2019’s collapse of the second U.S.-North Korea summit, held in Hanoi in February, marked a critical turning point in the trajectory toward building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In the aftermath of the summit, North Korea displayed a clear...
2019’s collapse of the second U.S.-North Korea summit, held in Hanoi in February, marked a critical turning point in the trajectory toward building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In the aftermath of the summit, North Korea displayed a clear pattern of strategic distancing not only from the United States but also from the South Korean government.
Subsequent developments—including changes in its discourse toward South Korea, warnings of military action, and the demolition of the Kaesong Inter-Korean Liaison Office—can be understood not merely as expressions of dissatisfaction with the failed negotiations, but as an attempt to redefine the overall relationship between the two Koreas.
This study approaches North Korea’s post-Hanoi shift in its South Korea policy not as a simple backlash to diplomatic failure or a temporary military response, but as a sequential structure composed of: ‘judgments on the strategic utility of South Korea’ (hereafter, “utility judgments”) - ‘a shift in the policy orientation toward South Korea (dialogue/engagement → hardline policy accompanied by exclusion and pressure)’ - ‘the antagonization of discourse toward South Korea’ - ‘the formalization of an adversarial “two-state” line.’ Within this chain, the study adopts a three-stage framework of strategy-discourse-perception. After the summit breakdown, North Korea assessed the “strategic utility” of South Korea as having declined; accordingly, it redirected its policy away from dialogue- and engagement-centered approaches toward a hardline stance emphasizing exclusion and pressure.
This transformation entailed more than policy adjustment.
It was accompanied by structural changes in official rhetoric, an elevation of the primary speaking actors, and a retreat of the ethnic-cooperation discourse that had foregrounded “nation” and “reunification,” alongside the pronounced rise in official statements of an antagonistic line that frames inter-Korean relations as de facto “two-state relations.”
To this end, the thesis (1) establishes the concept of strategic utility in the South Korea context and clarifies the analytical criteria for utility judgments; (2) analyzes North Korea’s official discourse and policy actions by period; and (3) closely traces how linguistic and discursive shifts in perceptions of South Korea, as well as the adversarial two-state line, surface and become entrenched in official discourse.
In particular, the study treats the demolition of the Inter-Korean Liaison Office-an event that occurred as an extension of the accumulation of hostile discourse after the Hanoi breakdown-as a key analytical turning point, and examines how North Korea’s utility judgments, policy orientation, discourse toward South Korea, and adversarial two-state line interlock with one another. By analyzing rhetorical strategy and intensity, the increase of othering vocabulary, and the dismantling of the ethnic community narrative, the study empirically demonstrates that North Korea has been realigning inter-Korean relations not as “intra-national relations,” but as increasingly hostile “two-state relations.”
The theoretical contribution of this research lies in proposing an integrated analytical framework that unifies the linkages among “utility judgments on South Korea - policy orientation toward South Korea - discourse toward South Korea - the adversarial two-state line” into a single strategy-discourse-perception structure.
In doing so, the study shows that North Korea’s policy shifts do not remain at the level of isolated incidents or tactical responses, but operate as a longer-term process of restructuring its overall line toward South Korea.
Moreover, by comprehensively analyzing changes in policy orientation, discourse structure, and the formalization of the adversarial two-state line, the study suggests a new approach in the study of North Korea’s negotiation strategy by combining strategic-utility judgment analysis with discourse analysis.
In terms of policy implications, this study underscores that the conditions for restoring inter-Korean relations require more than simply reopening channels of dialogue; they must satisfy integrated prerequisites such as building strategic mutual trust, reconstructing linguistic frames, and adjusting perceptions and the policy line toward South Korea.
Future research should further incorporate empirical analyses of North Korea’s methods of external messaging, speaking strategies, and internal decision-making mechanisms.