After the Arduous March, North Korea made great strides in marketization as the rationing system collapsed. Women have been at the forefront of this marketization. Based on previous research that shows that education, occupation, and region do not hav...
After the Arduous March, North Korea made great strides in marketization as the rationing system collapsed. Women have been at the forefront of this marketization. Based on previous research that shows that education, occupation, and region do not have a significant effect on informal income, this study seeks to explain North Korean women’s market activities through social ties. Social networks were categorized into kinship∙friendship networks, economic networks, and community networks based on the classification of Jo and Gwon (2022). The research was conducted as a qualitative study through in-depth interviews with three North Korean defector women who were engaged in various private economic activities in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province.
The study revealed several findings. First, those with stronger social networks were more successful in market activities than those without. Women with stronger economic networks, both in quantity and quality, were more likely to utilize informal networks and had higher incomes. There was no positive association between kinship and friendship networks, community networks and successful market activities. Kinship and friendship networks were more likely to be utilized when they were financially backed so that can be converted into economic networks. Community networks were also not positively correlated with successful market activities, but rather the opposite. This is likely due to the fact that people with higher informal incomes are less likely to participate in formal organizational activities within their community networks.
Second, there was no relationship between the level of awareness of social networks and success in the marketplace. Interviewees commonly rated family background such as law enforcement officers (police, security officers, etc.) and money as very important factors. Social network was ranked as a second- or third-ranked factor. In addition to this, credit and reputation was also found to be important. Given that much of North Korea’s informal economy is illegal, this suggests that credit and reputation can lead to income disparities.
This study also examined the impact of sanctions on people’s informal market activities. As sanctions tightened in the mid-2010s and China began to implement them in earnest, North Korean authorities expanded the issuance of trade licenses to government agencies to raise foreign currency. These agencies then acted as a check on individual smugglers, while the Worker’s Party tightened its control over smuggling at the same time. This has had a negative impact on North Korean women who had been making a living as vendors in the border areas, with the loss of trade lines as social network, reduced income, and job losses. This suggests that the negative effects of sanctions may be passed on to ordinary people who are excluded from North Korea’s official systems, such as the rationing system, and who make their living through informal markets.
At the micro level, the social networks between actors and the markets and economic classes they create will eventually shape the macro-level market and affect the socio-economic structure of North Korea. In the medium to long term, it will also affect the political and social structure of a reunified Korea. Therefore, careful policy design is needed in the formulation and implementation of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation policies to promote North Korea’s marketization and opening, as well as sanctions against the North Korean authorities, to ensure that they do not benefit North Korea’s elites and harm the general population.