This study aims to analyze the process through which the relationship between the President and the ruling party in South Korea has changed since the 1987 democratization, and to identify its structural characteristics. Behind the immense power wielde...
This study aims to analyze the process through which the relationship between the President and the ruling party in South Korea has changed since the 1987 democratization, and to identify its structural characteristics. Behind the immense power wielded by the Korean president, often described as an "Imperial President," lies the crucial political resource of the ruling party. However, despite its importance, the ruling party has not received significant attention, either academically or in practical politics. This is likely because, during the authoritarian government period, the ruling party was nothing more than a tool for the president's efficient rule and thus could not function as an independent political actor. In contrast, since democratization, various changes have led to the development of a more complex dynamic in the president-ruling party relationship.
In particular, this study seeks to answer the core research question: "Despite various political-institutional changes that were expected to expand the ruling party's autonomy, why does the ruling party still remain unfree from the president's sphere of influence?" To this end, this study focuses on three institutional inflection points that have fundamentally altered the president-ruling party relationship since democratization. The first is the 1987 democratization and the subsequent changes to the electoral system. The second is the change in nomination methods resulting from party reforms introduced in the early 2000s, ahead of the end of the "Three Kims" era. The third is the 2015 allowance of online party membership and the consequent changes in the party's membership structure. This study argues that these political-institutional changes have altered the incentive structures and behavioral patterns of actors—namely the president, the ruling party, and the party system—thereby leading to a shift in the typology of the president-ruling party relationship. Based on this problem consciousness and discussion, this study explains that the president-ruling party relationship since democratization has evolved through three main types.
The first type is the ‘Intra-coalition Conflict Model,’ which corresponds to the relationship under Presidents Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung. Democratization and the adoption of the single-member district system for local constituency elections led to a multi-party system based on regional voting patterns and a divided government with a minority ruling party. For stable governance, the ruling bloc artificially secured a parliamentary majority and created a unified government by forming party coalitions with politically and ideologically heterogeneous forces, such as the Three-Party Merger or the DJP Coalition. During this period, the president still held powerful authority as an ‘imperial’ party president, including the rights to nominate candidates, distribute political funds, and appoint party officials. However, the exercise of presidential power was inevitably constrained by the need to maintain a coalition of different political forces. The core of the president-ruling party relationship in this era lay in the conflicts, agreements, and compromises among the parties within the coalition. As the composition of forces within the ruling party was diverse, the degree of integration between the president and the party was low.
The second type is the ‘Inter-faction Competition Model,’ which applies to the relationship under Presidents Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye. In the early 2000s, as the era of the Three Kims was drawing to a close, a national consensus for political reform formed. A series of party reforms—including the abolition of the party president position, the establishment of the principle of separating party and government affairs, the introduction of public participation primaries, and the abolition of local party chapters—was accepted by both the ruling and opposition parties, leading to significant changes in party composition and organization. However, these reforms weakened the institutional and local foundations of the parties and shifted the electoral focus from parties to individual candidates. Parties became fragmented into several factions centered on influential presidential contenders, and these factions engaged in fierce competition to acquire political resources within the ruling party. In particular, competition intensified between the president's mainstream faction and non-mainstream factions over nominations for the next general election and the composition of the party leadership. Although the president could no longer directly control or intervene in the ruling party as in the past, their influence could still exist indirectly and informally as long as their loyalist forces secured the party leadership. The demand for autonomy from the ruling party increased significantly when non-mainstream factions secured the party leadership.
The third type is the ‘Intra-faction Unity Model,’ which corresponds to the relationship under Presidents Moon Jae-in and Yoon Suk-yeol. With the 2015 revision of the Political Parties Act that allowed for online party membership, the number and proportion of hardline members—so-called ‘fandom’ members with strong loyalty to specific politicians or ideologies—increased significantly. These members actively voiced their opinions by participating in presidential primaries and elections for party leadership. This trend not only appeared in both major parties but also coincided with the deepening political polarization following the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, raising the level of competition and conflict between the two parties. The possibility of compromise between the parties diminished, and the formation of non-mainstream factions within the ruling party was suppressed. The ruling party became composed of what was essentially a single faction, and in the context of the confrontational dynamic with the opposition, it showed a high degree of integration with the president.
In conclusion, the various institutional reforms since democratization, which were expected to enhance the ruling party's autonomy, have paradoxically weakened the party's organization and strengthened the president's influence, thereby resulting in the continued subordination and dependence of the ruling party on the president. Particularly in recent years, the ruling party has been strongly consolidating around the president to a degree reminiscent of the authoritarian government period. This demonstrates that despite changes in its patterns and characteristics, the fundamental challenges of the post-democratization president-ruling party relationship—namely, securing the party's autonomy and curbing the president's influence—remain unresolved. Based on this analysis, this study suggests that for the healthy development of Korea's president-ruling party relationship, the urgent task is to go beyond merely restricting the president's authority. Rather, it is to strengthen the party's own institutional capacity and autonomy through measures such as electoral system reform to encourage a multi-party system and the restoration of local party chapters.