This study aims to identify why North Korea, among its many branches of service, singled out artillery and elevated it to the level of "North Korea's Idea of attaching importance to Artillery." It argues that the artillery experience and lessons of th...
This study aims to identify why North Korea, among its many branches of service, singled out artillery and elevated it to the level of "North Korea's Idea of attaching importance to Artillery." It argues that the artillery experience and lessons of the Korean War constituted the point of departure for this idea, and examines how, amid the political and economic constraints of the 1960s and the Sino–Soviet dispute, North Korea's choice of artillery became institutionalized as an overarching idea by being fused with three pillars: military self-reliance, the strategization of terrain, and asymmetric deterrence.
First, North Korea's experience in the Korean War of the 1950s imprinted the recognition that artillery is a branch capable of determining tactical victory and defeat. Early wartime shortages of tanks and artillery, artillery losses resulting from the loss of air superiority, and subsequent debates and directives concerning ammunition conservation and the concentration of firepower revealed both the limitations and the possibilities of artillery employment. These experiences became the catalyst through which postwar North Korea repeatedly fixed artillery as "the basis of modern warfare" and "a way of fighting suited to our terrain," and the attachment of importance to artillery was transformed from a tactical reflection into a criterion for restructuring military strategy and the force structure.
Second, the Sino–Soviet dispute and the political and economic constraints of the 1960s endowed the choice of artillery with new political and ideological meaning. Advanced capabilities such as air power and guided missiles, even after being introduced, inevitably depended on Soviet technical assistance, implying a deepening dependence on the Soviet Union in the defense domain. By contrast, artillery centered on high-angle fire could be completed in a self-contained manner—production, maintenance, and ammunition supply—through North Korea's defense-industrial capabilities, including the "No. 65 Factory" restored during the Korean War. Kim Il Sung's statements emphasizing "a war fought by our own strength" and "a mix of weapons suited to our conditions" can be interpreted as a declaration of a line of "military self-reliance" intended to block simultaneously the reduction of external aid and interference in domestic affairs amid the Sino–Soviet dispute. In this context, artillery became, beyond the claim that it was "a cheap weapon chosen because there was no money," the symbolic branch of a self-reliant national defense: the only firepower means by which war could be sustained independently even if aid were cut off. In the process, artillery emerged as a political intersection that, through the advantage of low cost, alleviated internal fiscal concerns to some extent while also satisfying the military's demand for high-firepower, modern warfare. The choice of artillery thus functioned as a strategy of "low-cost mass defense" and as a leader's political decision to mend intra-party factional conflict and consolidate the monolithic rule system, expanding the attachment of importance to artillery beyond military policy into the level of an "idea," namely North Korea's Idea of attaching importance to Artillery.
Third, the emplacement of tunnelized long-range artillery was a measure that converted the Korean Peninsula's mountainous terrain into a strategic asset. The wartime experience of losing air superiority compelled North Korea to seek ways to "fight without air superiority," and "artillery that can strike at any time and survive" became, before the advent of nuclear weapons, the only conventional asymmetric deterrent North Korea could possess. Interlocked with the fortification of the entire national territory, the arming of the entire people, and an artillery-centered force structure, this formed the material foundation of North Korea's Idea of attaching importance to Artillery.
In conclusion, this study posits that North Korea's Idea of attaching importance to Artillery cannot be explained solely by force-structure choices or cost-effectiveness logic, but was formed under conditions in which war experience, the Sino–Soviet dispute, and intra-party power struggles intersected. The re-invocation of North Korea's Idea of attaching importance to Artillery under Kim Jong Un further shows that this historical DNA is being inherited and transformed within the framework of "nuclear–conventional combined warfare." Nuclear weapons, despite their destructive power, have limited practical usability, whereas long-range artillery and super-large multiple rocket launchers constitute constantly "usable" means of deterrence deployed along the forward area near the Military Demarcation Line. Artillery thus became more than a single branch chosen by Kim Il Sung; it became a political and ideological asset. From this perspective, the study offers an important clue for understanding North Korea's Cold War-era military strategy and its nuclear–conventional employment under Kim Jong Un, and has scholarly significance in that it allows North Korea to be read not as "a country with a lot of artillery," but as "a country that imagines war and the regime through artillery as its central axis."