(The) Influence of Organisational and Behavioral Risk Factors on Insider Threat Likelihood in Aviation : Case of Cameroon

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Insider threats have become a growing concern in aviation security, as employeeswith legitimate access to sensitive areas and systems can unintentionallyor
deliberately compromise safety. While aviation frameworks have traditionallyfocused on preventing external attacks, recent incidents showthat internal
vulnerabilities influenced by workplace conditions and human behavior canbejust
as significant. In Cameroon’s aviation sector, where operational demands, resourcelimitations, and evolving security structures intersect, understandingtheorganizational and behavioral factors that shape insider threat likelihoodisincreasingly important. This study examines how organisational justice, employee satisfaction, accesscontrol measures and workplace culture influence insider threat risks in Cameroon’saviation sector. Organizational Justice Theory provides a foundation for assessinghow employees view the fairness of procedures, communication, and managerial
practices. Positive perceptions of fairness tend to strengthen commitment andprocedural compliance, while perceived unfairness may increase frustration, reduceengagement, and heighten susceptibility to negligent or harmful actions. RoutineActivity Theory adds an operational perspective, highlighting howpredictable tasks, weak supervision, and unrestricted access can create opportunities for insider misuse. Using a quantitative approach, data was collected from employees across variousroles in Cameroonian airports. The survey measured organizational justice, employee satisfaction, access control and workplace culture and relatedvulnerabilities. Statistical analysis identified which factors most strongly predict
insider threat likelihood within the national aviation context

The findings aim to support the development of practical, human-centered securitymeasures in Cameroon’s aviation sector. By linking organizational dynamics withbehavioral patterns and operational realities, the study provides insights that canhelp strengthen insider threat mitigation, improve staff engagement, and enhancetheoverall resilience of aviation security systems.

Key Words: Insider Threats, Aviation Security, Organizational Justice, Behavioral
Risk Factors, Routine Activity Theory, Workplace Culture, Employee Satisfaction, Access Control, Cameroon Aviation Sector

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH CONTEXT 1
• 1.1. Research Background and Relevance 1
• 1.2. Research Objectives 3
• CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 4
• 2.1. Literature Review 4
• 2.1.1. Definition, Background and Context: 4
• 2.2. Classifications and Causes of Insider Threat 4
• 2.2.1. Classification 4
• 2.2.2. Causes 5
• 2.3. Understanding the Motivational Factors for an Insider to Become a Threat 6
• 2.4. Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses 7
• 2.5. Research Model Explanation 8
• 2.5.1. Organizational Justice and Insider Threat Likelihood 8
• 2.5.2. Employee Satisfaction and Insider Threat Likelihood 8
• 2.5.3. Workplace Culture and Insider Threat Likelihood 9
• 2.5.4. Access Control Measures and Insider Threat Likelihood 9
• 2.5.5. Workplace Culture as an Organizational Outcome 9
• CHAPTER 3 : RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 11
• 3.1. Research Approach 11
• 3.2. Research Design 11
• 3.3. Population and Sampling 11
• 3.4. Data Collection Instrument 12
• 3.5 Data Collection Procedure 12
• 3.6. Ethical Considerations 13
• CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 14
• 4.1. Introduction 14
• 4.2. Descriptive Statistics 14
• 4.3. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents- 14
• 4.3.1. Entity of Employment. 14
• 4.3.2. Employment Status- 15
• 4.3.3. Gender 15
• 4.3.4. Age Distribution. 16
• 4.3.5. Educational Level. 16
• 4.3.6. Functional Role. 16
• 4.4. Descriptive Statistics for Constructs 17
• 4.5. Measurement Model (Confirmatory Factor Analysis, CFA Results) 18
• 4.6. Structural Model Evaluation 19
• 4.6.1. Direct Effects 20
• 4.6.2. Indirect Effects and Significance (Mediation Analysis) 22
• 4.6.3. Total Effects 23
• CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 25
• 5.1. Interpretation of Significant Pathways 25
• 5.1.1. Employee satisfaction and insider threat likelihood 25
• 5.1.2. Access control and insider threat likelihood 27
• 5.1.3. Integrating the findings 28
• 5.2. Interpretation of Non Significant Pathways- 29
• 5.2.1. Organisational justice and insider threat likelihood 29
• 5.2.2. Workplace culture and insider threat likelihood 30
• 5.3. Theoretical Contributions- 30
• 5.3.1. Bridging organisational behaviour and security research 30
• 5.3.2. Routine Activity Theory in insider threats 31
• 5.3.3. Emphasising soft controls and organisational health 31
• 5.3.4. Contextualising theory in a developing country aviation sector 32
• 5.4. Limitations and Future Research Directions 32
• 5.4.1. Cross sectional design and causality 32
• 5.4.2. Self reported measures and common method bias 32
• 5.4.3. Measurement of culture and other constructs 33
• 5.4.4. Omitted variables, including risk awareness and individual differences 33
• 5.4.5. Moderation and contextual effects 33
• 5.4.6. Generalisability and sectoral limits 34
• 5.4.7. Linking to actual insider incident data 34
• CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 35
• 6.1. Overview of the Study 35
• 6.2. Synthesis of Key Findings in Relation to the Research Objectives 36
• 6.3. Overall Conclusions- 37
• 6.4. Practical Implications and Recommendations 38
• 6.4.1. Invest in robust but well designed access controls 38
• 6.4.2. Use employee satisfaction as a security indicator 39
• 6.4.3. Maintain organisational justice and transparent communication 39
• 6.4.4. Build a security conscious culture 40
• 6.4.5. Treat risk awareness and training as a bridge between culture and behaviour 40
• 6.4.6. Develop holistic insider threat programs 41
• Reference List 42
• Appendices 54