CONVENTIONAL NUCLEAR INTEGRATION FOR SOUTH KOREA AND THE U.S. EXTENDED DETERRENCE : A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH NATO

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

South Korea has relied on U.S. extended deterrence to counter North Korea’s threats, but tactical nuclear advancements have created a deterrence gap. This raises doubts about the U.S. commitment, echoing Cold War concerns in Europe. The U.S. addressed Soviet threats by forming NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which built allied trust. Similarly, the 2023 Washington Declaration announced the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to enhance extended deterrence for South Korea. The NCG aims to integrate South Korea’s conventional forces with U.S. nuclear strategy through training and planning. This thesis identifies CNI as crucial to addressing North Korea’s tactical nuclear threats and positions the NCG as a starting point. By analyzing NATO’s historical cases, the study highlights key factors for effective integration: full implementation of nuclear scenarios, improved resilience, aligned strategic objectives, and clear signaling. These insights provide a pathway to strengthening the credibility and effectiveness of U.S.-South Korea deterrence.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I.INTRODUCTION 1
• A.SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 1
• B.LITERATURE REVIEW 2
• 1.Deterrence and Extended Deterrence 3
• 2.Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNI) 4
• C.RESEARCH DESIGN 8
• D.THESIS OVERVIEW 9
• II.NORTH KOREA’S TACTICAL NUCLEAR THREATS 11
• A.NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE CAPABILITIES 12
• 1.Quantity of Nuclear Material and Weapons 12
• 2.Current Advancement in Delivery Systems 13
• 3.North Korean Nuclear Policy and Doctrine 14
• B.SOUTH KOREA’S COUNTER CAPABILITIES 15
• 1.Kill Chain 15
• 2.Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) 17
• C.IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC ASYMMETRIES 18
• D.CONCLUSION 19
• III.NATO’S CASE STUDY 21
• A.NATO’S STRATEGIES CHANGE DURING THE COLD WAR 21
• B.NATO’S NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) 24
• C.CASE STUDY OF EXERCISE: ABLE ARCHER 83 27
• D.CONCLUSION 28
• IV.APPLICATION OF CNI IN THE SOUTH KOREA-U.S. ALLIANCE 31
• A.COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN STRATEGY 31
• B.COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS 34
• C.COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXERCISES 36
• D.POSITIVE FACTORS 38
• 1.Full Integration of Nuclear Scenarios 38
• 2.Strengthening Resilience 38
• E.CAUTIONARY FACTORS 40
• 1.Discrepancies in Strategic Objectives 40
• 2.Faulty Signaling 41
• V.CONCLUSION 43
• A.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES THROUGH CNI 44
• B.RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 46
• C.FUTURE RESEARCH 47
• LIST OF REFERENCES 49
• INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 57