This dissertation aims to examine the financial decisions in the context of market inefficiency. Specifically, I intend to investigate how economic agents such as investors, firms, and information intermediaries make their decisions when the financial...
This dissertation aims to examine the financial decisions in the context of market inefficiency. Specifically, I intend to investigate how economic agents such as investors, firms, and information intermediaries make their decisions when the financial market is inefficient. This article is composed of three essays as follows.
The first essay investigates whether investor sentiment leads to irrational stock market reactions to analyst recommendation revisions. Using a firm-specific sentiment indicator based on Huang, Jiang, Tu, and Zhou (2015, Review of Financial Studies, 28, pp.791-837), this study shows that analyst recommendation revisions have more pronounced effects for downgrades, which is attributable to sentiment effects. Domestic investors tend to react less to upgrades (downgrades) news when their prior beliefs are pessimistic (optimistic), implying that they are overconfident. The domestic investors drive sentiment trades, whereas foreign investors are not biased.
The second essay examines how sentiment exposure influences corporate innovation investment. Firms experiencing greater uncertainty in sentiment exposure significantly reduce their innovation investment, while the overall level of exposure has no significant effect. The reduction in innovation investment due to sentiment exposure uncertainty is more pronounced in firms with risk-averse managers and predominantly domestic ownership. The findings remain robust after addressing potential endogeneity, applying alternative sentiment exposure measures, and conducting instrumental variable regressions.
The third essay analyzes how uncertainty in corporate bond valuation influences underwriting fees. Using the Korean bond market, bond valuation uncertainty is defined as the cross-agency dispersion in yield-to-maturity. I find that higher dispersion leads to lower underwriting fees, even after controlling for bond characteristics, expected benchmark yields, and macroeconomic conditions. The result is economically meaningful and robust across alternative measures of dispersion. We further show that underwriter competition strengthens this negative relationship. When market competition is high, underwriters more aggressively reduce fees in response to bond valuation uncertainty. In contrast, issuer-underwriter networks do not significantly affect the relationship. Our findings indicate that underwriters respond to bond valuation difficulty by lowering fees, especially under stronger competitive pressure. Such fee reductions represent a strategic adjustment to secure underwriting mandates.
Taken together, the three essays demonstrate how sentiment, uncertainty, and valuation difficulty shape the decisions of key market participants, suggesting new insights into financial behavior in inefficient markets.