This thesis explores the process of the financialization of American economic life during the early 1970s, focusing on the case of pension funds. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 is often noted for redirecting labor pension ...
This thesis explores the process of the financialization of American economic life during the early 1970s, focusing on the case of pension funds. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 is often noted for redirecting labor pension funds—the fruits of “politics of security”—toward high-risk investments in securities, mortgages, and venture capital. Previous scholarship on this topic has largely been divided into two strands. Progressive or Marxist economic historians interpret it as a neoliberal shift propelled by financial elites seeking speculative profit, thus locating its origins in forces external to and imposed from above upon the New Deal order. In contrast, recent U.S. historians view financialization as a direct outgrowth of the New Deal Order itself, arguing that New Deal liberals had promoted it from the 1950s onwards to meet the grassroots demands for material progress, with the 1970s representing its continuation or culmination. Both perspectives, however, tend to overlook the chaotic conjunctures U.S. capitalism faced in the 1970s, and hardly examine the discourse through which policymakers justified financialization and how key actors of the postwar political economy maneuvered.
This thesis offers an alternative explanation, drawing upon the Nixon administration’s pension reform discourses as revealed in administrative reports and records of congressional hearings. It argues that ERISA and pension fund financialization were devised as an industrial policy by Republicans to restructure and revitalize declining U.S. Fordism, and that industrial productivity lay at the core of their discourse. Indeed, plans to channel vast pension funds into long-term investment were conceived and discussed alongside proposals to make labor flexible by introducing individual retirement accounts. These initiatives were embedded within the administration’s broader macroeconomic vision to bolster American industry amid the “shock of the global,” marked by intensifying international competition and the rise of transnational speculation.
Financialization and labor flexibilization constituted a technocratic vision in which core pillars of economic security—retirement security and labor unionism—were traded away in favor of industrial productivity. Whereas the postwar “politics of productivity” presupposed a virtuous cycle between productivity and security, the Republican discourse in the early 1970s recast this politics by decoupling productivity from security and prioritizing the former as an end in itself. For this discursive campaign to succeed, Republicans foregrounded the “shock of the global” through two characteristic rhetorical styles. On the one hand, they justified their emergency measures by linking the crisis of U.S. Fordism to global structural changes with severe implications for U.S. hegemony. On the other hand, they broke away from the hubristic epistemology of earlier decades that fetishized postwar U.S., rather adopting a comparative political-economic approach that referenced capitalist competitors’ alternative models to concretize their vision.
As such, the “shock of the global,” as both structure and problem, was pivotal in the rise of technocratic political economy in late twentieth-century America. The tragedy of economic fetishism that still defines our era was begotten amidst the global crisis intrinsic to postwar industrial capitalism, even before the rise of neoliberal elites; financialization was merely one among its many repertoires.