The ROK-US Combined Defense System, a core axis of security on the Korean Peninsula, has been recognized as a constant sustaining the survival and prosperity of the Republic of Korea for over 70 years. However, the rapidly changing external security e...
The ROK-US Combined Defense System, a core axis of security on the Korean Peninsula, has been recognized as a constant sustaining the survival and prosperity of the Republic of Korea for over 70 years. However, the rapidly changing external security environment—characterized by the deepening of "America First" policies, the advancement of North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and the intensifying US-China hegemonic competition—foreshadows significant changes to the existing combined defense system. In particular, security policies such as the wartime Operational Control (OPCON) transfer, proactively pursued by the ROK government, entail a high-level policy change process where domestic political dynamics and international negotiations interact intricately, due to the distinctiveness that presupposes agreement with another nation.
Accordingly, this study analyzes the process of the ROK government's security policy changes toward the US regarding the ROK-US Combined Defense System since the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, employing a Longitudinal Single Case Study approach. To overcome the limitations of previous studies, which primarily interpreted Korea's security policy as a dependent variable of changes in US foreign strategy, this study focuses on the proactive role of the Korean government and the interaction between domestic and international factors. As an analytical framework, this study applies an integrated model combining the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which explains belief conflicts and learning processes within the domestic policy subsystem, and the Two-Level Game Theory, which explicates the international negotiation process.
This study focuses on analyzing three specific periods that served as critical junctures for the ROK-US Combined Defense System. First, the Park Chung-hee administration period resulted in a new institutional reinforcement—the establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)—contrary to the government's initial intention of simultaneously pursuing "deterrence of USFK withdrawal" and "self-reliant defense." Under the authoritarian regime at the time, the overwhelming advocacy coalition employed a strategy of rigidifying the Win-Set to enhance bargaining power against the US. Consequently, as a compensatory measure for the partial withdrawal of US forces, the administration experienced a policy change different from its initial projection.
Second, the Roh Tae-woo administration period is a case where the "peacetime OPCON transfer," pursued by the government from the outset, largely coincided with the actual policy change. Within the opportunity structure of democratization in 1987 and the post-Cold War era, Korea's demand for the "recovery of sovereignty" aligned with the US strategy of "cost reduction." As the Win-Sets of both nations intersected, the government utilized this to achieve the transfer of peacetime OPCON.
Third, the Roh Moo-hyun administration period is a case where the "wartime OPCON transfer" was agreed upon but its implementation was delayed. Although the government reached an agreement with the US through strong determination, it lost the sustainable momentum for the policy due to a lack of domestic consensus caused by severe internal ideological conflict and the security crisis triggered by North Korea's first nuclear test during the negotiations. Subsequently, with the change of government, the policy underwent a process of distortion.
The analysis results of this study establish that changes in the ROK government's security policy are not determined solely by the government's will, but are the product of complex interactions involving the cohesiveness (consensus) of the domestic policy subsystem, the nature of dynamic external events (crisis or opportunity), and the alignment of strategic interests (Win-Set intersection) between the ROK and the US. In conclusion, this study suggests that for a national security policy premised on inter-state agreement to result in policy changes consistent with the government's intentions, it is essential not only to have a firm state philosophy but also to form a national consensus, expand the Win-Set intersection by leveraging the counterpart's strategy, and ensure institutionalization to guarantee policy sustainability. This study holds academic and policy significance in that it conducts an in-depth analysis of cases of Korean security policy changes through an integrated analytical framework linking the domestic policy-making process with international politics.