This study takes Martha Nussbaum's 『Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (hereinafter WHD) as its central ob 』 ject of analysis and focuses on the philosophical Capabilities Approach articulated therein. In this work, Nussbaum ad...
This study takes Martha Nussbaum's 『Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (hereinafter WHD) as its central ob 』 ject of analysis and focuses on the philosophical Capabilities Approach articulated therein. In this work, Nussbaum advocates a genuinely international form of feminism and argues that all development plans and public policies must be grounded in a moral foundation. She further maintains that reflection on justice should move beyond abstract concepts formulated by economists or philosophers, and instead originate from the practical task and normative basis of securing the substantive freedom of women in poverty.
This study examines what kind of jurisprudential grounding the Capabilities Approach provides for constitutional human dignity and justice. In particular, by considering the situation of poor women in developing countries such as India and China from the perspective of the Capabilities Approach, this study argues that "capabilities" and "thresholds" function as the minimum requirements for the realization of human dignity, and as the core standard of judgement for transforming formal rights into substantive justice. On this basis, this study aligns Nussbaum's framework of "human dignity threshold capabilities – – " with key values of the Chinese constitutional, including dignity of personality, state-centrism, and the state's obligation to protect citizens' basic rights, and explores how the Capabilities Approach may be translated into the context of China's rule of law.
The primary purpose of this study is to start from the feminist perspective of Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach and, drawing on WHD, to demonstrate that international political and economic thought must treat gender difference as a question of justice, and that feminism should shift its focus from traditional agendas to the concrete problems faced by women in poverty in the Third World. In WHD, Nussbaum takes the dilemma of Vasanti, a poor woman in India, as her point of departure to illustrate how philosophy can support constitutional principles that governments are required to respect and implement. By employing these
principles as comparative standards for evaluating quality of life across nations, she calls on the international community to re-engage with feminism and clearly shows how philosophical arguments about justice are closely connected to concrete issues of public policy. On this basis, this study conducts a comparative analysis of the Vasanti case in India and the Fengxian case in China. Through the application of the Capabilities Approach, this study identifies both similarities and differences between the two cases, thereby assessing the extent to which the Capabilities Approach can be applied within Chinese society. Seeing Chapter II, "The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens," of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982/2018) as its doctrinal background, this study examines how a substantive reference list of capabilities for women in poverty may be practically connected with subordinate legislation such as the Women's Rights and Interests Protection Law and China's Anti-Domestic Violence Law. The ultimate aim of the Capabilities Approach is to connect theory and practice by providing law and public policy with a standard of judgement for substantive justice. Accordingly, this study seeks to demonstrate that Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach is not only an effective path for addressing the predicament of women in poverty, but also a philosophical and theoretical tool that offers practical significance and reference value for the implementation of the Chinese Constitution. The study raises three core questions: first, whether the Capabilities Approach is compatible with the constitutional structure of dignity of personality and state-centred governance in China; second, whether the state can
reconstruct its positive obligations within the private sphere through the legal principles of love, care, and human dignity; and third, whether the application of the Capabilities Approach within the Chinese legal system is limited by the fact that the public/private sphere in China does not correspond to the Western functional separation between state and society, but rather reflects a hierarchical logic of governance. Starting from the predicament of women in poverty, this study reviews the historical development of feminist legal thought, introducing its origins, stages of development, and core arguments. In particular, it
focuses on the theory of the public/private sphere, revealing how the division between the public and the private under the appearance o — f gender neutrality in law—has reproduced male-centred structures, and how injustices within the family sphere, such as violence and deprivation of resources, have been placed outside the scope of public legal institutions, thereby systematically concealing and entrenching women's oppression. The study thus argues that the theoretical difficulty of feminist legal reform in China lies not merely in insufficient gender awareness, but in gender politics embedded within a state-centricgovernance structure. The study then provides a detailed explanation of the influence of Amartya Sen's development economics and the significance of Nussbaum's 10 central capabilities, arguing that together they provide an executable, individual-level standard of judgement within a constitutional framework for assessing whether individuals especially — — women in poverty are able to live a life of dignity. Based on this framework, this study examines the role played by the 10 central capabilities in the Vasanti and Fengxian cases, diagnoses the roots of these problems from the perspective of a modified Capabilities Approach adapted to China, and explains how the Capabilities Approach may be applied in the concrete domains of family justice and global justice. Finally, through the three legal principles of love, care, and dignity, this study reflects on the philosophical foundation and jurisprudential guidance underlying the proposition of a "rights capabilities threshold. – " On this basis, it argues that the Capabilities Approach can be established as a constructible theory of justice that prioritizes the concrete well-being of individuals.
This study also acknowledges several limitations. First, Nussbaum has been criticized for relying excessively on intuitionism in justifying the legitimacy of the capabilities list, leading to an overly individualistic orientation. Second, the universal liberal Capabilities Approach developed in the West may be influenced by the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics. These limitations require further clarification and discussion in subsequent analysis. In conclusion, this study demonstrates that the Capabilities Approach constitutes a powerful analytical tool and normative guideline for the protection of the rights of women in poverty in China. Moving beyond a purely theoretical discussion of feminist jurisprudence, this research proposes a standard of judgement for substantive capabilities development and equality that goes beyond formal equality, thereby redirecting law and public policy from a focus on the efficiency of state governance toward the realization of individual human dignity.