As U.S.–China strategic competition has increasingly shifted toward technology, semiconductors have become an important issue in the international political order. Since 2018, U.S. measures targeting China’s semiconductor sector have expanded from...
As U.S.–China strategic competition has increasingly shifted toward technology, semiconductors have become an important issue in the international political order. Since 2018, U.S. measures targeting China’s semiconductor sector have expanded from firm-specific actions to broader restrictions covering equipment, materials, and design across the supply chain. These measures have placed growing pressure on China to pursue technological self-reliance. This study describes this situation as a period of “forced self-reliance” and examines how China’s national innovation system in the semiconductor sector has been adjusted under sustained external pressure.
The main research question of this study is whether the innovation outcomes and institutional changes observed in China’s semiconductor industry under intensified sanctions can be explained by existing discussions of the Chinese development model, or whether they should be understood as the result of an innovation system responding to external constraints. Rather than judging China’s semiconductor self-reliance strategy as a success or failure, this study focuses on how the national innovation system adapts and changes in response to external shocks.
The analysis shows that China’s semiconductor self-reliance has not taken the form of complete independence measured by a single indicator. Instead, it has developed as selective and partial self-reliance across different parts of the value chain. Specifically, the findings show expanded production capacity in legacy manufacturing and memory segments, progress in the localization of semiconductor equipment and materials, and the development of alternative arrangements in design and system-related areas. Although these changes are not fully captured by aggregate self-sufficiency indicators, they are visible at the national innovation system level through accumulated technological capabilities, an increase in participating firms, expanded R&D activity, and changes in policy support.
Firm-level analysis further indicates that while the early phase of sanctions revealed serious vulnerabilities, the later period saw more differentiated adjustment strategies among major firms such as Huawei, SMIC, CXMT, YMTC, and NAURA. Rather than attempting immediate breakthroughs in advanced manufacturing processes, these firms focused on building capabilities in more accessible areas such as legacy production, memory, and equipment, often in line with state policy priorities.
Overall, China’s semiconductor self-reliance strategy is best understood as a gradual process of adjustment rather than a rapid technological leap. This study interprets these developments as a resilience-oriented process in which the innovation system absorbs external pressure and makes incremental changes over time. At the same time, it does not draw a firm conclusion about the long-term outcome of China’s semiconductor self-reliance. Instead, it identifies the stabilization of an intermediate level of self-reliance centered on legacy manufacturing, memory, and equipment as a likely path under continued constraints on advanced technologies.
By placing China’s semiconductor strategy within the broader context of U.S.–China technological competition, this study contributes to understanding how national innovation systems respond to long-term external pressure in an era where technology plays an increasingly important role in international politics.