This article analyzes how North Korea’s perceptions have changed since its declaration on December 31, 2023, of hostile relations between two states, in comparison with the period in 2018 when three inter-Korean summits were held. From a constructiv...
This article analyzes how North Korea’s perceptions have changed since its declaration on December 31, 2023, of hostile relations between two states, in comparison with the period in 2018 when three inter-Korean summits were held. From a constructivist perspective, it examines speeches, statements, and articles published by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
First, in the political domain, North Korea in 2018 perceived itself as “an actor that should take the lead in inter-Korean relations.” Since late 2023, however, it has reconstructed its identity as “a state in a full-scale confrontation with South Korea.” Accordingly, the interests pursued by North Korea have shifted from “securing leadership in inter-Korean cooperation” to “gaining the upper hand in the confrontation,” which in 2024 led to actions such as the abolition of inter-Korean organizations and the dismantling of symbols related to unification and inter-Korean relations.
A shift in perception can also be observed in the military domain. In 2018, North Korea perceived itself as “a state capable of managing and controlling the situation in response to South Korea’s military exercises.” Since late 2023, however, it has come to perceive itself as “a state that must respond to military threats.” Accordingly, North Korea’s interests have shifted from “securing the capacity to manage military tensions” to “expanding military capabilities aimed at deterring the adversary and making it pay a price,” which has manifested in a sharp increase in missile test launches.
A similar shift can be observed in the diplomatic domain. In 2018, North Korea perceived itself as “a state that needed to block U.S. intervention in ethnic and inter-Korean issues.” Since late 2023, however, it has come to view itself as “a state that must possess the power to counter U.S. hegemony.” Accordingly, the interests pursued by North Korea have shifted from “securing autonomy in inter-Korean relations” to “strengthening external cooperation to counter U.S. hegemony,” which in turn led to the deepening of North Korea–Russia relations and its involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war.
In sum, changes in North Korea’s ideas regarding inter-Korean relations have led to a reconstruction of its identity and a corresponding shift in the interests it pursues, thereby producing changes in its policy and behavioral choices. Ultimately, North Korea’s actions can be understood as the outcome of its ideas concerning inter-Korean relations, the identity constructed by those ideas, and the interests derived from that identity.