a “normal country.” In particular, to counterbalance China’s expanding influence, Japan conducts joint exercises and engages in various military-diplomatic activities in the Pacific region through its alliance with the United States, aiming to maintain maritime superiority. South Korea is also pursuing the modernization of key naval capabilities, including submarines, destroyers, and maritime surveillance systems. However, compared to neighboring countries, its long-term development of naval force structure remains relatively constrained due to economic and strategic limitations, as well as domestic political debates. The qualitative and quantitative expansion of naval capabilities in the region extends beyond a mere arms race, leading to increased complexity in maritime territorial disputes, heightened transnational vulnerabilities of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and the expansion of legal and non-military arenas of competition. In particular, the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula, as a geopolitical pivot where the strategic interests of the three countries intersect, exhibit the simultaneous intensification of both traditional military conflict risks and non-traditional security threats. This study evaluates changes in the force structure and strategic posture of the three states through literature review, comparative analysis of defense white papers and defense planning documents, and long-term naval power projection data, and, based on these findings, derives response measures and development directions for the Republic of Korea Navy. This study proposes several strategic directions that the Republic of Korea Navy should adopt in the future: (1) strengthening substantive linkages between the ROK–U.S. alliance and multilateral security cooperation frameworks; (2) achieving a balanced development of blue-water maneuver forces and coastal deterrence capabilities; (3) acquiring intelligent unmanned and AI-enabled systems along with advanced surveillance and reconnaissance assets; and (4) institutionally enhancing multi-domain integrated operational capabilities and crisis-management proficiency. This analysis sheds new light on the structural challenges facing South Korea within the evolving maritime security environment of Northeast Asia and offers policy and scholarly implications for the Republic of Korea Navy to enhance its strategic deterrence and secure stable maritime control capabilities. Keywords : Naval power, Maritime forces, Maritime strategy, Naval strategy, South Korea–China–Japan naval capabilities
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      This study aims to examine the development of naval power in South Korea, China, and Japan within the Northeast Asian maritime domain across different periods, policy orientations, and national strategic frameworks, and to analyze the structural chara...

      This study aims to examine the development of naval power in South Korea, China, and Japan within the Northeast Asian maritime domain across different periods, policy orientations, and national strategic frameworks, and to analyze the structural characteristics of the maritime security threats arising from naval competition among these states. In recent years, China has dramatically expanded its blue-water operational capabilities through the modernization of its aircraft carrier strike groups, the rapid deployment of large surface combatants such as destroyers and cruisers, and the enhancement of its nuclear-powered submarine forces. Through the 2022 National Security Strategy, the United States has identified China as its “sole competitor” and “most consequential strategic rival,” thereby intensifying comprehensive measures to constrain Beijing. Since 2010, China has sustained rapid economic growth and, as of 2025, remains the world’s second-largest economy in terms of GDP. Its naval power is likewise assessed to rank second globally. The enhancement of China’s naval power, which now supports blue-water operations, can be regarded as an indicator of Beijing’s pursuit of regional—if not hegemonic —dominance. Furthermore, in order to prevent the United States from maintaining strategic control over the Pacific, China has formulated and implemented regional expansion strategies, including Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) concepts based on the first, second, and third island chains, the promotion of a “community of shared destiny” with neighboring states, and the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative as a means of extending its influence. Japan, grounded in a fundamental reconfiguration of its national security strategy, is expanding the operational scope and roles of the Maritime Self-Defense Force by prioritizing the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, the establishment of an integrated coastal and blue-water defense system, and the enhancement of multi-domain capabilities across the maritime, space, cyber, and electronic warfare domains. After its defeat in World War II, Japan maintained a principle of exclusive self-defense and a homeland-centered, passive defense posture grounded in the U.S.–Japan alliance. However, following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the operational scope of the Maritime Self-Defense Force gradually expanded. Currently, Japan operates a fleet of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers and emphasizes dynamic defense capabilities, advocating for collective self-defense and the notion of becoming a “normal country.” In particular, to counterbalance China’s expanding influence, Japan conducts joint exercises and engages in various military-diplomatic activities in the Pacific region through its alliance with the United States, aiming to maintain maritime superiority. South Korea is also pursuing the modernization of key naval capabilities, including submarines, destroyers, and maritime surveillance systems. However, compared to neighboring countries, its long-term development of naval force structure remains relatively constrained due to economic and strategic limitations, as well as domestic political debates. The qualitative and quantitative expansion of naval capabilities in the region extends beyond a mere arms race, leading to increased complexity in maritime territorial disputes, heightened transnational vulnerabilities of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and the expansion of legal and non-military arenas of competition. In particular, the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula, as a geopolitical pivot where the strategic interests of the three countries intersect, exhibit the simultaneous intensification of both traditional military conflict risks and non-traditional security threats. This study evaluates changes in the force structure and strategic posture of the three states through literature review, comparative analysis of defense white papers and defense planning documents, and long-term naval power projection data, and, based on these findings, derives response measures and development directions for the Republic of Korea Navy. This study proposes several strategic directions that the Republic of Korea Navy should adopt in the future: (1) strengthening substantive linkages between the ROK–U.S. alliance and multilateral security cooperation frameworks; (2) achieving a balanced development of blue-water maneuver forces and coastal deterrence capabilities; (3) acquiring intelligent unmanned and AI-enabled systems along with advanced surveillance and reconnaissance assets; and (4) institutionally enhancing multi-domain integrated operational capabilities and crisis-management proficiency. This analysis sheds new light on the structural challenges facing South Korea within the evolving maritime security environment of Northeast Asia and offers policy and scholarly implications for the Republic of Korea Navy to enhance its strategic deterrence and secure stable maritime control capabilities. Keywords : Naval power, Maritime forces, Maritime strategy, Naval strategy, South Korea–China–Japan naval capabilities

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      목차 (Table of Contents)

      • ABSTRACT ⅴ
      • 제1장 서 론·1
      • 제1절 연구의 배경과 목적 1
      • 제2절 연구의 방법과 범위·3
      • 제2장 이론적 배경7
      • ABSTRACT ⅴ
      • 제1장 서 론·1
      • 제1절 연구의 배경과 목적 1
      • 제2절 연구의 방법과 범위·3
      • 제2장 이론적 배경7
      • 제1절 해양패권의 이론과 통제의 개요· 7
      • Ⅰ. 해양패권 이론 7
      • Ⅱ. 제해권과 해양통제9
      • 제2절 해양력과 해군력의 의의와 역할·11
      • Ⅰ. 해양력 개념과 역할· 11
      • Ⅱ. 해군력 개념과 역할· 15
      • 제3절 해양전략과 해군전략· 19
      • 제3장 대한민국의 해군력 현황과 해양전략 21
      • 제1절 개관· 21
      • 제2절 해군의 역사 23
      • Ⅰ. 창군기(1945 ~ 1950년대)23
      • Ⅱ. 한국전쟁기(1950 ~ 1960년대) 25
      • Ⅲ. 발전기(1960 ~ 1990년대)26
      • Ⅳ. 대양해군 건설기(1990 ~ 2000년대)27
      • Ⅴ. 대양해군 발전기(2000년대 ~ 현재)31
      • 제3절 주요 해양전략32
      • Ⅰ. 한국형 3축 체계와 전략·32
      • Ⅱ. 대양해군 발전 전략35
      • 제4절 해군력 분석·36
      • Ⅰ. 대한민국 해군의 조직과 임무36
      • Ⅱ. 대양해군과 대한민국 해군의 역할·38
      • 제4장 중국의 해군력 현황과 해양전략· 41
      • 제1절 개관· 41
      • 제2절 시대별 군사전략 및 해양전략44
      • Ⅰ. 마오쩌둥(1949 ~ 1970년대) 45
      • Ⅱ. 덩샤오핑, 장쩌민(1980 ~ 2000년대 초)45
      • Ⅲ. 후진타오(2000년대 초 ~ 2013년) 46
      • Ⅳ. 시진핑(2013년 ~ 현재) 48
      • 제3절 주요 해양전략50
      • Ⅰ. 반(反)접근 및 지역거부 전략50
      • Ⅱ. 일대일로 전략53
      • 제4절 해군력 분석·55
      • Ⅰ. 중국 해군의 현대화와 해양굴기55
      • Ⅱ. 항공모함의 발전 58
      • 제5절 주변국과의 이해관계 분석60
      • Ⅰ. 중국과 대만과의 상호관계60
      • Ⅱ. 중국과 일본과의 상호관계62
      • Ⅲ. 중국과 대한민국과의 상호관계·65
      • 제6절 소결66
      • 제5장 일본의 해군력 현황과 해양전략69
      • 제1절 개관· 69
      • 제2절 시대별 군사전략 및 해양전략73
      • Ⅰ. 새로운 안보정책 모색(1990년대) 74
      • Ⅱ. 해상자위대의 활동범위 확대(2000년대) 75
      • Ⅲ. 통합기동방위력 강화(2010년대)76
      • 제3절 주요 해양전략· 79
      • Ⅰ. 자유롭고 열린 인도-태평양 지역전략·79
      • Ⅱ. 안보다이아몬드 전략81
      • 제4절 일본의 해군력83
      • Ⅰ. 해상자위대의 구성과 편성83
      • Ⅱ. 항공모함 건조와 원해작전 능력 구축·85
      • Ⅲ. 자위대의 전력증강과 미ㆍ일 관계속 전략적 역할87
      • 제5절 주변국과의 이해관계 분석89
      • Ⅰ. 일본과 중국과의 상호관계92
      • Ⅱ. 일본과 대한민국과의 상호관계·95
      • 제6절 소결97
      • 제6장 결 론99
      • 제1절 요약· 99
      • 제2절 제언 101
      • 참 고 문 헌·104
      • 국 문 초 록·112
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