한국반공연맹 연구

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This thesis is a study on the Korea Anti-Communist League. It analyzed the establishment background, operational status, and chronological changes of the Korea Anti-Communist League (KACL) and its predecessor organizations to clarify how anti-communist ideology was reconstructed and utilized in modern Korean history according to the political needs of the regimes. The results confirmed that the KACL was not a spontaneous product of a pure ideological movement, but a sophisticated political tool mobilized by each regime to overcome internal and external crises and secure political legitimacy. This study diachronically examined the process by which the organization and activities of the League changed in response to the direction of power at major political turning points, such as the April 19 Revolution, the May 16 Military Coup, and the establishment of the Yushin system, through the history of the League's organization.
The origins of anti-communist organizations during the Rhee Syngman administration could be found in the mobilization logic of "unity of the military, officials, and people" and the slogans of "Anti-Comintern" (bang-gong) and "crush communism" (myeol-gong) of the Japanese Empire during the colonial period. The Rhee Syngman administration actively utilized international anti-communist solidarity as a political and diplomatic tool based on this historical legacy. When the opposition to the armistice and the call for unification by marching north faced limitations due to U.S. checks, the regime led the establishment of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL) in 1954 to escape diplomatic isolation and demonstrate internal and external leadership. This was part of a propaganda strategy to secure security and economic aid from the United States rather than a substantial military alliance. Subsequently, as the search for external solidarity faced limitations and an economic crisis and election phase arrived in 1955, the regime established the Korea Chapter of the APACL (Korea Asian Anti-Communist League) to strengthen its exclusive control over anti-communist ideology and use it as a means of internal control to neutralize rival forces. However, at the time, the League remained a nominal organization without substantial mass mobilization power due to inherent limitations and financial difficulties.
After the May 16 Military Coup, the Park Chung-hee administration proclaimed the logic of "victory over communism" (seung-gong), premised on economic development, as a new ruling ideology instead of the existing defensive "crush communism" to secure the legitimacy of the coup and gain an upper hand in system competition. To support this, the regime enacted the Korea Anti-Communist League Act in 1963, granting the League special legal status and grounds for financial support, effectively turning it into a state apparatus. This was a political response to reorganize the sluggish anti-communist projects under state leadership and to compensate for the regime's ideological vulnerabilities, such as the controversy over Park's past involvement with the South Korean Workers' Party. After the transfer to civilian rule, the regime pushed for the formation of nationwide branches of the League to fill the organizational vacuum caused by the dissolution of the National Movement Headquarters. Although it ostensibly advocated a voluntary national movement, it was substantially intended to expand the regime's support base and establish a top-down mobilization system. In particular, around the time of the constitutional amendment for a third term, the League lost its autonomy as a public enlightenment group and its character became fixed as a government-led propaganda organization propagating the logic for the regime's long-term seizure of power.
After the establishment of the Yushin system, the Korea Anti-Communist League was subordinated to the regime's maintenance strategy and degenerated into a large-scale mobilization organization. With the declaration of a state of national emergency in 1971, "Total National Security" emerged as the supreme national ideology, and anti-communism was reorganized as a means to force blind loyalty to the regime under the pretext of national unity. To demonstrate its support base, the Yushin regime introduced a special branch and special membership system in 1974, forcibly incorporating millions of members from public institutions and private companies into the League. The organizational power secured in this way was mobilized for demonstrations of force to protect the system and silence anti-Yushin public opinion, such as holding government-controlled rallies. However, after 1975, as the effectiveness of anti-communist ideology reached its limits and new control mechanisms such as the Central Council for Total National Security appeared, the status of the League gradually diminished.
In conclusion, the history of the Korea Anti-Communist League proved that anti-communism was not a fixed and immutable belief system, but a ruling technique that was variably modified according to the times and the needs of power. The League constantly changed its character from a diplomatic propaganda tool of the Rhee Syngman administration to an institutional basis for building the "winning over communism" system of the Park Chung-hee administration, and further to a coercive mobilization apparatus of the Yushin system. The "civilian autonomy" and "voluntary participation" advocated in this process functioned as a logic to conceal and justify the state mobilization system. This study revealed that the Korea Anti-Communist League was not a pure social movement organization, but a government-sponsored organization planned and fostered by state power, serving as a key infrastructure supporting the authoritarian ruling structure of modern Korean political history.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론 01
• 1. 문제제기와 선행연구 검토 01
• 2. 구성과 활용자료 07
• Ⅱ. 이승만 정권기 국제적 반공조직 창설과 외교 활동 13
• 1. 아시아 반공 조직 구상과 국제 연대 모색 13
• 1) 일제하 사상 통제와 방공(防共) 인식의 형성 13
• 2) 아세아방공간담회와 국제 방공 연대 모색 16
• 2. 태평양동맹 구상과 아시아민족반공연맹 창설 22
• 1) 태평양동맹 구상의 전개와 한계 22
• 2) 아시아민족반공연맹의 창설 28
• 3. 한국아세아반공연맹 설립과 외교적 활동 35
• 1) 한국아세아반공연맹의 설립 35
• 2) 한국아세아반공연맹의 민간외교 활동 48
• 3) 4·19 혁명 직후 한국아세아반공연맹의 활동과 승공 논리 부상 54
• Ⅲ. 제3공화국 시기 한국반공연맹 설립과 국가기구화 64
• 1. 5·16 군사 정변과 한국아세아반공연맹의 역할 64
• 1) 5·16 군부의 승공 정책과 한국아세아반공연맹의 조직 개편 64
• 2) 자유센터 건립을 통한 5·16 군부의 반공 정책 가시화 74
• 2. 민정이양기 박정희의 “용공”논란과 한국반공연맹 설립 84
• 1) 박정희의 “용공”이력 논란과 정치적 대응 84
• 2) 「한국반공연맹법」 제정과 한국반공연맹 설립 96
• 3. 한국반공연맹의 공보 대행과 전국 조직 구성 103
• 1) 한국반공연맹의 정부 공보 선전 업무 대행 103
• 2) 한국반공연맹의 지부 설치와 전국적 조직 완비 111
• 4. 반공 선전 활동의 국제화와 한국반공연맹의 정치적 활용 125
• 1) 세계반공연맹 창설과 대외협력 추진 125
• 2) 삼선개헌 추진과 한국반공연맹의 조직적 활용 132
• Ⅳ. 유신체제 시기 한국반공연맹의 조직 확장과 총력안보 동원체계 구축· 140
• 1. 삼선개헌 이후 장기 집권 기반 구축과 국론통일 강화 140
• 1) 장기 집권 기반 구축을 위한 승공 정책의 성과 선전 140
• 2) 박정희 정권 중심의 국론통일 정책과 관변단체 통합 추진 146
• 3) 1971년 12월 국가비상사태 선언과 총력안보 태세 확립 152
• 2. 유신체제 옹호 여론 조성과 한국반공연맹의 조직적 동원 160
• 1) 한국반공연맹의 조직 확대를 위한 법 개정 논의 160
• 2) 유신체제 옹호 여론 조성을 위한 공보 활동 167
• 3) 한국반공연맹의 조직 확장과 대중 총동원 177
• 3. 유신체제 위기 심화와 한국반공연맹의 재편 192
• 1) 한국반공연맹의 기능 축소와 총력안보국민중앙협의회 창설 192
• 2) 1970년대 후반 한국반공연맹의 반공 교육 활동 199
• 3) 유신체제 이후 한국반공연맹의 정치적 활동과 조직 해체 204
• Ⅴ. 결론 216
• 참고문헌 225
• 별첨목차 234
• 영문초록 242