공모사업 추진과 지방의회의 권한 비대칭 분석 : 진안군 주민통합플랫폼 사업을 중심으로 = An Analysis of the Public Offering Project and the Asymmetric Authority of Local Councils: Focusing on the Jinan-gun Resident Integration Platform Project

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Competitive, ministry-led grant programs increasingly steer local public investment in Korea, yet their accelerated calendars often compress or bypass legislative deliberation. This study asks why local councils drift into ex post approval within such programs and what design choices can restore ex ante scrutiny without sacrificing administrative speed. The empirical focus is County A in Jeollabuk-do, where a “Resident-Integration Platform” was planned, contracted, briefly operated, and then halted under a national smart-service initiative. Rather than treating the case as an administrative mishap, the analysis explains how authority, information, and incentives are arranged across the grant cycle and why those arrangements mute the council’s voice.
A qualitative single-case design is employed. Administrative records and briefings are read alongside council minutes where available and the relevant statutory and program texts (e.g., Local Autonomy Act, Local Finance Act, smart-service manuals). The policy cycle is mapped into six stages—planning, application, selection, budgeting, implementation, and evaluation—and a side-by-side matrix compares de jure powers of the council and executive with de facto practice at each stage. Explanatory analysis then traces mechanisms along six dimensions: institutional rules, organizational capacity, information and timing, political behavior, contractual and financial incentives, and recording and evaluation practices.
Three findings stand out. First, the oversight “window” narrows at the front end: application and selection often fall between sessions, while a tripartite agreement fixes core terms—asset ownership and use, maintenance duties, and termination or transfer conditions—before any budget hearing. Later deliberation becomes confirmation rather than design. Second, information asymmetry is intensified by translation frictions: technical contracts are written in a language different from budget and audit documents. In the absence of short, shared synopses, councillors cannot readily convert contract clauses into budget logic, so questioning arrives late and cautious. Third, reversal costs rise over time. Matching funds, sunk effort, and rigid contract clauses make mid-course correction politically and financially expensive, which further encourages quiet acceptance and shifts debate to post-hoc reporting.
The article reframes the issue from “council intervention” to the “allocation of authority and information,” and proposes a minimalist, scalable toolkit that requires no statutory overhaul: a one-page pre-application brief; a three-page post-selection agreement synopsis; a budget–agreement matching table; a two-page quarterly implementation brief; and a one-page, pre-agreed exit/transfer criterion. For monitoring, four light indicators are suggested—reporting lag, the share of design-oriented questions in debate, the rate of conditional (with-remarks) approvals, and lead time on change reports.
Limitations include reliance on a single county and documentary sources, which constrains generalization and leaves actor motives indirectly inferred. Future work should test the framework across municipalities with different fiscal capacity and committee support, and combine document analysis with interviews to surface informal rules that shape reporting and challenge. Overall, the case indicates that power asymmetry stems less from a formal deficit of council powers than from a misalignment of calendars, documents, and incentives; reordering those elements offers a practical path to reconcile grant-making speed with democratic oversight.


Key words: local council, competitive grants, information asymmetry, legislative oversight, policy cycle, contract design, political silence, Korea, Jeollabuk-do

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 제1장 서 론 (1)
• 제1절 연구 배경 및 필요성 (1)
• 제2절 연구의 목적 및 구성 (4)
• 제2장 이론적 배경 (8)
• 제1절 정보 비대칭과 의회-집행부 관계 (8))
• 1. 정보 비대칭 이론의 개념 (8)
• 2. 지방의회-집행부 간 정보 비대칭의 구조 (9)
• 3. 선행연구 검토 (10)
• 제2절 공모형 재정제도의 성립과 정책 흐름 (13)
• 제3절 지방의회의 법정 권한과 운영상의 간극 (17)
• 제3장 연구 방법 (21)
• 제1절 연구 대상 (21)
• 제2절 연구 방법 (22)
• 제3절 자료수집 및 분석 (23)
• 제4장 진안군 공모사업 (27)
• 제1절 진안군 의회와 행정 (27)
• 제2절 진안군 주요 공모사업 (30)
• 1. 공모사업 추진과 의회 보고 관행 (30)
• 2. 주민생활 통합지원 플랫폼 사업 사례 (32)
• 3.「진안군 공모사업 관리에 관한 조례」제정 (33)
• 4. 진안군 워케이션 센터 조성 사업 사례 (35)
• 5. 진안군 사례의 함의 (38)
• 제5장 진안군 주민통합플랫폼 사업 분석 (40)
• 제1절 진안군 주민통합플랫폼 사업 개요 (40)
• 제2절 단계별 법정 권한과 현실의 격차 (46)
• 제3절 구조적 원인 분석 (55)
• 제6장 결론 및 시사점 (64)
• 제1절 결론 (64)
• 제2절 시사점 (66)
• [참고문헌] (70)