Three Essays on Agency Problems in North American REITs = REITs의 대리인 문제에 관한 연구

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study investigates agency problems in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and examines the institutional, behavioral, and contractual mechanisms through which they may be mitigated. Unlike traditional corporations, REITs are legally required to distribute at least 90% of taxable income as dividends and are classified as pass-through entities for tax purposes. Although this framework strengthens external governance discipline, it simultaneously generates unique agency issues, including earnings management, abnormal asset disposals, and misaligned executive incentive structures.
To address these challenges, the dissertation conducts three empirical analyses across complementary dimensions—accounting-based, real-decision-based, and compensation-structure-based.
First, from an accounting perspective, the study examines discretionary accruals in net income and adjustments to Funds from Operations (FFO). The findings indicate that REIT managers strategically employ both accrual-based earnings management and FFO adjustments to enhance short-term performance or maintain dividend-paying capacity.
Second, from a real-decision perspective, the analysis evaluates whether dividend payouts exceeding the statutory minimum requirement (excess dividends) serve as an internal governance mechanism restraining myopic asset sales. The results show that REITs paying excess dividends exhibit significantly lower incentives to generate short-term cash flow through asset disposals, thereby supporting long-term value preservation and operational stability.
Third, from a compensation perspective, the study analyzes the nonlinear relationship between CEO stock option compensation and firm value. Piecewise regression results reveal an inverted U-shaped association, demonstrating that option-based compensation enhances firm value up to approximately 50% of total pay, beyond which excessive incentive intensity induces value-destroying managerial behaviors. The magnitude and direction of these effects vary with firm characteristics: positive incentive effects weaken in highly leveraged firms, while growth-oriented firms benefit more from moderate option-based compensation.
This study provides several important contributions. Academically, it extends agency theory by empirically testing its predictions within the REIT sector—an industry characterized by distinctive regulatory constraints, asset structures, and cash-flow dynamics that remains underexplored in governance research. Methodologically, it applies nonlinear modeling and threshold regression techniques (Hansen, 2000), providing a quantifiable benchmark for optimal incentive design. Practically, it delivers actionable implications for REIT boards and compensation committees, emphasizing that dividend and incentive policies should be tailored to firm-specific financial and structural characteristics rather than applied uniformly. From a policy standpoint, the findings underscore the need for differentiated regulatory guidelines that reflect firms’ leverage levels, growth potential, and governance maturity instead of one-size-fits-all restrictions.
This study also has limitations. The empirical analyses focus primarily on North American REITs due to limited domestic data availability. The Korean REIT market, introduced in 2001, remains modest in scale and less institutionally mature. Nonetheless, this limitation reinforces the global relevance and transferability of the findings. As the Korean REIT industry continues to expand, the empirical insights derived from advanced markets provide a valuable benchmark for institutional development, governance enhancement, and policy refinement.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 REITs(Real Estate Investment Trusts)에서 대리인 문제(agency problem)가 어떠한 양상으로 나타나는지, 그리고 이를 완화할 수 있는 제도적·계약적 장치가 무엇인지를 다층적 관점에서 분석하였다. REITs는 일반 기업과 달리 법적으로 일정 수준 이상의 배당 지급을 의무화하고(미국과 한국 모두 최소 90%), 도관체(pass-through entity) 구조를 통해 과세 혜택을 부여받는 제도적 특수성을 지닌다. 이러한 제도적 설계는 투자자 보호와 정보 투명성을 강화하는 측면이 있는 반면, 성과지표 조정이나 비정상적인 자산 처분, 성과연동형 스톡옵션 보상 설계 등을 통해 경영진의 사적 이익추구 유인이 작동할 여지도 존재한다. 이러한 문제의식을 배경으로 본 연구는 성과 조정, 실물적 의사결정, 그리고 보상 구조라는 세 가지 분석 축에서 실증분석을 시도하였다.
첫째, 회계적 측면에서 성과 수준 구간별 이익조정 행태를 분석한 결과, 이익 기반 임계구간에서는 발생액 조정이, 시장가치 기반 임계구간에서는 FFO 조정이 상대적으로 활성화되는 패턴이 확인되었다. 이는 경영진이 단기 성과 관리와 배당 여력 유지를 위해 서로 다른 성과 지표를 상황에 따라 선택적으로 활용하고 있음을 시사한다.
둘째, 실물적 측면에서는 배당 집중 전략이 비정상적 자산 처분을 억제하는 지배구조 장치로 기능하는지를 검증하였다. 실증 결과, 배당 집중 전략은 자산 처분을 통한 단기 현금흐름 확보 유인을 약화시키고 이익조정 행태를 억제함으로써 장기 성과 개선에 기여하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 배당 정책이 단순한 현금 분배 수단을 넘어 경영진의 단기주의적 행동을 규율하는 메커니즘으로 작동할 수 있음을 보여준다.
셋째, 계약적 측면에서는 경영자 스톡옵션 보상과 기업가치 간의 비선형 관계를 분석하였다. Piecewise 회귀 분석 결과, 스톡옵션 보상은 일정 수준까지 기업가치를 제고하나, 특정 임계점을 초과하면 오히려 기업가치를 훼손하는 역 U자형 관계가 나타났다. 특히 부채비율이 높은 기업에서는 보상의 긍정적 효과가 제한적인 반면, 성장성이 높은 기업에서는 일정 범위 내에서 장기 투자 및 혁신 유인을 강화하는 효과가 관찰되었다.
본 연구의 학문적 기여는 REITs라는 제도적으로 특수한 산업을 대상으로 대리인 문제를 경영진의 성과 지표 조정, 자산처분 의사결정, 보상 구조라는 다층적 관점에서 통합적으로 분석했다는 점에 있다. 특히 비선형 구조와 전환점 분석을 통해 스톡옵션 보상의 효과가 전환되는 정량적 임계점을 실증적으로 제시함으로써 기존 선형 중심 연구를 확장하였다.
정책적 시사점으로는 REITs의 배당 정책과 보상 정책을 단순한 규제 준수 수단이 아닌 핵심적인 지배구조 장치로 인식할 필요가 있음을 제시하였다. 이는 일률적인 배당·보상 규제보다는 기업의 재무 구조, 성장 단계, 위험 수준을 고려한 차별적 가이드라인이 보다 효과적일 수 있음을 의미한다.
한편, 본 연구는 북미 REITs 데이터를 중심으로 분석을 수행하였기에 연구 결과를 한국 REITs 시장에 직접적으로 일반화하는 데에는 한계가 있다. 이는 국내 REITs 시장이 제도 도입 이후 표본 규모와 제도적 성숙도 측면에서 여전히 제약을 받고 있기 때문이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 본 연구의 실증 결과는 향후 한국 REITs 제도의 설계 및 감독 체계 고도화 과정에서 유의미한 비교 기준과 정책적 참고자료로 활용될 수 있을 것이다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 1 INTRODUCTION 1
• 1. Research Motivation and Objectives 1
• 2. Scope and Methodology of the Study 5
• 3. Structure of the Study 8
• 2 OVERVIEW OF REITs 10
• 1. Indirect Real Estate Investment and REITs 10
• 2. Definition of REITs 13
• 3. Summary of REIT Eligibility Requirements 16
• 3 ACCRUAL-BASED AND FFO ADJUSTMENT BEHAVIOR ACROSS PERFORMANCE THRESHOLDS IN REITS 20
• 1. Introduction 20
• 2. Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses 22
• 2.1. The Concept of Earnings Management and the Direction of Earnings Management Incentives 23
• 2.2. Instruments and Measurement of Earnings Management 25
• 2.2.1. Accrual-Based Earnings Management 26
• 2.2.2. FFO (Funds from Operations) Adjustments 27
• 2.3. Hypothesis development 29
• 3. Research Methodology and Sample 32
• 3.1. Classification of Earnings Management Incentive Regions 32
• 3.2. Earnings Management Estimation Models 35
• 3.2.1. Accrual-Based Earnings Management Model 35
• 3.2.2. FFO Adjustment 36
• 3.3. Managerial Ability 38
• 3.4. Hypothesis Testing Models 40
• 3.5. Sample Selection 43
• 3.5.1. S&P Data Structure and Its Application in This Study 44
• 4. Empirical Results 45
• 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 45
• 4.2. Performance Adjustment Behavior of REITs Based on Performance Measures (DA and FFO) 48
• 4.3 The Moderating Effect of Leverage on Performance Measure Adjustments across Threshold Regions 51
• 4.4 The Moderating Effect of Managerial Ability across Threshold Regions and Performance Measures 55
• 5. Concluding Remarks 58
• 4 DIVIDEND CONCENTRATION STRATEGIES AND ABNORMAL ASSET DISPOSAL BEHAVIOR OF REITS 62
• 1. Introduction 62
• 2. Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses 64
• 2.1. The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis and Managerial Overinvestment 64
• 2.2 Signaling Theory and Dividend Policy 65
• 2.3 Asset Disposal Behavior and Firm Value 66
• 2.4 Governance Effects of Baseline Dividends and Dividend Focus 67
• 2.5. Hypothesis development 68
• 3. Research Design and Sample Selection 71
• 3.1. Definition and Measurement of the Dividend-Focused REIT Variable 71
• 3.2. Abnormal Asset Disposal Gains and Losses (Herrmann et al., 2003) 73
• 3.3. Managerial Earnings Management (Discretionary Accruals) 74
• 3.4. Measurement of Long-Term Performance 75
• 3.5. Sample Selection 77
• 4. Empirical Results 77
• 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 77
• 4.2. Threshold Estimation Results (Hansen, 2000) 81
• 4.3 Mean Difference Test between Dividend-Focused REITs and Non-Dividend-Focused REITs: Hypothesis 1-1 83
• 4.4 Regression Results on the Relationship between Dividend-Focused REITs and Abnormal Asset Disposals: Hypothesis 1-2 86
• 4.5 Moderating Effect of Dividend-Focused REITs on the Relationship between Abnormal Asset Disposals and Earnings Management: Hypothesis 2 89
• 4.6 Empirical Results on the Relationship between Dividend-Focused REITs, Abnormal Asset Disposals, and Long-Term Performance: Hypothesis 3 92
• 4.6.1. Baseline Analysis: Long-Term Performance Effects in Non-Focused REITs 92
• 4.6.2. Supplementary Analysis: Re-estimation Using the Bottom 25% Tobin’s Q Subsample and the Effect of Growth Constraints 94
• 5. Concluding Remarks 94
• 5 STOCK OPTION COMPENSATION LEVELS AND FIRM VALUE ENHANCEMENT AS MECHANISMS FOR MITIGATING AGENCY PROBLEMS IN REITS 98
• 1. Introduction 98
• 2. Review of Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 100
• 2.1. The Relationship Between Stock Options and Firm Value 100
• 2.2. Firm-Specific Differences in the Effects of Stock Options 102
• 2.3. Hypothesis Development 104
• 3. Research Design and Sample Selection 106
• 3.1. Definition and Measurement of Independent Variables 107
• 3.2. Definition and Measurement of the Dependent Variable 107
• 3.3. Specification of Control Variables 107
• 4. Empirical Results 108
• 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 108
• 4.2. Exploring the Relationship between CEO Stock Option Compensation and Firm Value 111
• 4.3 Nonlinear Relationship between Executive Stock Option Compensation and Firm Value 111
• 4.4 Differences in the Firm Value–Enhancing Effects of Executive Stock Option Compensation across Firm Characteristics 117
• 4.5 Endogeneity Control and Robustness Tests 120
• 5. Concluding Remarks 122
• 6 CONCLUSION 125
• 1. Summary of the Study 125
• 2. Policy and Practical Implications 127
• 3. Contributions and Limitations of the Study 128
• References 131
• Appendices 140
• Appendix A. Variable Definitions for Essay 1 140
• Appendix B. Variable Definitions for Essay 2 140
• Appendix C. Variable Definitions for Essay 3 141
• Abstract (in Korean) 142