This study examines North Korea's nuclear posture, focusing on tactical nuclear weapons, which have emerged as an existential force among North Korea's increasingly advanced nuclear and missile capabilities since Kim Jong Un took power. Under Kim Jong...
This study examines North Korea's nuclear posture, focusing on tactical nuclear weapons, which have emerged as an existential force among North Korea's increasingly advanced nuclear and missile capabilities since Kim Jong Un took power. Under Kim Jong un, North Korea has utilized tactical nuclear weapons to build an offensive nuclear posture and threaten the U.S.-ROK alliance and its neighbors. In addition to developing nuclear weapons, North Korea has continued to upgrade its offensive nuclear doctrine and tactical delivery systems to counter the conventional forces of the U.S.-ROK alliance through tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, and has maintained its nuclear posture as an operational force with a separate command and control system.
A number of previous studies on North Korea's nuclear posture have used Vipin Narang's 'Nuclear Posture Optimization Theory' as a central analysis framework to determine the level of North Korea's nuclear posture in stages or to identify changes in its nuclear posture. However, after the success of a tactical ballistic missile with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers that can carry a nuclear warhead, which came to the fore after 2022, it is necessary to revisit North Korea's nuclear posture and purpose. This study examines North Korea's nuclear posture through tactical nuclear weapons with military operations in mind through the three elements of military strategy: ends, ways, and means.
Chapter 1 introduces the background, purpose, scope, and methodology of the study, while Chapter 2 summarizes the meaning of tactical nuclear posture through theoretical considerations and presents an analytical framework for analyzing tactical nuclear posture. In Chapter 3, the study of North Korea's tactical nuclear weapons, doctrine, operational organization, and training in the Kim Jong un era confirmed that North Korea's tactical nuclear weapons are available for use, and in Chapter 4, the diagnosis of North Korea's tactical nuclear posture confirmed that North Korea is equipped with an asymmetric proliferation posture and achieves denial and retaliatory deterrence. Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing North Korea's tactical nuclear posture and suggests the need for the U.S.-ROK alliance to establish measures to raise the nuclear threshold to prevent North Korea from using tactical nuclear weapons in the future in order to deter the Republic of Korea through a deterrent/retaliatory nuclear posture.