This study explicates the strategic mechanisms and typologies of hedging strategies employed by secondary and tertiary states in Central Asia amidst heightening structural uncertainties since 2014. To this end, the study identifies China and Russia as...
This study explicates the strategic mechanisms and typologies of hedging strategies employed by secondary and tertiary states in Central Asia amidst heightening structural uncertainties since 2014. To this end, the study identifies China and Russia as the primary great powers influencing the regional order and selects Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as focal cases for comparative analysis. As key regional actors and post-Soviet states, both nations share the historical experience of navigating great-power politics and have consistently pursued strategic autonomy through "multi-vector" foreign policies. Yet, they provide an ideal comparative set due to their distinct divergence in relative risk assessments and subsequent strategic pathways toward major powers. The year 2014 serves as a critical structural juncture; the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea transformed the threat of sovereignty infringement by the regional existing hegemon, Russia, into a tangible reality. Simultaneously, China’s Belt and Road Initiative began reshaping the Russia-centric regional order into a multipolar configuration involving the regional emerging power, China.
In traditional International Relations (IR) discourse, secondary and tertiary states have long been marginalized as passive actors, presumed to either succumb to systemic pressures or choose between the binary of balancing and bandwagoning. However, 21st-century secondary and tertiary states eschew such rigid alignments, instead navigating sophisticated foreign policies that interweave cooperation and containment to calibrate their strategic autonomy. Despite burgeoning scholarly interest in hedging, existing literature often reduces it to a reactive mechanism within the balancing-bandwagoning spectrum—a "modified alignment" subordinated to great-power relations. Such perspectives fail to capture the proactive agency of states that intentionally circumvent alignment to preserve autonomy. Furthermore, by overemphasizing exogenous structural variables, current research inadequately addresses the endogenous cognitive processes through which states independently interpret and politically construct perceived risks.
To bridge this gap, this study conceptualizes hedging not as a passive reflex to external stimuli, but as a dynamic process driven by the path-dependent perceptions and strategic judgments of ruling elites. It expands the taxonomy of hedging into an independent strategic category that encompasses non-aligned behaviors, thereby providing a more granular map of strategic options for secondary and tertiary states. Drawing on neoclassical realism, the study proposes a structure-actor analytical model that identifies riskification—the actor-level interpretation and reconstruction of structural risk—as the central intervening variable. In this model, objective risks are processed through "cognitive filtering" based on national interest priorities, followed by a 'relative risk assessment' where the risks of each great power are weighed against the benefits of engagement. This cognitive recalibration ultimately dictates the specific type and intensity of the chosen hedging strategy. Based on this mechanism, the study categorizes hedging into three distinct types: light hedging, heavy hedging, and non-aligned hedging.
The analysis reveals that the hedging strategies of Central Asian states represent a dynamic evolution driven by ruling elite perceptions. Until the mid-2010s, Kazakhstan pursued ‘light hedging’, leveraging the regional emerging power, China, as an economic engine to offset its structural dependence on the regional existing hegemon, Russia. Despite the shocks of 2014 and 2022, a path-dependent riskification process led ruling elites to recalibrate Russia as a ‘manageable risk’. Conversely, deepening anxieties over Chinese economic encroachment and domestic anti-Chinese sentiment have recast China as a relatively higher-risk factor. Consequently, Kazakhstan transitioned toward balancing-oriented 'heavy hedging,' which entails leveraging the regional existing hegemon as a strategic counterweight to regulate the influence of the regional emerging power while maintaining essential economic ties. Specifically, Kazakhstan leverages Russia to offset Chinese influence, while simultaneously diversifying its partnerships with the EU, US, and Turkey. Furthermore, it utilizes multilateral frameworks—such as the C5+China Summit and the SCO—as institutional buffers to regulate the pace and scope of China’s regional footprint.
In contrast, Uzbekistan has steadfastly upheld ‘self-reliance’ (Mustaqillik) as the guiding principle of its foreign policy. Initially, it engaged in 'light hedging' by utilizing the regional emerging power as an economic counterweight to mitigate structural dependence on the regional existing hegemon. However, as concerns over economic subordination and constraints on autonomy accumulated, China was re-evaluated as a high-risk actor alongside Russia. For the ruling elites in Tashkent, Russia’s revisionist behavior and China’s expanding economic influence were perceived not merely as structural pressures, but as potential threats directly linked to social unrest and regime security. Rooted in a long-standing de-Russification stance and a strategic aversion to institutional dependence, Uzbekistan—unlike Kazakhstan—did not consider aligning with Russia to offset Chinese pressure as a viable option. Consequently, Uzbekistan transitioned to ‘non-aligned hedging’, eschewing exclusive alliances in favor of strategic distancing. This represents a proactive choice to preemptively block risks of entrapment and infringement on autonomy inherent in great-power-led blocs. By strengthening regional cooperation and utilizing multilateral platforms like the C5+1 to disperse external influence, while simultaneously pursuing internal balancing through the enhancement of military and economic capacities, Uzbekistan has established a robust autonomous buffer system.
In sum, Kazakhstan's alignment-based "heavy hedging" and Uzbekistan’s "non-aligned hedging" represent divergent strategic outputs of idiosyncratic risk perceptions and relative risk assessments. These cases offer a compelling illustration of the proactive agency exercised by secondary and tertiary states—actors that transcend the role of mere subordinates to great-power politics, instead actively securing survival and strategic autonomy within a multipolar order.
Furthermore, the strategic trajectories of these states are projected to undergo continuous recalibration, driven by three pivotal dynamics. First, the cognitive transformation of structural risks into existential threats: when ruling elites perceive latent risks as surpassing critical thresholds, they may pivot from flexible hedging toward balancing or bandwagoning. Second, the expansion of opportunity structures through diversified great-power engagement: the institutionalization of frameworks like the "C5+U.S." and "C5+EU" summits allows states to optimize their strategic agency and maximize their maneuvering space. Third, the fluidity of risk perception amidst Russian revisionism: while China is currently identified as the primary source of risk, Russian revisionist conduct may prompt a redefinition of Russia as the immediate threat, fundamentally altering the "hedging equation" and transposing the roles of great powers as either a source of risk or a strategic counterweight.
Ultimately, the structure-actor model and the expanded hedging typology presented in this study provide a robust framework for analyzing the survival strategies of states in a fluid multipolar system. The riskification-based decision mechanism identified herein offers a vital theoretical foundation for predicting the diplomatic trajectories of other states facing similar geopolitical vulnerabilities in an era of deepening structural uncertainty.