토마스 아퀴나스의 존재론에 있어 존재와 본질의 상관관계에 관한 연구 : <신학대전> 제1부와 <존재자와 본질> 4장을 중심으로 = A Study of the Relationship between Esse and Essentia in the Ontology of Thomas Aquinas

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This thesis critically examines whether Thomas Aquinas’s analysis of beings as a composite of existence(esse) and essence(essentia) is sufficient for a complete understanding of beings. To this end, it analyzes the ontologies of Plato and Aristotle with a focus on their respective concepts of essence(οὐσία), examines Aquinas’s ontology as developed through his critique of these positions, and then criticizes the limitations of his account while proposing an alternative.
Existence, taken by itself, is not knowable but is always the existence of something. Plato conceptualized this ‘something’ as essence through the determinacy of Ideas, while Aristotle understood essence not in a transcendent realm of Forms but within concrete beings themselves. Aquinas, however, argues that these accounts fail to adequately explain both the cause of the actuality of beings and the existence of immaterial substances, and thus proposes a new understanding of beings as a composition of existence and essence.
This account raises two fundamental questions. First, are existence and essence really distinct within a single being? Second, is their composition sufficient to explain a being as such? With regard to the first question, proponents of the Intellectus Essentiae argument(IE argument) maintain that the distinction is merely conceptual until the existence of God is demonstrated. By contrast, supporters of the Esse/Essence argument(EE argument) criticize this view, claiming that the distinction originates not conceptually but from knowledge of the existence of things as given in experience. Despite their differences in starting point, both positions agree in affirming a real distinction between existence and essence.
Once this real distinction is granted, the second question can be addressed. Even if existence and essence are distinct principles, a being ultimately appears as essence manifested through existence, since existence adds nothing to or subtracts nothing from the content of essence. However, in the beings we encounter—especially human beings—we observe that essence is manifested or constituted in diverse modes. This suggests that beings must be understood not only through speculative metaphysical analysis but also within concrete contexts of reality. In other words, existence and essence alone are insufficient to account satisfactorily for a being. This limitation can be remedied by a more active interpretation of a characteristic already implicit in the Aristotelian understanding of esse, namely its dynamic role in manifesting essence in reality, and by conceiving beings through a triadic principle that adds a “mode of existence” to existence and essence.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 서론: 존재-본질 합성의 한계 8
• 1. 토마스 아퀴나스 이전의 존재 이해 13
• 1.1. 플라톤의 존재론 17
• 1.2. 아리스토텔레스의 존재론 24
• 1.2.1. 이데아론 비판 25
• 1.2.2. 실체론 28
• 1.2.3. 질료형상론 33
• 2. 토마스 아퀴나스의 존재론 40
• 2.1. 토마스 아퀴나스의 인식론 42
• 2.2. 존재자와 존재(Esse) 47
• 2.3. 존재자와 본질(Essentia) 56
• 3. 존재와 본질의 구별 59
• 3.1. 본질에 대한 이해로부터의 논증 63
• 3.2. 존재/본질 논증 66
• 3.3. 소결: 실제적 구별과 존재론적 위계 70
• 3.4. 존재의 유비 72
• 결론: 존재-본질 합성의 현대적 이해 82
• 참고문헌 87