The purpose of this study is to examine the development of the Republic of Korea Army’s future operational concept and the corresponding evolution of designated unit suited to the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. This analysis is conduc...
The purpose of this study is to examine the development of the Republic of Korea Army’s future operational concept and the corresponding evolution of designated unit suited to the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. This analysis is conducted through a comparative study of the U.S. Army’s successful operational concepts—Air-Land Operations and Multi-Domain Operations—and their associated designated unit, with further consideration of directions for whole-of-government cooperation.
The US Army’s Air-Land operations were developed based on the lessons learned from the failure of the Vietnam War and the Fourth Middle East War, and Multi-Domain operations were developed based on lessons learned from the A2AD strategy of Russia and China and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. At that time, the establishment of the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and Future Command allowed for the successful development of new operational concepts, Air-Land operations and Multi-Domain operations, and played a pivotal role in combat development. In addition, the first Training and Doctrine Command Commander, General DePuy, and his successors, as well as the first Future Command Commander, General Murray, led the cooperative system with other military branches such as the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as industry, academia, research, and allied forces through a four-year term of office, and were able to successfully promote the development of concepts and military modernization. This was possible because they received strong support and assistance from the US government.
In contrast, the ROK Army’s operational concept development system, the unit structure in charge of it, and the organizational system in charge of power development were identified as relatively inadequate. Therefore, the development direction is suggested as a result of comparing and analyzing the operational concept development system, the dedicated unit structure and role, and the government-wide collaboration system of the US and ROK Army.
First, the development of a future operational concept that is suitable for the security environment of the Korean Peninsula is required. To this end, a systematic writing procedure is required when writing the basic ground operation concept document, and in order to collect and share opinions, some parts that are not textual should be converted to plain text, and the term of office of the training commander should be guaranteed for at least 2-3 years. Considering the appropriate timing for the ongoing Russo-Russian War, a local training analysis team should be dispatched to derive lessons, and it can be seen that the development of the operational concept including practical preparation for the North Korean nuclear threat is required.
Second, to support the development of future operational concepts and combat development, the Army Training and Doctrine Command should be reorganized into a function-centered unit that focuses on core warfighting functions. The military academy system is still the main system, so there is no unit organization to research and develop command and control, mobility, information, firepower, defense, and sustained support. We must face the fact that we must develop jointness and joint operations with other military forces, and we must not delay any longer the reorganization of the unit into an integrated center for each combat function that suits our circumstances.
Third, we must create a dedicated unit to oversee future power development that suits the operational environment of the Korean Army. The Combat Development Department of the Education Command in the combat development system and the Planning and Management Staff Department of the Army Headquarters in the planning and management system and the Future Innovation Research Center are divided, resulting in duplication of effort and unnecessary administrative requirements. Therefore, we must comprehensively review similar organizations including these three organizations and create a so-called Combat Development Command to serve as a general unit in charge of future work.
Fourth, in order to maintain momentum in connection with Defense Innovation 4.0, we must establish and promote a pan-governmental collaboration system. As we can see that there are differences in the driving force of defense innovation depending on the interests and tendencies of the past governments, we must activate a collaborative system with active publicity and policy mindset. We must gather the Army's ideas to elicit government-wide support and support, knowing that government budget support is an essential element in building military power.
Keywords: Operational Concept, Unit Structure, Air-Land Operations, Multi-Domain Operations, Training and Doctrine Command, Futures Command.