The purpose of this study is to identify the mechanisms by which North Korea under Kim Jong Un has been restructuring its modes of social control in response to complex internal and external crises, and in particular to clarify the structural characte...
The purpose of this study is to identify the mechanisms by which North Korea under Kim Jong Un has been restructuring its modes of social control in response to complex internal and external crises, and in particular to clarify the structural characteristics through which social control and the legal system operate in an interlinked manner. Since the launch of the Kim Jong Un regime, North Korea has faced a triple hardship: economic difficulties resulting from the prolonged continuation of sanctions against North Korea, the loosening of collectivism due to the spread of marketization, and ideological transformation resulting from the inflow of external information. Accordingly, on the view that the system cannot be maintained through past arbitrary and physical modes of governance alone, the regime has sought a new governing strategy that secures the legitimacy of governance through legal norms and extends their coercive force across society as a whole. This study empirically argues that the essence of these changes is not simply the modernization of control instruments, but rather a “legalization of dictatorship (Legalization of Dictatorship)”—which establishes the grounds for defending the system through law and places all aspects of residents’ everyday lives under the state’s normative management—and a transition to a legalistic control structure.
The main findings of this study are as follows.First, in the domain of ideological control, North Korea has legalized a dual mechanism of “blocking” and “cultivating.” The Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act (반동사상문화배격법) and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act (평양문화어보호법) exhibit a tendency toward the politicization of the principle of legality by treating and punishing even non-political deviant acts—such as an individual’s private cultural consumption and language habits—as threats to the system, while the Youth Education Guarantee Act (청년교양보장법) attempts the “internalization of norms” by coercing loyalty to the system as a legal obligation. This indicates that a normative repression mechanism has been completed whereby the state actively expands its penal power to prevent ideological loosening and legally blocks freedom of thought at its source.Second, in the domain of economic control, North Korea is pursuing a strategy of “controlled marketization” that partially accepts the efficiency of markets while suppressing autonomy. While granting limited managerial autonomy through revisions to the Law on Enterprise (기업소법), it is converting private financial flows into digital data that the state can monitor through the enactment of the Law on Electronic Payments (전자결제법) and the compulsory expansion of electronic payment systems. In addition, through the Law on Grain Administration (량정법), the Law on Housing (살림집법), and the like, it is strengthening the state’s monopoly over essential goods for survival, including food and housing, thereby legally and technologically consolidating an “organized dependency” in which residents have no choice but to become dependent on the state system.Third, in the domain of social control, North Korea is advancing a “hybrid surveillance system” that supplements the limits of traditional human surveillance networks with digital technology. While granting legal authority to grassroots surveillance organizations through the Law on the Organization and Operation of Inminban (인민반조직운영법), it has, on the basis of the Law on the Registration of Citizenship (공민등록법), collected “biometric identification data” such as residents’ facial recognition, fingerprints, and palm-vein patterns and linked them with intelligent CCTV and electronic citizen ID systems. This signifies a transition to a stage in which surveillance goes beyond regulating individuals’ “conduct” to continuously tracking biological information itself, which is inseparable from the individual, and produces the effect of fundamentally eliminating the physical time and space through which surveillance networks could be evaded.
Collectively, the social control legal system in the Kim Jong Un era does not operate with the respective domains of ideology, economy (material foundations), and society (everyday life) functioning independently; rather, it forms a “comprehensive control system” in which normative blocking, material subordination, and physical repression are intricately interlocked. Within this system, the legal system provides the authority and justification for collecting data necessary for control, and digital technology works in tandem by executing these functions in an automated manner. In conclusion, this study confirms that the “socialist rule of law” advocated by the Kim Jong Un regime is not for the protection of the people’s rights, but is a typical form of “rule by law (Rule by Law)” aimed at realizing efficient repression by the system. North Korea is currently shifting its governing paradigm from control centered on ex post punishment to predictive preventive control that, by combining law and technology, blocks deviant behavior in advance and preemptively removes potential threats through big data analysis. However, such excessive control reveals the paradoxical limits of control by intensifying residents’ fatigue and producing deferred loyalty and corruption within bureaucratic society. This may strengthen the regime’s grip on the system in the short term, but it is expected ultimately to bring about dual outcomes that structurally entrench violations of residents’ fundamental rights and deepen systemic rigidity.