This study examines the money laundering risks of stablecoins in the Korean context, focusing on their predominant use as instruments for crypto-asset trading and cross-border value transfer rather than as payment instruments. Unlike conventional regu...
This study examines the money laundering risks of stablecoins in the Korean context, focusing on their predominant use as instruments for crypto-asset trading and cross-border value transfer rather than as payment instruments. Unlike conventional regulatory approaches that emphasize issuer regulation and reserve adequacy, this paper analyzes stablecoins from the perspective of value transfer structures and supervisory capacity. Due to their technical invisibility, decentralized transfer paths, and the entrenchment of off-system circulation channels, stablecoins fundamentally conflict with the assumptions underlying traditional financial regulation, including identity-based transparency, continuity of transaction information, and institution-centered foreign exchange controls. These conflicts represent not merely regulatory gaps or legal deficiencies, but a complex convergence of technical, structural, institutional, and operational risks arising from the stablecoin transfer architecture itself.
This paper first reviews domestic and international regulatory frameworks as well as representative money laundering cases to demonstrate that the primary risks associated with stablecoins in Korea emerge during the process of value transfer rather than at the issuance or reserve management stage. It then analyzes how the current legal framework—centered on the Act on Reporting and Using Specified Financial Transaction Information, the Electronic Financial Transactions Act, and the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act—fails to adequately capture function-specific risks of stablecoins, thereby producing regulatory blind spots and supervisory fragmentation. Based on this analysis, the study identifies four core regulatory challenges: technical invisibility of transfers, structural entrenchment of off-system circulation, failure of function-based legal classification, and the lack of real-time supervisory responsiveness.
In response, this paper proposes a function-based regulatory framework comprising technical, structural, institutional, and operational dimensions. At the technical level, it suggests reconnecting decentralized transfer paths to the regulatory information network through risk-based assessments and the expansion of travel rule applicability. At the structural level, it introduces a Market Access Rule that recalibrates regulatory scope based on domestic user accessibility rather than issuer location. Institutionally, the study advocates a reallocation of regulatory authority according to functional categories such as issuance, circulation, cross-border transfer, and payment, drawing on comparative models including the EU’s MiCA framework, Singapore’s Payment Services Act, and Japan’s dual-track approach. Operationally, it proposes the establishment of real-time transaction risk blocking mechanisms and an integrated AML–foreign exchange monitoring system to enhance supervisory effectiveness.
By situating stablecoin-related money laundering risks within Korea’s specific financial and foreign exchange regulatory environment, this study contributes a regulatory design that preserves the functional utility of stablecoins while rendering them governable within the domestic financial order. The proposed framework offers a policy-relevant reference point for future stablecoin legislation and comprehensive digital asset regulation in Korea.