How far will Patron share? : Comparative studies on US nuclear sharing cases towards its allies = 핵국은 어디까지 공유할 것인가? : 미국의 동맹 핵공유 사례 비교 연구

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study seeks to analyze the factors that contribute to differences in the United States’ nuclear sharing policies with its allies, noting that the US implemented a greater variety of nuclear sharing arrangements with more allied nations than any other nuclear state during the Cold War. The research observes that during the Cold War period (1945-1990), amid intensified nuclear competition with the Soviet Union, the United States developed, completed, and maintained both physical and non-physical nuclear-sharing systems with its allies, including the deployment of nuclear weapons, technology sharing, and the establishment of the Nuclear planning mechanism(NPG). However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the United States shifted its policy, reconceptualizing nuclear weapons as a final defense measure, leading to a substantial reduction in the US nuclear stockpile. This study posits that the scope of US nuclear sharing was shaped by two key factors: 1) the advancement of the Soviet Union's second-strike capability, and 2) the exchange of mutual benefits (referred to as alliance reciprocity) between the US and its allies particularly through burden sharing for effective deterrence. As adversarial second-strike capabilities strengthened, the erosion of US nuclear superiority necessitated strategic adjustments including measures to enhance the survivability and accuracy of its nuclear weapons. While the US adjusted its strategy, the contributions of allies and their involvement in this process created a security trade-off, enhancing alliance reciprocity. Therefore, a higher level of the adversary's nuclear second-strike capability, combined with stronger alliance reciprocity, would increase the likelihood of implementing a broader range of nuclear sharing. This study tests the hypothesis through case studies of US nuclear sharing with its Cold War allies, illustrating how variations in nuclear sharing outcomes can emerge from the same context due to shifts in the values of key variables. Through this historical lens, this research seeks to derive lessons on strategic frameworks and alliance management in addressing evolving nuclear challenges posed by Russia, North Korea, Iran, and other proliferating actors.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 냉전 시기 미국이 다른 핵 보유국에 비해 가장 많은 동맹국과 다양한 형태의 핵 공유를 시행한 점에 착안하여, 동맹국에 대한 미국 핵 공유 정책의 차이를 야기하는 요인을 분석하였다. 미국은 소련과의 핵경쟁이 심화된 냉전시기(1945-90)에 동맹국을 대상으로 핵무기 배치, 기술공유, 나토 핵기획그룹 창설 등 물리적∙비물리적 핵공유 체계를 구축, 완성, 유지하였다. 이후, 소련이 붕괴된 1990년을 기점으로 핵사용을 방어의 최후의 수단으로 활용하는 것으로 정책노선을 변경하고 핵무기 보유량을 급격히 축소하였다. 본 연구는 이러한 관찰을 바탕으로 미국의 동맹국에 대한 핵공유 범위는 적국(소련)의 핵위협, 구체적으로는2차 타격능력 증강과 이를 억지하기 위한 동맹국의 역할분담에 따른 동맹간 상호 이익교환 수준에 따라 결정될 것이라고 주장한다. 특히 적국의 2차 타격능력 증강은 미국의 핵전력 우위를 상실케 하며 핵무기의 생존가능성과 타격의 정확성을 제고를 야기하는 등 기존의 핵전략의 변경이 불가피해짐에 따라 이러한 전략 조정에 기여하고 상호 안전보장의 이익교환(trade-off)을 통해 동맹의 상호성(alliance reciprocity)이 제고된 사례일수록 다양한 형태의 핵공유가 시행될 가능성이 높다고 주장한다. 본고는 이러한 주장을 냉전시기 미국의 동맹국에 대한 핵공유 사례 연구를 통해 검증하고 나아가 같은 사례라도 변수 값의 변화에 따라 핵공유의 결과가 달라질 수 있음을 밝혀 가설의 신빙성을 높였다. 나아가 냉전시기 미국의 핵공유 정책 분석을 통해 현재 러시아, 북한, 이란 등 다양한 핵확산 위협과 추이에 대해 미국과 동맹국들이 어떻게 대응해 나갈지에 대한 교훈을 모색하였다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Abstract i
• 국문 초록 ii
• Acknowledgements iii
• Table of Contents iv
• List of Tables vii
• List of Figures viii
• Abbreviation ix
• CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
• CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 6
• 2.1 Theoretical frameworks on Nuclear Proliferation 6
• 2.2 Previous Research on 'Nuclear Sharing' 9
• 2.2.1 Key Topics and Features of Existing Research 9
• 2.2.2 Limitation of Previous Research 15
• 2.2.3 Addressing the Gaps: Contribution of the Study 18
• CHAPTER 3. DEFINITION 20
• 3.1 New Insights: Redefining Nuclear Sharing 20
• 3.2 Basing 26
• 3.2.1 Covert Stationing 28
• 3.3 Alliance Loaning 30
• 3.3.1 Joint Nuclear Planning 31
• 3.3.2 Inter-allied Nuclear Operation 32
• 1) Joint Military Action 32
• 2) Logistical Co-operation 34
• 3.4 Giving 35
• 3.4.1 Burden Sharing between Nuclear Allies 36
• 3.4.2 Soft Sharing: Technical Diffusion 38
• CHAPTER 4. ARGUMENT: MY THEORY OF NUCLEAR SHARING 40
• 4.1 Argument 40
• 4.2 Methodology 48
• 4.2.1 Scope of Study: US Cold War Nuclear Sharing with Treaty Allies 48
• 4.2.2 Variables 55
• 1) Alliance reciprocity in US Nuclear Strategy (IV1) 55
• 2) Adversary's Secure Second-strike Capability (IV 2) 62
• (1) US Nuclear Strategy Amid Soviet Nuclear Advancement 71
• 4.2.3 Multi-Case Analysis with Within-Case Variation 79
• 1) Universe of Case 79
• 2) Case Selection 83
• 3) Resource Used 87
• CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY: MINIMAL SHARING 88
• 5.1 Alliance Loaning 89
• 5.1.1 UK (1954-57) 89
• 5.1.2 Italy (1955-59), Turkey (1959-62), Greece (1960-65) 103
• 5.2 Basing 123
• 5.2.1 South Korea (1958-90) 123
• 5.2.2 Japan (1954-72) 132
• 5.3 Logistical Co-operation 142
• 5.3.1 Denmark(1955-66), Norway(1956-70) 142
• CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY: SEMI-SHARING 153
• 6.1 Eroding US nuclear superiority and rising demand for European nuclear forces 153
• 6.1.1 Germany (1955-66), Italy (1959-66) 155
• 6.1.2 Turkey (1962-66), Netherlands(1960-66), Belgium (1963-66), Greece (1965-66) 171
• 6.2 Denuclearization policy and Nonphysical participation 188
• 6.2.1 Denmark (1966-90), Norway(1970-90) 188
• CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDY: NUCLEAR SHARING 193
• 7.1 Full scale Nuclear Sharing between the Nuclear states 193
• 7.1.1 UK (1958-90) 193
• 7.2 Establishment of NPG and Tiers of Alliances(1966-90) 200
• 7.2.1 Permanent (Germany, Italy) and Rotational Membership(Turkey, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece) 200
• CHAPTER 8. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 209
• CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 215
• 9.1 Political Implication: Ongoing debate on Nuclear Sharing 215
• 9.2 Conclusion 223
• Bibliography 228