Satellite–IoT networks increasingly support mission-critical services such as remote sensing, disaster response, and safety monitoring. However, their segmented and delay-tolerant communication environment —distributed across ground, space, and us...
Satellite–IoT networks increasingly support mission-critical services such as remote sensing, disaster response, and safety monitoring. However, their segmented and delay-tolerant communication environment —distributed across ground, space, and user segments with heterogeneous operating systems and protocol stacks, and characterized by inter-segment links, intermittent connectivity, and constrained bandwidth—expands the attack surface and makes it difficult to maintain consistent end-to-end security guarantees and coordinated mitigation under operational constraints. Accordingly, prior work has investigated threat modeling, anomaly detection, and mitigation to address these challenges, but the components are often developed and evaluated in isolation rather than as a unified decision pipeline. This lack of integration weakens the systematic linkage from threat scenarios and detection evidence to mitigation-policy selection, which can result in responses that are either insufficient for the actual threat context or unnecessarily disruptive. This dissertation presents an end-to-end security framework that integrates hierarchical threat scenario representation, semantic packet-level anomaly detection, and risk- and utility-aware mitigation into a closed-loop decision pipeline for Satellite–IoT networks. The framework constructs a hierarchical threat representation to organize attack scenarios and cross-segment propagation paths, yielding structured knowledge that can be directly used in downstream decision logic. It then introduces a domain-faithful semantic packet representation based on a fixed multi-field schema that encodes temporal, structural, and contextual attributes of satellite-linked communications. Using this representation, a lightweight Transformer-based detector performs multi-class attack discrimination by exploiting cross-field semantics and remains robust under partially observed packets with missing fields. Detection outputs are further mapped to mission-phase-aware situational risk to reflect phase-conditioned threat priorities. Finally, mitigation is formulated as a selectable decision. A deterministic transition-checking layer measures policy effectiveness via illegal-transition reduction across mitigation strengths, and a scenario-weighted utility formulation selects policy strength by balancing security benefit against operational cost. Experimental results show that the proposed pipeline consistently connects hierarchical threat scenario representation with semantic packet-level evidence and scenario-aligned mitigation selection, enabling interpretable and reproducible decision-making for Satellite–IoT security. The integrated framework supports transparent comparison of mitigation strengths and avoids uniformly maximal responses when they are not justified under the modeled threat context and operational constraints. Future work will expand the threat-scenario knowledge base by incorporating evidence from real-world incidents and mission-profile variations. It will also prioritize validation using real telemetry/protocol traces and realistic testbeds, including hardware-in-the-loop environments. In parallel, it will refine mission- and platform-specific calibration of risk, cost, and utility parameters.