This dissertation examines how Chinese family firms navigate succession and innovation under institutional and demographic constraints. As scrutiny of leadership legitimacy intensifies and high-uncertainty investments remain central to long-term advan...
This dissertation examines how Chinese family firms navigate succession and innovation under institutional and demographic constraints. As scrutiny of leadership legitimacy intensifies and high-uncertainty investments remain central to long-term advantage, two questions become pivotal: who becomes the successor and how successor identity shapes post-succession R&D. To address these questions, the dissertation treats succession as a process with distinct decision phases and conducts two empirical studies that isolate antecedents and consequences of successor-related choices.
Study 1 adopts a relative-legitimacy perspective to assess whether daughters are as likely as sons to be selected as successors in only-child families, where sibling rivalry is absent. Using Cox proportional hazards models on an original dataset of 979 firm-year observations from 369 listed Chinese family firms (2004–2023), the study finds that daughters are significantly less likely than sons to assume leadership even when they are the only child. It further shows that internal work experience within the family firm functions as a credible signal of legitimacy that increases daughters’ succession likelihood, whereas educational attainment does not exhibit a comparable effect. These results isolate gender effects from sibling dynamics and identify organization-embedded experience as a key pathway to legitimacy for female heirs.
Study 2 investigates gendered differences in post-succession R&D intensity and whether an only-child family structure attenuates those differences. Drawing on a legitimacy-plus-risk framework, the study analyzes 1,624 firm-year observations from 357 listed Chinese family firms (2004–2023) using fractional logit generalized linear models (binomial logit, QMLE) with firm-clustered standard errors and Mundlak-type corrections. The results indicate that female-led family firms allocate less to R&D than male-led counterparts; importantly, this negative female–R&D association is weaker when the successor is an only child, consistent with reduced peer comparison and more consolidated internal support in that family structure.
Taken together, the dissertation provides a nuanced, process-based account of succession and innovation in Chinese family firms. Theoretically, it integrates legitimacy dynamics and gendered risk behavior to explain both (i) who succeeds in only-child contexts and (ii) how successor identity shapes high-uncertainty investment after succession. Practically, it highlights two actionable levers: (1) giving daughters early, hands-on internal placements to build experience-based legitimacy and (2) designing governance that repairs legitimacy and socializes risk (formal decision rights, visible endorsements, milestone-based budgeting, and co-funded R&D) so that innovation spending remains resilient under heightened scrutiny.