남중국해에서의 중국 해양 강압외교에 관한 연구 = A Study on China's Maritime Coercive Diplomacy in the South China Sea|RISS 상세보기

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study aims to systematically analyze the operational mechanisms and outcome conditions of China’s maritime coercive diplomacy (MCD) as it has unfolded in the South China Sea since the 2010s. Traditionally perceived as a continental power, China has significantly expanded its strategic attention to the maritime domain following the Reform and Opening period, driven by rapid economic growth and expanding external trade. In this context, the maritime domain has increasingly been recognized as a core strategic space essential to national survival and prosperity. In particular, the South China Sea has been redefined as a critical arena directly linked to China’s economic security through sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and access to maritime resources, while simultaneously being perceived as a strategically vulnerable space through which neighboring states and external great powers could approach China’s strategic core.
Against this backdrop, the South China Sea has emerged as the central axis capable of materially sustaining China’s ambition to become a maritime power and to advance the maritime component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Accordingly, sovereignty over maritime features and jurisdictional rights in the South China Sea have been elevated to the status of non-negotiable core national interests. This shift in strategic perception has led to a structural transformation in China’s maritime policies and strategies. China moved beyond a passive, coastal-defense–oriented maritime posture and adopted a combined strategy of near-seas defense and far-seas protection, rapidly expanding its maritime capabilities. Alongside naval modernization, the expansion and consolidation of the China Coast Guard and the institutionalization of maritime militia forces provided China with the capacity to employ military and non-military instruments in parallel.
Following the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the goal of building China into a “maritime power” was officially institutionalized as a national development strategy, transforming maritime strategy from a conceptual vision into a policy-driven and action-oriented framework. This strategic acceleration coincided with changes in the international environment after the 2008 global financial crisis, which weakened the relative position of the United States and contributed to a perceived reduction in U.S. external intervention. China interpreted this shift as a window of strategic opportunity and moved away from the cautious foreign policy posture symbolized by taoguang yanghui toward a more assertive strategy emphasizing the active defense of maritime rights and interests.
Despite its growing capabilities, China did not rely on the large-scale use of military force to achieve its objectives in the South China Sea. Direct military confrontation risked triggering U.S. intervention and strengthening regional alignment against China. Instead, China adopted a strategy of maritime coercive diplomacy that combines naval forces, coast guard units, maritime militia, and economic and diplomatic pressure instruments. This approach allows China to manage disputes at a low level of intensity while incrementally consolidating de facto control through the accumulation of faits accomplis. Maritime coercive diplomacy thus functions as a cost-effective tool that constrains the policy choices of target states and induces behavioral change while avoiding high-cost, high-risk military conflict.
China’s maritime coercive diplomacy first intensified in the South China Sea and has since expanded to the East China Sea and waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula. This pattern suggests that China’s use of maritime coercion is not a temporary or region-specific tactic but rather a long-term, repeatable strategy. Such developments carry direct security and policy implications for South Korea, underscoring the need to accurately diagnose the nature of China’s maritime coercive diplomacy and to formulate response strategies suited to Korea’s strategic environment.
Based on this problem awareness, this study seeks to explain how China’s maritime coercive diplomacy operates and under what conditions it succeeds or encounters constraints. Three core research questions guide the analysis: First, with what intentions and through what mechanisms does China implement maritime coercion? Second, why do similar coercive instruments produce divergent outcomes across cases? Third, how are the effects of China’s coercion shaped by the interaction among the target state’s level of resistance, the structural environment of the dispute, and the involvement of external great powers?
Drawing on coercive diplomacy theory, this study constructs an analytical framework that conceptualizes China’s maritime coercive diplomacy as a process of strategic interaction among the coercing state, the coerced state, and external great powers. Three hypotheses are tested. First, China’s use of maritime military power, coast guard and militia forces, and economic pressure is likely to induce policy change by targeting the core pressure points of the opposing state. Second, the stronger the target state’s willingness to employ military force and the political resolve of its leadership, the higher the likelihood that China’s maritime coercive diplomacy will fail. Third, when external great powers—particularly the United States—do not actively intervene, China’s maritime coercive diplomacy is more likely to succeed in altering the status quo and consolidating faits accomplis.
To test these hypotheses, China is treated as the coercing state, while Vietnam and the Philippines are analyzed as target states. Four representative maritime dispute cases in the South China Sea are selected for in-depth analysis. Through comparative examination of China’s coercive mechanisms, the target states’ resistance strategies, and the level of U.S. involvement, this study empirically identifies the mechanisms and conditions under which China’s maritime coercive diplomacy produces varying outcomes.
The case analyses demonstrate that China’s maritime coercive diplomacy does not operate as a uniform, one-directional mechanism. Rather, it is a conditional strategy whose effectiveness varies significantly depending on the target state’s resistance, the institutional and strategic environment of the dispute, and the level of U.S. involvement. In the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, China succeeded in consolidating de facto control due to the Philippines’ limited naval and coast guard capabilities, weak political resolve, and the United States’ restrained response. In contrast, in the Second Thomas Shoal case, sustained Philippine resistance, the maintenance of a symbolic military presence, and active U.S. involvement prevented China from achieving a change in the status quo, resulting in prolonged stalemate. Similarly, in the Vietnam cases, despite the use of comparable coercive instruments, China achieved only partial or constrained outcomes due to Vietnam’s relatively strong military foundation, firm political resolve, and active diplomatic engagement supported by U.S. involvement.
These comparative findings empirically demonstrate that the effectiveness of China’s maritime coercive diplomacy is determined less by the intensity or frequency of coercive tools themselves than by the strategic interaction structure formed between coercion and resistance. Building on these findings, this study refines the theoretical understanding of maritime coercive diplomacy and assesses that China is likely to continue and expand its strategy of incremental status quo change while avoiding direct military confrontation. At the same time, the study confirms that such a strategy is subject to structural constraints imposed by the target state’s resistance and the level of engagement by external great powers.
The findings offer important policy implications for South Korea’s maritime security. China’s maritime coercive diplomacy may unfold in similar forms in waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Effective responses therefore require not only military capability enhancement but also the integrated employment of naval, coast guard, and law-enforcement capacities; the clear signaling of political resolve at the early stages of disputes; and the construction of credible deterrence structures through strategic coordination with the United States and allied partners. Furthermore, South Korea must adopt a multi-layered strategy that combines legal and diplomatic measures with on-site control capabilities to prevent the accumulation of low-intensity coercion from evolving into irreversible faits accomplis. In this respect, this study contributes both academically and practically by clarifying the nature of China’s maritime coercive diplomacy and providing strategic guidance for potential future coercive scenarios facing South Korea.

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국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 2010년대 이후 남중국해를 중심으로 전개되고 있는 중국의 해양 강압외교(Maritime Coercive Diplomacy)의 작동 방식과 성과 조건을 체계적으로 분석하는 것을 목적으로 한다.
전통적으로 대륙국가로 인식되어 온 중국은 개혁·개방 이후 급격한 경제성장과 대외 교역 확대를 경험하면서 해양이 국가 생존과 번영을 좌우하는 핵심 전략 공간이라는 인식을 강화해 왔다. 특히 해상교통로(SLOC), 해양자원 확보의 관점에서 남중국해는 중국의 경제안보와 직결되는 핵심 공간으로 재인식되었으며, 동시에 주변국 및 외부 강대국이 중국의 전략 심장부에 접근할 수 있는 주요 해상 축이라는 점에서 안보적 취약성을 내포한 공간으로 인식되었다. 이러한 맥락에서 남중국해는 중국이 추구하는 해양강국 건설과 일대일로 정책의 해양축을 실질적으로 보장할 수 있는 중심축으로 자리매김하였고, 이 지역에서의 도서 영유권과 해양관할권은 중국이 결코 양보할 수 없는 국가 핵심이익으로 규정되었다.
이와 같은 인식 변화는 중국 해양정책과 전략의 구조적 전환으로 이어졌다. 중국은 연안 방어 중심의 소극적 해양전략에서 벗어나, 근해방어와 원해호위를 결합한 전략을 채택하며 해양력을 빠르게 증강시켜 왔다. 해군력의 현대화와 더불어 해경 조직의 확대·통합, 해상 민병대의 제도화는 중국이 해양에서 군사적 수단과 비군사적 수단을 병행 운용할 수 있는 기반을 제공하였다. 특히 2012년 제18차 당대회를 전후로 ‘해양강국 건설’이 국가 발전 전략으로 공식화되면서, 중국의 해양 전략은 단순한 개념적 선언을 넘어 정책과 행동 차원에서 제도화되었다. 이러한 전략 변화는 2008년 글로벌 금융위기 이후 미국의 상대적 위상 약화와 대외 개입 축소 기조라는 국제적 환경 변화와 맞물리며 가속화되었다. 중국은 이를 전략적 기회의 창으로 인식하였고, 도광양회로 상징되던 신중한 대외 전략에서 벗어나 보다 적극적인 해양 권익 수호 전략으로 전환하였다.
그러나 중국은 남중국해에서의 목표를 달성하기 위해 전면적인 군사력 사용에 의존하지 않았다. 직접적 무력 충돌은 미국의 개입을 촉발하고 역내 국가들의 연합을 강화할 위험을 내포하고 있었기 때문이다. 이에 중국은 해군, 해경, 해상 민병대, 경제·외교적 압박 수단을 결합한 해양 강압외교 전략을 채택하였다. 이러한 전략은 분쟁의 강도를 저강도로 관리하면서도, 현장에서의 기정사실화를 누적함으로써 실효적 지배를 점진적으로 강화하는 방식으로 작동하였다. 해양 강압외교는 고비용·고위험의 군사충돌을 회피하면서도 상대국의 정책 선택을 제약하고 행동 변화를 유도할 수 있는 비용 효율적인 수단으로 기능하였다.
중국의 해양 강압외교는 남중국해에서 먼저 본격화된 이후, 동중국해와 한반도 해역까지 확산되는 양상을 보이고 있다. 이는 중국의 해양 강압외교가 특정 지역에 국한된 일시적 전술이 아니라, 장기적이고 반복 가능한 전략으로 정착되고 있음을 시사한다. 이러한 상황은 한국에게도 직접적인 안보적·정책적 함의를 지니며, 중국 해양 강압외교의 실체를 정확히 진단하고 한국의 전략 환경에 부합하는 대응 전략을 마련할 필요성을 제기하였다.
이러한 문제의식에 기초하여 본 연구는 중국의 해양 강압외교가 어떠한 방식으로 작동하며, 어떤 조건에서 목표를 달성하거나 제약을 받는지를 규명하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 다음과 같은 핵심 질문을 설정하였다. 첫째, 중국의 해양 강압은 어떠한 의도와 방식으로 실행되는가? 둘째, 유사한 강압 수단이 동원되었음에도 불구하고 왜 사례별로 상이한 결과가 나타나는가? 셋째, 중국 강압의 효과는 피강압국의 대응 수준, 분쟁의 구조적 환경, 그리고 외부 강대국의 관여와 어떻게 상호작용하며 조정되는가?

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본 연구는 2010년대 이후 남중국해를 중심으로 전개되고 있는 중국의 해양 강압외교(Maritime Coercive Diplomacy)의 작동 방식과 성과 조건을 체계적으로 분석하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 전통적으...

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