Credit Rating Agencies as Global Institutional Actors : A Neoliberal Institutionalist Analysis of Private Authority and Institutional Resilience = 글로벌 제도적 행위자로서의 신용평가기관:민간 권위와 제도적 지속성에 대한 신자유주의 제도주의 분석

국문 초록 (Abstract)

신용평가기관(Credit Rating Agencies, CRAs)은 반복적인 실패와 공식적인 공적 권한의 부재에도 불구하고, 글로벌 금융에서 상당한 영향력을 행사하는 민간 기업이다. 본 논문은 CRAs를 글로벌 제도적 행위자로 간주하고, 로버트 코헤인(Robert Keohane)의 신자유주의 제도주의 이론을 적용함으로써 이들의 지속성을 설명할 수 있는지를 탐구한다. 주요 금융위기 사례 연구를 통해, CRAs의 지속은 성과 때문이 아니라 자기강화적인 제도적 논리에 기인한다는 주장을 제시한다. 분석 결과, 협력의 논리에서 구조적인 전환이 나타나며, CRAs와의 지속적 관계는 전략적 선택이라기보다 체계적인 필연성으로 작용하게 된다. 공공 제도적 이론 틀을 민간 행위자에 적용함으로써, 본 논문은 초국적 권위와 제도적 지속성에 대한 학제 간 논의에 기여한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are private firms with significant influence in global finance, despite recurring failures and a lack of formal public authority. This thesis explores whether their persistence can be explained by treating them as global institutional actors and applying Robert Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalist theory. Through case studies of major financial crises, it argues that CRAs endure not because of performance, but due to a self-reinforcing institutional logic. The analysis identifies a structural shift in the logic of cooperation, where continued engagement with CRAs becomes a systemic necessity rather than a strategic choice. By extending a public institutional framework to a private actor, the thesis contributes to interdisciplinary debates on transnational authority and institutional resilience.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Table of Contents
• I. Introduction 4
• II. Literature Review 7
• 1. Credit Rating Agencies as Gatekeepers in Global Finance 7
• 2. Enduring Criticism and Persistent Challenges 10
• 2.1 Structural Critique: Power, Regulation, and Market Embedding 10
• 2.2 The Issuer-Pays Model and Conflicts of Interest 12
• 2.3 Financial Crises and Market Turmoil: Performance Failures 13
• 3. CRAs as Private Actors with Public Authority 16
• 4. Previous Interdisciplinary Approaches and Their Limits 19
• 5. Theoretical Gap: Explaining Institutional Resilience 22
• III. CRAs background 24
• 1. Origins and Evolution of the Credit Rating Industry 24
• 2. What Credit Ratings Are and How They Work 25
• 3. Why Credit Ratings Matter: Market and Policy Implications 26
• 4. Critiques, Challenges, and Continued Centrality 28
• IV. Theoretical Framework 30
• 1. Introduction to the framework 30
• 2. Core Concepts of Neoliberal Institutionalism 30
• 2.1 Overcoming Anarchy: The Role of Institutions 30
• 2.2 Institutional Functions: Reducing Uncertainty and Promoting Stability 31
• 2.3 Regime Theory: Rules, Norms, and Cooperation 33
• 2.4 Institutional Persistence and Adaptation 34
• V. Reframing Private Authority: CRAs as Institutionalised Actors 36
• 1. Overcoming Anarchy: How CRAs Reduce Uncertainty and Enable Market Cooperation 36
• 2. Institutional Functions: Reducing Uncertainty and Promoting Stability 39
• 2.1 CRAs as Information Intermediaries 39
• 2.2 Standardisation and Market Efficiency 40
• 2.3 Repeated Interaction and the Shadow of the Future 41
• 3. Regime Theory: Rules, Norms, and Cooperation 42
• 3.1 Regime Embeddedness and Regulatory Codification 42
• 3.2 From Regime Participants to Rule-Makers 43
• 3.3 Issue Linkage and Cross-Domain Influence 44
• 4. Institutional Persistence and Adaptation 45
• 4.1 Sunk Costs and Systemic Lock-In 45
• 4.2 Functional Legitimacy Despite Shortcomings 47
• Summary 48
• VI. Case Studies/Analysis 50
• 1. Asian Financial Crisis 51
• 2. Global Financial Crisis 59
• 3. Enron scandal 65
• 4. Summary 71
• 4.1 Institutional Interaction and Strategic Constraint 71
• 4.2 The Self-Reinforcing Logic of CRA Persistence 72
• 4.3 From Dilemma to Design 73
• VII. Conclusion 75
• VIII. Bibliography 78
• IX. Appendix 85
• 1. Credit Rating Scale 85
• X. Abstract in Korean 87